Abstract
What are the likely future roles of and requirements for theater nuclear weapons1 in light of changing strategic concepts and evolving political, economic, military, and technological factors? Which weapons characteristics should be developed to meet future requirements in light of current assessments of these future military requirements and likely constraints on the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, particularly in Europe?
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Notes and References
In this chapter we refer to theater nuclear weapons and theater nuclear forces interchangeably. We also use standard Western definitions of terms such as theater, tactical, and strategic, recognizing that there could be some ambiguities in the precise meaning of these terms.
General Bernard Rogers (retired), testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 100th Congress, 2nd sess., NATO Defense and the INF Treaty, pt. 2, February 1, 1988.
These recommendations include the development of a standoff air-to-ground missile, such as the Air Force’s tactical air-to-surface missile, the development of a follow-on to the Lance missile, enhancement of NATO’s dual-capable aircraft, and improvements in airbase survivability and in the dual-capable aircraft’s ability to penetrate Soviet air defenses. He also recommended the modernization of NATO’s 8-inch and 155-millimeter artillery. See Supreme Allied Commander John Galvin, testimony before the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 100th Congress, 2nd Sess., Department of Defense Appropriations for 1989, pt. 2, February 1, 1988.
For a useful history see David N. Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983).
For example, McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith, “Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance,” Foreign Affairs 60 (Spring 1982), pp. 753–68; and more recently.
McGeorge Bundy et al., “Back from the Brink,” Atlantic 258 (August 1986), pp. 35–41.
According to one source (using NATO data), the United States in 1985 “contributed nearly 75 per cent of the total $358 billion defense spending by alliance members. Britain contributed 6.2 per cent, France 5.4 per cent, and Germany 5.3 per cent. All the others together only add up to 7.7 per cent of the total.” See Timothy W. Stanley, Western and Eastern Economic Constraints on Defense: The Mutual Security Implications (Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council, 1986).
See the comments by General Rogers in “NATO Chief Says Alliance Under Strain,” Washington Times, September 11, 1986, p. 9. Also note Henry Kissinger’s recent proposal that “some of the American forces not in Europe would contribute more effectively to global defense if they were redeployed as strategic reserves based in the United States and able to be moved to world trouble spots,” in “Alliance Cure: Redeployment,” Washington Post, May 13, 1986, p. A19.
See Tim Carrington, “Budget Woes Force U.S., Europe to Collaborate on New Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, December 19, 1985, p. 32; David M. North, “NATO Members, Congress Boost Joint Weapons Development,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (June 23, 1986), pp. 26-27.
David M. Abshire, “NATO on the Move,” (Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council, 1985), The Alliance Papers, no. 6.
Quoted in Andrew J. Pierre et al., Nuclear Weapons in Europe (New York: New York University Press, 1984), pp. 98–100.
See Phillip A. Peterson and John G. Hines, “The Conventional Offensive in Soviet Theater Strategy,” Orbis 27 (Fall 1983), pp. 695–739.
Notra Trulock III, “Soviet Perspectives on Limited Nuclear Warfare,” in Albert Wohlstetter, Fred Hoffman, and David Yost, eds., Swords and Shields (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1987).
For an elaboration, see C. N. Donnelly, “The Soviet Operational Maneuver Group: A New Challenge for NATO,” International Defense Review 15 (1982), pp. 1177–86.
The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, January 1988).
Steven L. Canby, “The Conventional Defense of Europe: The Operational Limits of Emerging Technology” (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center, 1984), working paper no. 55.
A group of RAND experts studying nonnuclear weapons concluded that “non-nuclear weapons can be conceived to pursue military objectives now assigned to nuclear weapons, but they are likely to be less easily developed or deployed for targets which do not have distinctive signatures, are mobile, hard, or very large in area or numbers.... The destructive effects of [nonnuclear weapons] are likely to be less certain, permanent, or observable than those of nuclear weapons; and they are likely to be much more susceptible to countermeasures.” See Carl Builder et al., “The RAND Winter Study on Non-Nuclear Strategic Weapons: Executive Summary” (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1984), N-2227-AF, p. 6.
Bundy et al., “Back from the Brink,” pp. 35 and 40.
Ibid.
For example, Karl Kaiser, Georg Lever, Alois Mertes, and Franz-Joseph Shulze, “Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace,” Foreign Affairs 60 (Summer 1982), pp. 1157–70.
For example, High Frontier Europa, “A First Report on European Defense Initiative,” by the Von Hassell Policy Group, November 1985, (mimeographed); Stewart Menaul, “A European Defense Initiative,” Journal of Defense and Diplomacy (February 1986), pp. 18-21.
Galvin said that “The strategy is one that is capable of accomplishment with the resources that we have available provided that, over time, those resources continue to be modernized....” Hearings, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 100th Congress, 2nd Sess., Department of Defense Appropriations for 1989, pt. 2, February 1, 1988.
For a more detailed critical analysis of the NWDG, see Nuclear Concepts Working Group, “Evaluation of Long Term Planning for Nuclear Weapons Requirements,” July 1986 (for Defense Nuclear Agency).
DoD, Annual Report to the Congress FY 87, p. 227.
Army Secretary John Marsh and Army Chief of Staff General John Wickham, “The Posture of the U.S. Army for FY 87,” p. 34.
According to the former Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, Richard Wagner, “the Navy has not deployed a new non-strategic nuclear weapon since 1964.” See David C. Morrison, “The Navy’s Vanishing Nuclear Arsenal,” National Journal (September 13, 1986), pp. 2184-85.
See statement by General Rogers in Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY86 (Part 3: Unified Commands; Binary Chemicals), Hearings before Senate Armed Services Committee (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1985), p. 1452.
Continued development of standoff weapons will have to overcome an apparent reluctance on the part of some aviators to use these weapons. According to a recent press report, many “do not trust unmanned weapons and [they] want to preserve the tradition of foiling enemy defenses and dropping their bombs precisely.” See Washington Post, September 26, 1986, p. A34.
However, in 1987, Jurgen Todenhoefer, a member of the Bundestag and a CDU-CSU spokesman on defense, called for the creation of an integrated European nuclear force including U.S., French, and British weapons and managed by an executive group consisting of the United States and all European members of NATO, including the FRG. “Somewhat to his surprise,” according to an American who has followed these developments, “Todenhoefer received favorable reactions from a number of French and West German officials. [And], since the Spring of 1985, leaders of the Social Democratic Party have expressed a new interest in Franco-German nuclear cooperation.” See Samuel F. Wells, “The United States and European Defense Cooperation,” Survival (July–August 1985), p. 164.
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Laqueur, W., Sloss, L. (1990). Future Requirements for Theater Weapons in Western Europe. In: European Security in the 1990s. Issues in International Security. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-3576-2_4
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