Abstract
By recommending knowledge that is the result of philosophical discussion, Socrates ’ epistēmē is apt to lead a man not into a state of self-overcoming, namely of being carried out of himself, but rather into a state of self-knowledge , or of a certain self-cognizance . Self-knowledge and self-awareness can only be achieved in one way, that is, through Socrates’ dialectical method. This idea is aptly highlighted by Socrates’ exhortation to ‘care for virtue-self-soul’, whereby self seems to be equated with soul. Plato manages to demonstrate the tragic situation of Socrates’ present interlocutor who, being uncritically motivated by the Homeric moral lessons, performs particular actions undermined by his own worldview. In these circumstances, he fails to live with his words and deeds in harmonious consistency. Plato thus hints at the fact that the problem lies in a profound misconception about the notions of self and being, a misconception caused by a kind of intellectual confusion, for which Homeric education is primarily responsible. The disagreement between the two discussants sharing common ideas is thus due to the lack of knowledge with respect to the subject of epimeleia of young men , and the incorrect use of the respective terms and concepts as a result of their ideological confusion.
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Notes
- 1.
τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα τοῖς νέοις ὠφέλιμον εἶναι ἐπίστασθαι πολλαχῇ, 181e1–2.
- 2.
τὸ σῶμα βέλτιον ἴσχειν ἀνάγκη, 181e4–5.
- 3.
ἅμα προσήκει μάλιστ’ ἐλευθέρῳ, 182a1. Schmid (1992, 64) points out that the concept of freedom, as used here, has slightly aristocratic ideological overtones , manifested in military contexts: “There is a subtle depreciation of peacetime activities, together with undertones of the old aristocratic assumption that war is the only truly manly game […] Nicias’ conception of freedom will prove to be less rooted in citizenship than it is in being independent of others”. Cf. also Emlyn-Jones (1996, 65) for the same view. Cf. also 191, n. 17 of Schmid’s study, according to which freedom is identified with self-sufficiency: “Freedom […] includes maximum self-sufficiency or the absence of dependence on others’ goodwill. For one who wishes to live the good life , this implies wealth and power over others”. Furthermore, at 65 the same scholar says: “Freedom and virtuosity of war, it appears, are practically equivalent, both serving the welfare of the individual”. Lastly at 66, he concludes that for Nicias hoplomachia seems to prepare each man to prevent himself from being harmed rather than to help him serve his city or his friends in danger. On Plato’s conception of freedom (eleutheria) and its connection with temperance and justice, see Stalley (1998) and Hansen (2010).
- 4.
πανταχῇ ἂν ταύτῃ πλεονεκτοῖ, 182b4.
- 5.
ἐπὶ πᾶν ἂν τὸ περὶ τὰς στρατηγίας, 182c1.
- 6.
πολλοῦ ἄξια ἀνδρὶ μαθεῖν τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεῦσαι.
- 7.
Passaloglou (1983, 48) disagrees with Friedländer’s view in (1964, 39) that the two terms, ‘bolder’ (tharraleōteros) and ‘more courageous’ (andreioteros), are used by Nicias synonymously. On the contrary, she holds that the general, who will distinguish these two notions at 197a–b, is not likely to use them indiscriminately here (cf. also Emlyn-Jones 1996, 66; Hobbs 2000, 79). Closer to Friedländer’s view of synonymity is Schmid (1992, 65), who notes: “Nicias does not seem to distinguish courage or bravery from boldness, and that he says that science makes one braver ‘than himself’. Thus it seems that art can alter nature”. Nevertheless, although I agree with the above view shared by both scholars, I have strong reservations about the latter’s observation, since it entails the equation of self (see hautou) with nature (phusis). Nicias does not refer to nature, but Laches, as shall be seen, does. Nicias’ treatment of ‘self’ depends entirely on the aristocratic notion of aretē. But how is this dependency defended? The course of my analysis will hopefully make that clear.
- 8.
