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Abstract

As the textbooks tell us, when there is a complete set of perfectly competitive markets, including those for contingent commodities, it does not matter whether capital hires labour or labour hires capital. This indeterminacy denies any significance to the question of who actually organises production. Moreover, there is no room for diversity of contracts. For prices convey all relevant information and individuals can buy or sell as much of each contingent commodity as they please, taking prices as parametrically given.

I am indebted to Irma Adelman for valuable editorial comments but I retain full responsibility for any errors that remain.

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© 1989 International Economic Association

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Bell, C. (1989). The Choice of Tenancy Contract. In: Adelman, I., Lane, S. (eds) The Balance between Industry and Agriculture in Economic Development. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10268-6_11

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