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Introduction and Method

Introduction into the Book and Method

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The Juridical Act

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 129))

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Abstract

It is generally accepted that within Western legal systems there needs to be a possibility to perform an act which has the purpose of changing the set of legal facts. Not only can an act have that purpose, but also, because it has that purpose, the act can change the set of legal facts. Some examples of this type of act are: the possibility for an agent to intentionally enter into a contract, to make a statutory law, to transfer ownership of his property, to grant a licence, or to start a limited liability company. It is this group of acts that are the focus of this work.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The western legal tradition includes but is not limited to continental Europe, the Nordic countries, Latin-America and the Anglo-American legal systems.

  2. 2.

    See e.g.: Flume (1979), pp. 1–363; von Savigny (1840), pp. 1–7, 98–306.

  3. 3.

    See e.g. Lokin (2004), pp. 63–83.

  4. 4.

    Title 3.2 Dutch Civil Code and art. 1:3 of the General Administrative Law Act.

  5. 5.

    Schmidt (2012).

  6. 6.

    Halpin (1996), pp. 129–152.

  7. 7.

    See a.o.: Hart (1983), pp. 88–120, 265–277.

  8. 8.

    I will use single quotation marks (‘…’) for terms, both to denote that it is a term and when an unusual term is used, for concepts and quotes and I will use, what I call, square quotation marks (˹…˺) for facts.

  9. 9.

    DCFR 2009 art II. – 1:101.

  10. 10.

    Schmidt (2012).

  11. 11.

    Obviously this is a personal choice, the connotations people have with words are highly colored by their use and experience of the words in combination with their legal culture. However, a choice had to be made, and therefore it became ‘the juridical act’ for the reasons stated.

  12. 12.

    I will argue this point more extensively later, in Chap. 4.

  13. 13.

    Both in practice and in theory, concepts are used in many ways. These are just examples.

  14. 14.

    The term ‘the world of law’ will be explained more fully later. For now I will give Hage’s definition of the world of law: ‘the world of law in a broad sense consists out of everything the existence of which is based on the application of legal rules. This includes real estate, mayors, cars, but also certain kinds of events, acts, states of affairs and rules.’ See: Hage (2011).

  15. 15.

    There also exist forms of legal science that are not concerned with the world of law as their object, but they have a different object, such as e.g. legal psychology and legal sociology.

  16. 16.

    Kelsen (1960) (2009), pp. 193–220.

  17. 17.

    The fact that a concept can be used with different ‘meanings’ dependent on what its function is can be compared to Wittgenstein’s later ideas concerning how the meaning is dependent on ‘grammatic rules’. For an overview of Wittgenstein and his importance for legal concepts and meaning see: Fleuren (2015).

  18. 18.

    This distinction comes from the work of Frändberg on concepts: Frändberg (2009).

  19. 19.

    Hohfeld (1913); in his earliest work he still used the term ‘right’.

  20. 20.

    Hohfeld (1913).

  21. 21.

    Hohfeld does not make a distinction between system-dependent and system-independent concepts.

  22. 22.

    Comparable to murder.

  23. 23.

    211 StGB: (1) Der Mörder wird mit lebenslanger Freiheitsstrafe bestraft. (2) Mörder ist, wer aus Mordlust, zur Befriedigung des Geschlechtstriebs, aus Habgier oder sonst aus niedrigen Beweggründen, heimtückisch oder grausam oder mit gemeingefährlichen Mitteln oder um eine andere Straftat zu ermöglichen oder zu verdecken, einen Menschen tötet. <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__211.html> (last checked 20-08-2018).

  24. 24.

    Movable property.

  25. 25.

    E.g. in the Law of Property Act 1925, 87(3): Such declaration shall not affect the priority of the mortgage or his right to retain possession of the documents, nor affect his title to or right over any fixtures or chattels personal comprised in the mortgage. <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/15-16/20> (last checked 20-08-2018).

  26. 26.

    Comparable to the concept ‘property’.

  27. 27.