φιλοτιμηθείς, 182b7. Schmid (1992, 65) observes that Nicias’ address is governed by the same principle that was central to Lysimachus: what matters in life is victory in the city’s contests, together with individual honor and distinction. No small part of his praise of fighting in armor focuses on the role it plays in promoting an honor-loving life or ambition (philotimia), as Schmid calls it, which can be conceived as a form of courage, specifically the boldness to seek high honors or noble things. See also 66: “[…] like Lysimachus, too, Nicias seems to care less about the common good than about his own bestness or superiority, and seems not to distinguish bestness from the reputation or appearance of it”.
- 9.
For a further analysis of this, see Stefou (2013, 283).
- 10.
Schmid (1992, 67) notes that Nicias seems to be dangerously close to the view that justice and moderation are not necessary to the noble life, comprising the life of manly virtue. This view is even further strengthened if one takes into account that, as Adkins (1960, 61) has shown, the heroic system of values, as depicted in the Homeric poems, excuses unjust (adikos) behavior, since the ‘quieter’ values, expressed by pinutos, saophrōn, dikaios and similar words, are less valued.
- 11.
The chiastic word order (δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἐμοί, 181d8–e1, and ἐμοὶ μὲν […] δοκεῖ τε, 182d2–3), which are used for the purpose of framing the main part of Nicias’ speech, has been the subject of considerable debate among scholars. Passaloglou (1983, 39, n. 92) argues against Nagel’s view in (1962, 126), namely that the chiasmus characterizes the hesitant Nicias in contrast to the self-confident Laches. Schmid (1992, 64) thinks that this maybe simply a sly way of Nicias’ forestalling a possible criticism. However, to my mind Plato’s aim is deeper: the circular design of Nicias’ speech indicates how he is trapped in a vicious cycle revealing his dependence on the opinion of the many as well as on his uncritical acceptance of it. Clearly, it reflects the final refutation of Nicias: opinion (doxa) is not a safe guide to attaining the good. This is achieved by the pursuit of knowledge only.
- 12.
πολυμαθίη νόον ἔχειν οὐ διδάσκειν, 22[12]Β40[16] DK. Kahn (1979, 108), comments: “Heraclitus does not say that the polymathiē is a waste of time, only that it is not enough: that the mere accumulation of information will not yield understanding, unless it is accompanied by some fundamental insight”. In this light, it seems that Heraclitus interprets the term noos as the fruit of exercise in critical thinking.
- 13.
See Hp. Mi. 368b.
- 14.
πλεονεκτοῖεν τῶν ἄλλων περὶ τὸν πόλεμον, 183a1–2. The term spoudaios in connection with seriousness and the good (agathon), and its being—interchangeably—used in place of agathos are often found in Plato: see e.g. Alc. I 110e, 111a; Euthd. 278c3, 300e1, 307a4; R. 519d7, 603c2. In reworking the concept of agathon, Plato will in turn induce the revision of all concepts associated with it.
- 15.
Cf. also 183a4: σπουδάζουσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις.
- 16.
οὐδεὶς πώποτ’ εὐδόκιμος γέγονεν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀνὴρ τῶν τὰ ὁπλιτικὰ ἐπιτηδευσάντων, 183c3–5.
- 17.
καταγέλαστος, 184c3. Cf. ἦν δὲ γέλως, 184a2; οὐκέτι οἷοί τ’ ἦσαν τὸν γέλωτα κατέχειν, 184a5–6; Zuckert (2009, 255–256).
- 18.
In contrast with my analysis, Schmid (1992, 69–70) observes that Nicias uses an eloquent and flattering speech in order to appeal to the bold desire for high honor, whereas, on the other side, Laches’ more modest, harsh and condemnatory speech relates to the fear of the opinion of the many, i.e. shame (aidōs). According to him, Laches reminds the fatherly figures (viz. Lysimachus and Melesias) of the danger of dishonor, namely of the painful self-awareness of being seen by others in a way that reveals one to be less than one wanted to be: “Such shame is the shame of never becoming a man among men, or even worse, of having proved oneself to be less than a man, having had one’s public being destroyed” (cf. Benardete 2000, 262). Nevertheless, although I agree with Schmid’s analysis on the importance of the feeling of shame for the aristocratic man, I do stand apart from him on a very crucial point: the opinion of the many is the main motivating factor for both of Socrates’ interlocutors.
