Abstract
There is a general assumption in dealing with NATO nuclear weapons issues that American omnipotence prevailed throughout the Cold War. This assumption could easily arise from the more general belief that the United States created NATO as a sphere of influence tool, that NATO is merely an American pawn in the great Cold War chess match with the Soviet Union, and therefore this must hold true when dealing with the huge destructive potential of the West’s nuclear arsenal.1
“Die Politik ist die Lehre vom Möglichen.”.
Bismarck
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Notes
Thomas G. Paterson, On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979).
Thomas B. Cochrane et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume I: U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984) p. 15.
Mark Cioc, Pax Atomica: The Nuclear Defence Debate in West Germany During the Adenauer Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988)
Michael M. Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).
David N. Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington D.C.: the Brookings Institution, 1983).
Jane E. Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO’s Debate Over Strategy in the 1960s (Oxford: Macmillan Press, 1988).
Ivo H. Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theatre Nuclear Forces Since 1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991) pp. 108–109.
Sean M. Maloney, ‘Notfallplanung für Berlin: Vorläufer der Flexible Response 1958–1963,’ MilitärGeschichte, 7, 1 (1997), pp. 3–15.
David Alan Rosenberg, ‘Nuclear War Planning,’ in Michael Howard et al., The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).
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© 2001 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Maloney, S.M. (2001). Limiting American Nuclear Omnipotence in NATO: The Canadian Method, 1951–68. In: Schmidt, G. (eds) A History of NATO — The First Fifty Years. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-65573-1_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-65573-1_10
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