Abstract
Several parliamentary governance structures based upon a directly elected premier are analyzed through their effectivity functions.lt is shown that only collegial governance structures which provide a tight connection between the premier and her prefixed majority enjoy strong stability.
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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Vannucci, S. (2000). Effectivity Functions and Parliamentary Governance Structures. In: Patrone, F., García-Jurado, I., Tijs, S. (eds) Game Practice: Contributions from Applied Game Theory. Theory and Decision Library, vol 23. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4627-6_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4627-6_15
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-7092-5
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