Abstract
Let us now consider the most formidable argument against God’s existence, the atheistic argument from suffering: ‘An omnipotent being would have the power to abolish suffering and a perfectly good being would abolish it; hence, no being is both omnipotent and perfectly good, i.e. a maximally great being does not exist.’ In view of M1, A and O, we have reason to believe that this argument is unsound. However, as we shall see, it is no simple matter to discover just what is wrong with it.
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Notes
J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) p. 174.
Flew and MacIntyre, New Essays in Philosophical Theology (London: SCM Press, 1955) pp. 149–51.
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© 1989 Clement Dore
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Dore, C. (1989). The Free-Will Defence, I. In: God, Suffering and Solipsism. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20047-4_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20047-4_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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