Abstract
In this paper we analyze four national elections held in 1982, 1986, 1989 and 1994 in the Netherlands on the occurrence of the Condorcet paradox. In addition, we investigate these elections on the occurrence of three so-called majority-plurality paradoxes. The first paradox states that a party having a majority over another party may receive less seats. The second states that a Condorcet winner may not receive the largest number of seats and even may not receive a seat at all. The third says that the majority relation may be the reverse of the ranking of parties in terms of numbers of seats.
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Van Deemen, A.M.A., Vergunst, N.P. (1998). Empirical evidence of paradoxes of voting in Dutch elections. In: Hinich, M.J., Munger, M.C. (eds) Empirical Studies in Comparative Politics. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5127-7_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5127-7_11
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