- 19.
Cf. 182c6, where Nicias used the terms ‘bold’ (tharraleos) and ‘courageous’ (andreios) without making any semantic distinction between them.
- 20.
Schmid (1992, 69) points out that Laches believes that andreia is a matter of one’s nature or character or individual will, not a matter of armor, superior knowledge or skill.
- 21.
Cf. the term pephukos in 192c1, which strengthens my view.
- 22.
phthonos + gelōs, epiphthonos 184c1. Cf. Prt. 316d; Passaloglou (1983, 44, n. 118).
- 23.
Here andreia is clearly identified with aretē. Stokes (1986, 45–48) holds that the term andreios is used by Laches in the sense of ‘skilled in fighting’, whereas deilos in the sense of ‘unskilled or inadequate at fighting’. Thus, the identification of andreia with aretē (at 49) means that “goodness is, pretty clearly, the same quality here as that in virtue of which a man is andreios, and not deilos: efficiency in war”. Meanwhile, Emlyn-Jones (1996, 72) observes that Laches uses here the word aretē in its restricted sense of ‘bravery in battle’, and cites a passage 5.9.9 from Thucydides. Nevertheless, these observations overlook, in my opinion, the fact that throughout the conversation for all Socrates’ interlocutors, and especially here for Laches, aretē is identical with andreia, while at the same time we must not forget that andreia is, for Laches, intertwined with the ‘nature’ (phusis) of man (cf. Friedländer 1964, 39). Moreover, cf. Hobbs (2000, 83), who notes that the most natural reading of 184c2 is that andreia and aretē are being used interchangeably in a casual and unreflective way. I quote here her observations (at 83) clarifying not only Laches’, but also, in my opinion, all Socrates’ fellow discussants’ intellectual confusions: “It is this very unreflectiveness which is revealing: Laches’ unconscious ambivalence in his treatment of the relation between andreia and arete again exposes a profound ambivalence in conventional moral thought. On the one hand, most Greeks were happy to regard andreia as just one of the cardinal virtues , along with justice, temperance, wisdom and piety; such a view follows naturally if andreia is seen principally as courage. On the other hand, if andreia is conceived both more generally and more specifically as manliness, the attributes required to be a ‘real man’, then what need does a man have of any other quality in order to count as fully virtuous? We have only to consider the Homeric poems where, in the absence of the term andreia, arete is frequently employed in this sense” (Cf. de Romilly 1980, 308; Benardete 2000, 261 and 274, n. 10; Rabieh 2006, 26). Accordingly, these observations diminish the importance of Socrates’ contribution to the widening of aretē as well as its partition.
- 24.
Schmid (1992, 70), notes: “Shame in this sense is the specifically restrictive potentiality of pride”. According to him, Laches’ sense of shame is the link between his courage on the one hand and his moderation and justice on the other. Laches’ stance reveals his being bound to the public good (cf. Blitz 1975, 195–196), and he seems more concerned with avoiding disgrace or defeat than with attaining glory or victory. Schmid extends his view (at 70–71) by regarding Nicias’ and Laches’ speeches as a confrontation between Athenian and Spartan values respectively. On the one hand, Laches repudiates the claim that art can alter human nature; he places great emphasis on nature, the actual practice of war and the modest aversion to disgrace. On the other hand, Nicias represents the Athenian emphasis on art, learning, and the daring appetite for the noble (cf. Emlyn-Jones 1996, 72; Benardete 2000, 259). A wide range of scholars conclude with the view that the opposition between Laches and Nicias is expressed in yet another way: Dieterle (1966, 36 and n. 3), describes Nicias as the mirror of the new Athenian spirit influenced by the sophists, and Laches as the representative of the archaic patriarchal spirit (cf. de Laguna 1934, 175). For a similar view, cf. Umphrey (1976, 5), Schmid (1992, 71), Emlyn-Jones (1996, 64 and 66; 1999, 127), Michelini (2000, 74) (with the exception of Nagel (1962, 127), who holds the opposite view, namely that it is Laches’ speech that contains sophistic elements: see Passaloglou (1983, 47)). Nevertheless, there cannot be found in Nicias’ speech, on my interpretation, any verbal element