Abstract
Repeated game is a generic name for any model where players take simultaneous actions alternately and then a lottery, depending on those actions and the current state of nature, selects jointly a new state of nature, and a private signal and current payoff for each player. Players are interested in some long-term average of the payoffs.
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© 1989 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Mertens, JF. (1989). Repeated Games. In: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., Newman, P. (eds) Game Theory. The New Palgrave. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20181-5_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20181-5_24
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