The Function of ‘Thrasymachus’ in Plato’s Text

Abstract

While the interpretation which concluded the last chapter contains important insights it needs to be supplemented with an analysis of the reasons why the order of Plato’s text is as it is. We need to know, in other words, why Thrasymachus’ views about how injustice relates to strength, happiness, and ruling in the second speech should be seen as grounding his earlier claim that in all political arrangements the determination of what counts as just in a society is tied to the advantage of the ruler. The link Thrasymachus sees between the essential injustice of the strong and the ability of rulers to rule needs explanation. How does a body of citizens remain more or less orderly within the bounds of particular policies and regulations when these represent and foster what is advantageous to rulers who, being ‘the strong’, must necessarily be unjust? If those who are strong and rulers are necessarily unjust, must those who are weak and subject be necessarily just? Granting that the driving motive of the strong is personal aggrandisement (pleonexia), must we postulate an opposite drive which keeps the just in a weak and subject position? Even so, how can people motivated by the ‘anti-pleonectic’ motive which confines them to the role of subjects not only allow themselves to be ruled by the powerful, but actually admire the driving force and tenacity which allows the latter’s injustice to get them to the top? If, on Thrasymachus’ view, admiration of strength is incompatible with admiration of justice, how is it nevertheless that some sort of ‘justice’ prevails in all poleis? Why is just conduct praised and unjust conduct reviled and punished?