    Art 544 Code Civil: ‘La propriété est le droit de jouir et disposer des choses de la manière la plus absolue pourvu qu’on n’en fasse pas un usage prohibé par la loi ou les règlements’.

  28. 28.

    Literal translation by the author: administrative penalty. It is a pecuniary sanction that can be executed by a public body such as a.o. the local government. It is therefore a sanction that is not part of the domain of criminal law.

  29. 29.

    Hart (1961) (2012), pp. 94–99.

  30. 30.

    More on the value in Sect. 1.7 and Chap. 4.

  31. 31.

    Most examples will be derived from Dutch law.

  32. 32.

    Studiefinanciëring, I have translated this as student grants. DUO (the institution that grants these) uses ‘student finances’, but I believe ‘students grants’ is a better translation. <https://duo.nl/particulieren/international-student/student-finance/how-does-it-work.asp> (last checked 20-08-2018).

  33. 33.

    See a.o.: Daniels (2013); Rawls (1971), pp. 17–22, 46–53.

  34. 34.

    Hage (2011), in order to see how differences that are close to this distinction can create differences in legal discourse see Smith (2014).

  35. 35.

    Hage (2011).

  36. 36.

    Dworkin (1986), pp. 52, 90; Asser-Scholten (algemeen deel) (1974), pp. 1–129; van Dunné (1971).

  37. 37.

    Smith (2014).

  38. 38.

    Hage (2011).

  39. 39.

    These ‘square’ quotation marks are used to denote facts.

  40. 40.

    For this work, I accept that there is such a thing as a physical world existing independently of human influence and I do not entertain any other ontological notions.

  41. 41.

    Hage (2011).

  42. 42.

    Hart (1961) (2012); MacCormick and Weinberger (1986).

  43. 43.

    MacCormick and Weinberger (1986), pp. 1–30. A good introduction to institutional theories of law can be found in: Hage (1998).

  44. 44.

    Anscombe (1958); Searle (1969), pp. 33–37, and in later work from Searle: Searle (1996), pp. 31–57; Searle (2010), pp. 42–123.

  45. 45.

    In all future cases I will use the term ‘reality’ instead of ‘world’. The only exception is the expression ‘world of law’, since this is an existing term. There is no difference between ‘reality’ and ‘world’ in this sense; the terms can be used interchangeably.

  46. 46.

    For more on social reality see e.g. Searle (1996, 2010), Tuomela (2002) and Gilbert (1992).

  47. 47.

    Facts can be denoted by a descriptive sentence. For example, the descriptive sentence: the dog is barking, describes a certain state of affairs in the world. If that state of affairs exists, the sentence is true, then it is a fact. If the state of affairs does not exist (the dog is not barking but silent), the sentence is false, and it is a non-fact. Terms in sentences (such as ‘dog’) can denote an object, I use the term ‘object’ for anything that is an entity; that exists by itself, an object however does not need to be material.

  48. 48.

    Anscombe (1958).

  49. 49.

    With physical properties I mean all properties that are part of a physical reality that exists independent from human acceptance, they can usually be determined through sensory perception.

  50. 50.

    Tuomela (2002), pp. 122–155.

  51. 51.

    I will hereafter not extensively argue and explain these different theories, since that it outside the scope of this work. For a good overview see: Epstein (2018).

  52. 52.

    Hart (1961) (2012), pp. 100–110.

  53. 53.

    For such a study that focuses on Hart’s theory see: Epstein (2015), pp. 88–100.

  54. 54.

    I personally feel that this is what Hart was aiming at, he seems to put an emphasis on the recognition of certain practices and rules (by the officials of a system): Hart (1961) (2012), pp. 100–110.

  55. 55.

    Moreover, objects themselves can be social (or institutional). Rules for example are objects and they can be social in nature.

  56. 56.

    For more on labels and statuses see e.g. Searle (1996), pp. 13–23, 31–126; Searle (2010), pp. 58–60.

  57. 57.

    In the case of MacCormick, he explicitly means institutive, consequential and terminative rules. MacCormick and Weinberger (1986), pp. 53–54. I will hereafter adapt his taxonomy of rules in Sect. 3.2.

