Abstract
Externalities involve an economic environment where the consumption of resources by a user may create benefits or costs for another user. Two types of externalities are key features of railroad scheduling: conflict externalities and synergy externalities.
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Brewer, P.J. (2002). Externalities and Alternative Auction Rules for Access to Rail Networks: Some Evidence from the Laboratory. In: Zwick, R., Rapoport, A. (eds) Experimental Business Research. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5196-3_7
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