Skip to main content

Pricing Issues in the Deregulation of Railroad Rates

  • Chapter
Economic Analysis of Regulated Markets

Abstract

This chapter is addressed to the central pricing issues involved in partial deregulation of railroad rates. It enunciates principles to guide regulatory oversight of the rate setting of unsubsidized railroads — principles that are consistent with economic analysis and that are essential for protection of the public interest. The paper is largely motivated by the Staggers Rail Act, recently passed by the Congress of the United States, which mandates both an end to periodic Federal subsidies to railroads and continuing regulatory oversight of railroad rates. Nevertheless, the principles espoused here are equally germane wherever partial deregulation of railroads, or other utilities, is at issue.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes and References

  1. As put by A. E. Kahn: ‘The only economic function of price is to influence behavior. This is a notion that traditional regulators have great difficulty accepting.’ Public Utilities Fortnightly, 101, 13–17 (19 January 1978). See any economics textbook for a detailed exposition — for example, W. J. Baumol and A. S. Blinder, Economics: Principles and Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1979 ) pp. 590–602.

    Google Scholar 

  2. See R. D. Willig, ‘Pareto-superior Nonlinear Outlay Schedules’, The Bell Journal of Economics, 9, 56–69 (Spring 1978 ).

    Google Scholar 

  3. See R. Braeutigam, (1979) ‘Optimal Pricing With Intermodal Competition’, American Economic Review, 69, 38–49.

    Google Scholar 

  4. W. J. Baumol, J. C. Panzar and R. D. Willig (1982) Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich).

    Google Scholar 

  5. W. J. Baumol, E. D. Bailey and R. D. Willig, ‘Weak Invisible Hand Theorems on the Sustainability of Prices in a Multiproduct Monopoly,’ American Economic Review, 67, 350–65 (June 1977).

    Google Scholar 

  6. See R. D. Willig, ‘Multiproduct Technology and Market Structure’, American Economic Review, 79, 346–51 (May 1979).

    Google Scholar 

  7. See Faulhaber, op. cit. and R. D. Willig (1980) ‘What Can Markets Control?’, in Perspectives on Postal Service Issues, R. Sherman (ed.) ( Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute ).

    Google Scholar 

  8. The classic treatment is A. C. Pigou (1928) A Study of Public Finance, ( 3rd edn) (London: Macmillan, 1947 ).

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Copyright information

© 1983 Jörg Finsinger

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Baumol, W.J., Willig, R.D. (1983). Pricing Issues in the Deregulation of Railroad Rates. In: Finsinger, J. (eds) Economic Analysis of Regulated Markets. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17099-9_2

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics