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Bank of England Control and Supervision

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British Banking, 1960–85
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Abstract

In each advanced industrialised country with a well-developed banking system, the central bank regulates both banking institutions and the flow of credit. The extent to which banks are supervised is greater than for any other sub-sector of the economy. It has gradually been recognised that, while competition and the operation of a free market generally may be desirable objectives, banking is somehow or other different. In most industries competition is encouraged because it is thought that, if the less efficient firms are forced out, the more efficient firms will survive and that this will lead in time to lower prices. But the same considerations do not apply to banks. It is believed that the social costs of failure outweigh any advantages that untramelled competition might bring. When a bank fails, it is not only its staff, its shareholders and its suppliers who suffer but also its depositors who risk losing their deposits. Moreover, only the banks can monetise debt and hence increase or decrease the credit base of the economy. This ability can clearly have macroeconomic implications of considerable importance.

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Notes and References

  1. Cooper (1984) offers a discussion which emphasises the first topic. Artis and Lewis (1981) and Bain (1979) discuss monetary control; Moran (1984) looks at the interaction of political and monetary developments since 1971, and its implications for monetary control.

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  2. Perhaps the best explanation of this is that the fund is meant to protect the small investor who may be misled, but not the large investor who is in a position to inform himself about the status of a deposit-taker. But, as noted above, banks do not make much information available about the customers to whom they lend, and so it is difficult to come to an informed view.

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  3. Keynes was referring to administered interest rates and not to the return on market instruments such as Treasury bills or gilt-edged securities. The Treasury bill rate was, in any case, bounded above by the bank rate and below by the minimum call money rate (Chapter 4).

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  4. Under the Bank of England Act, 1946, the Bank was empowered to give directions to any bank, after consultation with the Treasury. This power has never been used: instead ‘moral suasion’ has been applied by the Bank of England whose requests have usually been met in the letter if not in the spirit.

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  5. Moran (1984, Chapter 6) suggests it was concerned not only about the economic implications of this, but also over the risk that it could lose influence if the position of the clearing banks continued to decline.

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  6. Although the Committee of London Clearing Bankers (1977) argued that, because the authorities were in close touch with the markets, this was not a practical obstacle to monetary control. If this were the case it is not clear why the supplementary special deposits scheme (p. 58) would have been necessary.

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© 1986 the Estate of the late John Grady, and Martin Weale

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Grady, J., Weale, M. (1986). Bank of England Control and Supervision. In: British Banking, 1960–85. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07535-5_4

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