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The Causes of our Present Discontents

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Britain’s Naval Future
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Abstract

No student of history should expect the patterns of the past to be selfperpetuating, but the recorded insistence of the British on the maintenance of sea-power did correspond to certain obvious needs and opportunities. These were not diminished, but actually increased, by many of the trends that developed in the first three quarters of the twentieth century. A potential enemy had now emerged with much the same ideological incentive to the conquest of the British Isles as that once possessed by Philip II or the leaders of Revolutionary France. Growing British dependence on imports had sharpened the weapon, wielded in different forms by Napoleon, by Imperial Germany and by Hitler, of their denial. The identity and location of the enemy had reinforced the geographical advantage of the British Isles, that unsinkable aircraft carrier athwart the exits from the Baltic and the Norwegian Seas. On the face of it, there was more for the Navy to do than there had ever been. But there was also a very general acquiescence in its decline.

After the injuries of two of the severest wars that ever the Sea yet knew …

Samuel Pepys, 16751

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Notes

  1. Herbert Rosinski, in B. Mitchell Simpson III (ed.), The Development of Naval Though. (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 1977) p. vii.

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  2. Captain S. W. Roskill, The Strategy of Sea Powe. (Collins, 1962) p. 15.

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  3. Sir Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strateg. (1911; Conway Maritime Press, 1972) p. 90.

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  4. Quoted in James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, The Future of United States Naval Powe. (Indiana University Press, 1979) p. 41.

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  5. Captain A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon Histor. (1890; Boston: Little, Brown, 1940) p. 138.

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  6. Francis Bacon, Essay. (1625; Everyman edition, J. M. Dent, 1906) p. 96.

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  7. Ibid., p. 48.

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  8. Johan Jørgen Holst, in Power at Sea, II: Super Powers and Navies. Adelphi Paper No. 123 (IISS, 1976).

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  9. Michael K. MccGwire, ‘Advocacy of Seapower in an Internal Debate’, Admiral Gorshkov on Navies in War and Peac. (Arlington, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, 1974) p. 49.

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  10. Admiral Sir James Eberle, ‘Designing a Modern Navy: A Workshop Discussion’ in Adelphi Paper, op. cit.

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  11. Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report Fiscal Year 1979 (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2 February 1978) p. 92.

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  12. S. G. Gorshkov, Admiral of the Fleet, The Sea Power of the Stat. (Russian, 1976; English trans., Pergamon, 1979) pp. ix, 221 and 217.

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© 1983 James Cable

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Cable, J. (1983). The Causes of our Present Discontents. In: Britain’s Naval Future. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-06657-5_3

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