In this chapter I offer an account of only one special form of scepticism, the philosophical activity and view known as Pyrrhonism. Moreover, the account I give is of Pyrrhonism as represented by Sextus Empiricus in his work Outlines of Pyrrhonism (1933). Thus, my treatment of scepticism might seem to be doubly narrow. However, there are some reasons for not attempting a more inclusive picture. One is that such presentations can already be found in textbooks on Greek philosophy, in philosophical and other reference books, and in a number of monographs devoted solely to scepticism. But there is a more compelling reason as well.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2005 Springer
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
(2005). Pyrrho’s Scepticism According to Sextus Empiricus. In: Drengson, A. (eds) The Selected Works of Arne Naess. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-4519-6_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-4519-6_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-3727-6
Online ISBN: 978-1-4020-4519-6
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)