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What Research Reveals: Deficits of Electoral Accountability

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Smarter Ballots

Part of the book series: Elections, Voting, Technology ((EVT))

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Abstract

This chapter explains how, since the end of the Cold War, academic research has advocated increasing levels of skepticism about the empowerment of voters through the electoral accountability of governments. This recommendation is visible from three different angles on the scholarly literature: a review of empirical studies covering topics such as economic performance and governmental corruption; a reconsideration of the thought of V. O. Key, often misread as having vindicated the idea of electoral accountability; and a survey of research on a wide variety of conditions and institutions that hinder accountability, yielding a “top ten” list of reasons to embrace electoral skepticism.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Quotations at Hamilton et al. (2005, 286, 311). For “the electoral connection”: Mayhew (1974). For “retrospective voting”: Fiorina (1981).

  2. 2.

    Quotation at VandeHei and Fletcher (2005). For the judgment of public-opinion scholars that not enough of Perot’s voters would have supported Bush to secure his re-election, even if Perot had not been on the ballot: Norpoth (2001, 425n).

  3. 3.

    On two concepts of accountability: Bovens (2005) and Mansbridge (2014).

  4. 4.

    On post-2008 elections: LeDuc and Pammett (2013). This study analyzes 27 elections between 2008 and 2011, 24 of which were the first to occur after the crisis; I excluded two of these from my count where the incumbent was a “caretaker” government unconnected to pre-2008 policies.

  5. 5.

    This conceptual scheme and the accompanying Fig. 2.1 are adapted from Maloy (2014, 14–15).

  6. 6.

    Wattenberg (1991, 92–93).

  7. 7.

    Quotations at De Vries and Solaz (2017, 392, 393). On the gap between voters’ intentions and effective outcomes: Crisp et al. (2014). On the many conditions required for successfully punishing corruption through voting: De Vries and Solaz (2017, 398–403).

  8. 8.

    On the tendency for vote-share studies to draw less skeptical conclusions than survival-in-office studies: Healy and Malhotra (2013, 297n) and Maloy (2014, 16–17, 24). For skeptical results based on a global dataset of survival in office: Maravall (2010). On biases in economic perceptions: Healy and Malhotra (2013, 292–93). On the problem of economic responsibility under conditions of globalization: Duch and Stevenson (2008) and Hellwig et al. (2008).

  9. 9.

    Canes-Wrone (2015).

  10. 10.

    On the intellectual history of electoral accountability: Manin (1997) and Maloy (2008).

  11. 11.

    Quotation at Manin et al. (1999b, 24). On economic voting: Cheibub and Przeworski (1999). On Latin American policy switches: Stokes (1999). On sanction vs. selection: Fearon (1999, esp. 77–81). On political manipulation: Maravall (1999). For the most optimistic contribution to this volume: Stimson (1999).

  12. 12.

    Anderson (2007) and Duch and Stevenson (2008).

  13. 13.

    Achen and Bartels (2016, 118–28).

  14. 14.

    Quotations (respectively) at Bartels (2016, 39) and Przeworski (2018, 4).

  15. 15.

    Lamis (2008).

  16. 16.

    Key (1966, 2–3).

  17. 17.

    On the influence of The Responsible Electorate down to the present: Healy and Malhotra (2013, 286).

  18. 18.

    Quotations at Key (1966, viii, 7, 10). For skeptics’ citations of Key as an optimist: Manin et al. (1999a, 42), Fearon (1999, 56), Maravall (1999, 155), Anderson (2007, 273), and Achen and Bartels (2016, 92).

  19. 19.

    Quotations at Key (1961a, 557; 1961b, 487, 489, 494).

  20. 20.

    Quotation at Key (1961b, 490).

  21. 21.

    For a rebuttal to Key’s optimistic account of 1936: Achen and Bartels (2016, 178–96).

  22. 22.

    The rest of this section and the accompanying Fig. 2.2 are revised (and condensed) versions of material in Maloy (2015, 80–86).

  23. 23.

    Quotation at Prior (2007, 134). On voter ignorance in general: Hardin (2000). On rich vs. poor media environments: Arnold (2004, 251–53), Snyder and Stromberg (2010). On right-wing echo chambers: Jamieson and Cappella (2008).

  24. 24.

    Quotation at Achen and Bartels (2016, 128). On partisan misperception and bias: Claassen and Highton (2006) and Healy and Malhotra (2013, 292–93). On weak memory and recency bias: Jacobs and Shapiro (2000, 43–44) and Huber et al. (2012).

  25. 25.

    For the original “clarity of responsibility” study: Powell and Whitten (1993). On lack of clarity in the American federal system: Brown (2010). On lack of clarity in Latin America: Gelineau and Remmer (2005) and Alcaniz and Hellwig (2011). For Paine’s association of democracy with institutional simplicity: Paine (2003, 7–9, 248–51, 294–301).

  26. 26.

    On China: Tsai (2007, 254–55). On Brazil: Pereira et al. (2009).

  27. 27.

    On Peru: McMillan and Zoido (2004).

  28. 28.

    On behind-the-scenes policy-making: Fellowes and Wolf (2004). On policy switches in the 1990s: Ferguson 1995. On campaign donations in the 2012 election: Ferguson et al. (2013). On American states’ campaign-funding rules: Hogan (2004) and Hamm and Hogan (2008).

  29. 29.

    On weak parties in the USA: Fiorina (1981, 202–210). On problems with clarity of responsibility and party unity around the world: Powell (2000, Chapter 3) and Anderson (2007, 281–86).

  30. 30.

    On hyper-partisan primaries in the USA: Jacobs and Shapiro (2000, 32–36), Lee et al. (2004), and Masket and Noel (2012). On partisan districting: Thompson (2004, 52–55). On “cartel parties” outside the USA: Katz and Mair (2009).

  31. 31.

    On electoral fraud in the USA, yesterday and today: Argersinger (1985) and Campbell (2005). On Russia and Ukraine: Myagkov et al. (2009). On various other countries: Lehoucq (2003, 237–45). On independent and professional administrative bodies: Hartlyn et al. (2008), Kropf and Kimball (2012), and Norris (2017).

  32. 32.

    For average error rates: Stewart (2010, 372). On the superiority of optical-scan systems: Saltman (2006, 189). On the vulnerability of touch-screen systems to fraud: Herrnson et al. (2008, 111–12) and Jones and Simons (2012, 153–54, 331). On the lack of a paper trail: Stewart (2010, 359, 364, 367–68).

  33. 33.

    For the conclusion that PR and SSP are equally limited on accountability: Franklin et al. (2014, 395–96). For mixed findings about congruence (depending on how it is defined) in single-seat vs. multi-seat systems: Golder and Ferland (2018).

  34. 34.

    Mansbridge (2009, 2014).

  35. 35.

    McCormick (2006), Maloy (2008, 187–189), and Chwalisz (2015, 38–55).

  36. 36.

    Quotations at Key (1961b, 487; 1964, 544). For bluntness: Manin et al. (1999a, 45–46, 50–51), O’Donnell (2003, 48–49), and Przeworski (2018, 97).

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    J. S. Maloy

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Maloy, J.S. (2019). What Research Reveals: Deficits of Electoral Accountability. In: Smarter Ballots. Elections, Voting, Technology. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13031-2_2

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