Abstract
As a preview of the subsequent analysis, imagine the following hypothetical situation. Assume that the five most recent Democratic presidents all lived at the same time (the present). All decide to seek their party’s presidential nomination in the first presidential primary in New Hampshire. You are a registered Democratic voter in New Hampshire and can vote for any candidate. If the candidate with the most votes wins in a plurality election, which candidate would you vote for? (Your judgment should be based not on the specific policies advocated by these presidents at the time they served, but instead on their competence to solve problems and their effectiveness as political leaders.)
This module is based in part on material contained in Brams [2], Brams [4], Brams and Fishburn [7], and Brams [5]. The latter two works contain detailed citations to the literature not given here. A booklength treatment and extension of results in this module, which was published as an Innovative Instructional Unit (Test Edition) by the American Political Science Association in 1978, can be found in Brams and Fishburn [6].
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References
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Brams, S.J. (1983). Comparison Voting. In: Brams, S.J., Lucas, W.F., Straffin, P.D. (eds) Political and Related Models. Modules in Applied Mathematics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-5430-0_3
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