showing a clear link between Nicias and the contemporary sophists, despite the fact that (a) we saw earlier that Nicias’ argumentation had much in common with Callicles’ view in the Gorgias, and (b) Nicias in 197d, we are told, has been taught by Damon, an associate of Prodicus. Indeed, the very fact that he makes no semantic distinction between the terms andreios and tharraleos, as Socrates will do in due course, does reveal what seems at this stage to be his primary concern, namely, the formulation of the most complete and convincing arguments in favor of the aristocratic behavior of unconditional ruling. Moreover, the idea on which Schmid bases his view, i.e. that Laches is concerned with avoiding disgrace, does not necessarily entail modest or just behavior. Such a conclusion would be risky enough to be credited to an exponent of aristocratic ideology, especially as it is not based on the text. On the contrary, in my opinion, Plato in this passage highlights the notion of ‘self-inferiority’ , namely the inability to act in accordance with the aristocratic, competitive standards of excellence.
- 25.
αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων (Il. 6.208, 11.784).
- 26.
This analysis stands in contrast to the conclusion reached by O’Brien (1963, 146). He holds that Plato’s Laches dramatizes two aspects of courage by contrasting a thoughtful soldier (Nicias) with an active one (Laches). Thus, on the one hand, Nicias represents logos in human affairs, i.e. what Pericles regards as a possible impediment to action (Th. 2.40.3), whereas Laches, on the other, represents ergon. O’Brien concludes (at 147) that Socrates is the truly ‘musical’ man, in the sense in which Laches uses the word (188d): his deeds are in harmony with his words (for similar views cf. Hoerber 1968, 100; Tessitore 1994, 122 and 127). Although I agree with O’Brien’s final position, I believe that the contrast between word (logos-Nicias) and deed (ergon-Laches), as presented and highlighted, can be quite misleading, particularly if one overlooks the main motivating factor for Socrates’ interlocutors. Nicias and Laches pursue a particular outcome (ergon), i.e. success (cf. Hobbs 2000, 81). Nicias chooses ‘appearing’ (phainesthai) in order to achieve his final purpose, i.e. absolute superiority: self-overcoming through ‘appearing’ is a function of overcoming the factor of the opinion of the many, i.e. in this context the opinion of other aristocrats. In effect, however, his success in the struggle for supremacy will lead to the approbation of the multitude (of aristocrats as well as of all those sharing the same aristocratic paideia), whereas his failure will lead to its disapprobation. Laches stands on the opposite side: self-restricting through ‘being’ (einai) is a function of blindly overestimating the factor of the opinion of the many: success in this kind of struggle will lead to the disapprobation of the multitude (of aristocrats as well as of all those sharing the same aristocratic paideia), and the failure to its approbation. Thus, a final conclusion is reached: Nicias ignores the dareful (tharraleon) while Laches ignores the dreadful (deinon), and their choices are not rational. Nevertheless, the problem, at its core, arises due to an erroneous aim set as their primary worry. Plato manages to stress the confusion created by those standards of conduct based on Homeric ethics. However, where does this confusion come from? Or, in other words, what causes the inability to prove consistency of words and deeds? This kind of inability is due to the inability to acquire self-knowledge. Subsequently, the inability to acquire self-knowledge stems from a fallacious incentive for human action, i.e. the opinion of the many. The knowledge suggested by Socrates (and the necessity of philosophical discussion) leads to the consistency of words and deeds. This kind of consistency is the result of self-knowledge—self being identified with soul—, of the knowledge of the dareful and the dreadful, and, generally, of the knowledge of good and evil.
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Stefou, K. (2018). Nicias’ and Laches’ Speeches on ‘Fighting in Armor’ (Hoplomachia) (181d8–184d4). In: Socrates on the Life of Philosophical Inquiry. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04188-5_2
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