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Law as Social Discourse II

Legal Discourse

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Legal Discourse

Part of the book series: Language, Discourse, Society ((LDS))

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Abstract

My concern in what follows is to frame, to outline and to exemplify, the general characteristics of a concept of legal discourse or, in the terms of the preceding chapter, a materialist rhetoric of law. Substantively my procedure, one which I will by and large assume to be self-explanatory, will be that of translating the topology of discourse already proposed, into a schematic account of legal discourse. There are, however, two preliminary points to be made, both of which may broadly be said to concern the scope and potential development of what is admittedly a nascent discipline.

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Notes and References

  1. The terminology is that of P. Q. Hirst, On Law and Ideology (London: Macmillan, 1979) pp. 106–22 and appendix 1.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, UK

    Peter Goodrich (Lecturer in Law)

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© 1987 Peter Goodrich

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Goodrich, P. (1987). Law as Social Discourse II. In: Legal Discourse. Language, Discourse, Society. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11283-8_7

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