Abstract
As financial markets have become increasingly international, the question of how competing institutions from different countries should be regulated has been raised repeatedly in many different contexts. I will attempt to address that question by analyzing three recent attempts at coordinating international regulation: (1) the risk-based capital standards developed by the regulators of the major industrial countries, (2) the financial integration initiatives of the European Community, and (3) the financial provisions of the U.S.-Canada free-trade agreement. I will then suggest a framework for cooperation that is, in my opinion, superior to the frameworks used in reaching those agreements.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Chase, Laub & Company. 1987. “Insulating Banks from Risks Run by Nonbank Affiliates.” Paper prepared for the American Bankers Association, Washington, D.C., October.
Chase, Laub & Company. 1988. “Benefits of the Dual Banking System.” Paper prepared for the American Bankers Association, Washington, D.C.
Samuel Chase & Company. 1983. “Corporate Separateness as a Tool of Bank Regulation.” Paper prepared for the American Bankers Association, Washington, D.C.
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Laub, P.M. (1991). International Regulation: How Much Cooperation is Needed?. In: England, C. (eds) Governing Banking’s Future: Markets vs. Regulation. Innovations in Financial Markets and Institutions. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-6714-7_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-6714-7_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4684-6716-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-4684-6714-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive