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Central Banks and Supervision with an Application to the EMU

  • Chapter
Challenges for Central Banking

Abstract

The aim of the present paper is to discuss the optimal financial architecture arrangements between the central bank and other agencies with the aim of preserving the stability and soundness of the financial and banking system. The ideas developed are applied to assess the financial architecture framework of the European Monetary Union.

This is an adapted version of the paper “Banking supervision in EMU” presented at the workshop “Challenges for Modern Central Banking”, Stockholm, January 2000. I am grateful to participants at this workshop and to Staffan Viotti for helpful comments.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica, CSIC, Barcelona, Spain

    Xavier Vives

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  1. Xavier Vives
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, USA

    Anthony M. Santomero

  2. Sveriges Riksbank, Sweden

    Staffan Viotti  & Anders Vredin  & 

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Vives, X. (2001). Central Banks and Supervision with an Application to the EMU. In: Santomero, A.M., Viotti, S., Vredin, A. (eds) Challenges for Central Banking. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3306-8_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3306-8_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-4891-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-3306-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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