Abstract
Most of us are familiar with an experience that, baffling and discouraging as it is in the narrower context of expounding subjectivist doctrine, points to the existence of a deeper problem pertaining to the way in which economists understand their own role. The experience is this: having referred a friend or student to Shackle’s work, one is told after a time that, gratifying and exciting as the experience was, the reader found it hard to see what all this had to do with the daily concerns of economists.
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References
COLLINGWOOD, R. G. (1926) ‘Economics as a Philosophical Science’, Ethics, January.
HAYEK, F. A. (1955) The Counter-Revolution of Science ( The Free Press, Glencoe).
HICKS, J. R. (1976) ‘“Revolutions” in Economics’, in Sp. Latsis (ed.), Method and Appraisal in Economics (Cambridge University Press).
LACHMANN, L. M. (1977) Capital, Expectations and the Market Process ( Sheed & Ward, Kansas City).
MISES, L. VON (1949) Human Action ( Hodges, London).
SHACKLE, G. L. S. (1972) Epistemics and Economics (Cambridge University Press).
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© 1990 Stephen F. Frowen
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Lachmann, L.M. (1990). G. L. S. Shackle’s Place in the History of Subjectivist Thought. In: Frowen, S.F. (eds) Unknowledge and Choice in Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08097-7_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08097-7_1
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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