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A Power Index for Individuals and Coalitions

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Probability in Social Science

Part of the book series: Mathematical Modeling ((MMO,volume 1a))

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Abstract

“Power is a major explanatory concept in the study of social choice. It is used in studies of relations among nations, of community decision making, of business behavior, and of small-group discussion. Partly because it conveys simultaneously overtones of the cynicism of Realpolitik, the glories of classical mechanics, the realism of elite sociology, and the comforts of anthropocentric theology, power provides a prime focus for disputation and exhortation in several social sciences.” (March [26, p.39].) A general exposition of the notion of power and of attempts to study and explain politics by analyzing power relationships is given by Dahl [11].

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio, 44074, USA

    Samuel Goldberg

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© 1983 Birkhäuser Boston, Inc.

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Goldberg, S. (1983). A Power Index for Individuals and Coalitions. In: Probability in Social Science. Mathematical Modeling, vol 1a. Birkhäuser Boston. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-5616-8_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-5616-8_1

  • Publisher Name: Birkhäuser Boston

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4612-5618-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4612-5616-8

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