Abstract
During NATO’s first ten years, the relationship between Britain and Germany was of particular significance. The conflict between the security objectives of these two major members of the Western Alliance played an important role in shaping the policies and institutional interactions within the Alliance as a whole.
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Notes
Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1953–1955, Stuttgart, Deusche Verlags Anstalt, 1966, Chs IX and X.
Graeme P. Auton and Wolfram Hanrieder, The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France and Britain, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1980, Ch. 9
Josef Joffe, ‘Germany and the Atlantic Alliance — The Politics of Dependence, 1961–1968’, in William C. Cromwell (ed.), Political Problems of Atlantic Partnership, Bruge, Council of Europe, 1969, pp. 321–454.
For an exposition on Adenauer’s concept of reunification through Politik der Stärke based on extensive archival research see Peter Siebenmorgen, Gezeitenwechsel, Bonn, Bouvier Verlag, 1990, Ch. III.
For a discussion of the tension between Politik der Stärke and reunification as foreign policy objectives, see Helga Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1983, pp. 73–7.
For an exposition of the more sanguine British assessments of the likelihood of a Soviet attack on Western Europe, as compared with the American views (which rated the risk of war more highly and thus demanded a higher level of defence preparations) see Public Records Office, London (henceforth PRO), DEFE 7/677, Sir O. Franks, no. 822 to Foreign Office, 3 August 1952. This reference is discussed in Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy 1945–1955, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 174ff.
Carl-Christoph Schweitzer, The Changing Western Analysis of the Soviet Threat, London, Pinter Publishers, 1990, pp. 119–35.
Angelika Volle, ‘Deutsch-Britische Beziehungen’, (PhD. Thesis, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität, Bonn, 1976), pp. 33–69
Royal Institute of International Affairs (ed.), Britain in Western Europe, London, Oxford University Press, 1956, pp. 7ff.
John W. Young, Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945–1951, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1984.
Jane M.O. Sharp, ‘After Reykjavik: arms control and the allies’, International Affairs, vol. 53, no. 2, Spring 1987, pp. 246–57.
Formally, the nuclear non-production pledge constitutes a treaty obligation only with respect to the other six partners of the WEU, although it was also a pre-condition for West German membership of NATO. In 1965 (and later in his memoirs) Adenauer reported an exchange with John Foster Dulles in which he (Adenauer) confirmed that the German non-production pledge had only been given rebus sic stantibus, (i.e., as long as the conditions and circumstances under which it was made were still prevalent). An eye-witness of the occasion, Graf von Kielmansegg, claimed at a Nuclear History Program Conference in July 1988 that this statement was not in fact made under the circumstances described in Adenauer’s memoirs, (that is that the commitment was made without an escape-clause). See Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1953–1955 p. 347. For commentary, see Dieter Mahncke, Nukleare Mitwirkung, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1972, pp. 6–8
Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons, New York, Columbia University Press, 1975, p. 10.
11. The NATO Military Committee’s report MC 48 constituted the implementation of the ‘New Look’ in the European theatre. This document is still closed, but see Christoph Bluth, ‘British-German Defence Relations 1950–80: A Survey’ in Karl Kaiser & John Roper (eds.), British-German Defence Co-operation: Partners within the Alliance, London, Jane’s Publishing, 1988, p. 9 for a discussion of its contents.
Gustav Schmidt, ‘Die politischen und sicherheitspolitischen Dimensionen der britischen Europa-Politik 1955/56–1963/64’, in Gustav Schmidt (ed.), Grossbritannien und Europa — Grossbritannien in Europa, Bochum: Universitätsbuchhandlung Dr. N. Brockmeyer, 1989, pp. 169–252, p. 199.
David N. Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas, Washington, Brookings Institution, 1983, pp. 42–6.
Collection of the Nuclear History Program, c/o Seminar für Politische Wissenschaft, Universität Bonn (henceforth NHP), GMA, Fü B III, Tgb. Nr. 332/60, Bonn 7 November 1960., states that Strauss made it a condition of his acceptance of the position of Minister of Defence that NATO be informed about the FRG’s inability to provide the planned force levels. In January 1956 the first 1000 volunteers were called up. By the end of 1956 the Bundeswehr had a strength of 67,000 men. For more details, see Franz-Joseph Strauss, Die Erinnerungen, Berlin, Siedler Verlag, 1989.
Although Strauss was a promoter of the Umrüstung of the Bundeswehr, he had the task of explaining to British leaders who visited Bonn from 6 to 8 May 1957 German objections to the British version of Umrüstung. Macmillan was very impressed by Strauss’s performance, but there was no change in the British position. See Wilhelm G. Grewe, Rückblenden, Frankfurt/Main: Ullstein Verlag, 1979, pp. 280ff.
After some difficult negotiations in the WEU Council which began on 14 February 1957 and were concluded on 18 March 1957, a compromise was achieved whereby Britain was allowed to reduce its troops by 13500 men. As a result of the refusal by the West German government to continue paying support costs in November 1957, the British sought to reduce their troops further on the basis of the ‘escape clause’. On 29 January the WEU Council authorised the reduction of another 8 500 men. For more detail, see Olaf Mager, Die Stationierung der britischen Rheinarmee, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1990, pp. 161–88.
John Garnett, ‘BAOR and NATO’, International Affairs vol. 46, no.4, October 1970, pp. 670–81
This concept has been developed in Martin S. Navias, ‘The Sandys White Paper of 1957 and the move to the British New Look: An analysis of nuclear weapons, conventional forces and strategic planning 1955–57’, unpublished PhD. Thesis, London, King’s College, 1989, Ch. 4.
Robert von Pagenhardt,‘Toward an Atlantic Defense Community: The First Effort 1960–1966’, PhD. Dissertation, Stanford University, Stanford, 1970, pp. 41ff.
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Bluth, C. (1992). Nuclear Weapons and British—German Relations. In: Heuser, B., O’Neill, R. (eds) Securing Peace in Europe, 1945–62. St Antony’s/Macmillan Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21810-3_8
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