Abstract
The consequences of many policies are complicated and difficult to foresee. In the Netherlands, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) assists the government with assessing the consequences of economic policy. In addition, CPB calculates the economic consequences of party programmes before each election for parliament. The main objective of this chapter is to provide a rationale for the latter practice.
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Swank, O.H. (2003). A Rationale for Assessments of Election Programmes. In: Graafland, J.J., Ros, A.P. (eds) Economic Assessment of Election Programmes. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0290-6_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0290-6_8
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