Abstract
If it could be said that one theorist was principally responsible for the computational theory of the mind, then this theorist would not be one of those whose work directly inspired computer-modelling in psychology (for example, Turing, Minsky, Simon, G. A. Miller) nor Fodor; who coined the phrase. It would be Noam Chomsky.1
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Notes and References
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© 1984 James Russell
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Russell, J. (1984). Meaning: the Thought of Language. In: Explaining Mental Life. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-17671-7_8
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