Abstract
This paper discusses the reliability of group judgment in the context of decentralized decision making systems (indirect voting). Composite majority functions are introduced and their properties studied along with coalition structures. The effects on collective competence of grouping individuals in a hierarchic system are examined. Formulas are developed to measure the loss (or gain) in judgmental competence.
The author is grateful for finacial support from the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences and for valuable comments from one of the editors.
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© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Berg, S. (2001). On Small Coalitions, Hierarchic Decision Making and Collective Competence. In: Holler, M.J., Owen, G. (eds) Power Indices and Coalition Formation. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-4893-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-6221-1
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