  58. 58.

    Not only is the existence of the rule an institutional fact, the rule itself is an institutional object.

  59. 59.

    This idea of law as a system that contains rules and is ultimately based on social recognition and acceptance stems from Hart’s work. Hart described the law as ultimately resting on the ‘rule of recognition’, the rule that states what is the law, which is accepted by officials. Hart (1961) (2012), pp. 100–123.

  60. 60.

    Hage (2011).

  61. 61.

    Hart (1961) (2012), pp. 79–123.

  62. 62.

    This example closely resembles and is inspired by the example that can be found in: Hage (2013), pp. 277–304.

  63. 63.

    This might explain Van Dunné’s theory, where juridical acts are all acts that are, by a judge, normatively interpreted as having legal consequences. This means that all acts that have legal consequences are juridical acts, and whether they have legal consequences or not is dependent on normative interpretation. See Van Dunné (1971).

  64. 64.

    This is indeed a commonly held belief, see a.o.: Nieuwenhuis (1979), pp. 23–32; Hage (2011); Ruiter (1992, 1993); Tiersma (1986); Schane (2012); Trosborg (1991); Hart (1983), p. 276; Kurzon (1986); Hogg (2011); Charnock (2009).

  65. 65.

    I explicitly say ‘could just as well not have existed’, since it seems possible in law that the legal consequences can come into existence even if they do not reach anybody. If for example Ivo offers his car for sale on his website, this would seem to be a valid offer, even if nobody ever visits his website (it therefore seems to be the case that in law communication can be successful when uptake is theoretically possible). However, the offer will not be very effective if it never reaches anybody. I would like to thank Prof. Mr. I. Giesen for this example.

  66. 66.

    I use ‘I do’ here as an example. In reality couples rarely say ‘I do’, often they have lengthy vows or they simply say ‘yes’. However, due to pop culture the sentence ‘I do’ has become the standard expression when one talks about people marrying. For the simplicity of the examples I will use the term ‘I do’ hereafter when I refer to the speech act that is used to marry.

  67. 67.

    What a speech act does and means is always dependent on the situation and the circumstances in which it is performed.

  68. 68.

    The following examples are only the tip of the iceberg. For our present purpose it is not useful to give a comprehensive overview of all work on speech acts in legal science.

  69. 69.

    Nieuwenhuis (1979), pp. 23–32.

  70. 70.

    A.o. Tiersma (1986), Schane (2012), Trosborg (1991) and Rijgersberg and van der Kaaij (2013). Reinach, in his work on social acts in private law, seems to anticipate speech act theory while describing similar ideas, Reinach (1913) (1983); see Crosby for a discussion on speech act theory and Reinach’s social acts: Crosby (1983).

  71. 71.

    Kurzon (1986).

  72. 72.

    Ruiter (1992, 1993).

  73. 73.

    Matczak (2013).

  74. 74.

    A whole journal has been dedicated to these lines of enquiry: Journal of Pragmatics 41 2009.

  75. 75.

    Austin (1955) (2009), a.o. pp. 5, 22, 137.

  76. 76.

    According to Dutch administrative law, only a decision can be appealed. Therefore, if there is no decision, there is no access to the administrative court. In order to be able to hold an administrative authority accountable for doing nothing it is thus necessary to declare that ‘not making a decision’ is a ‘decision’, so that access to the courts is secured: van Wijk/Konijnenbelt and van Male (2014), pp. 566–574.

  77. 77.

    In Sect. 4.4 such an internal inconsistency in the DCFR is explored.

  78. 78.

    For some of the discussion see e.g. Jansen (2006), pp. 305–338; de Groot and Schneider (1994), pp. 53–68; Oderkerk (1999), pp. 15–88; Constantinesco (1972), pp. 277–325; van Hoecke (2004), pp. 165–196.

  79. 79.

    Oderkerk (1999), pp. 61–99.

  80. 80.

    For an extensive overview of comparative concepts, concepts that can be used for comparative legal research and their value see: van Laer (1997).

  81. 81.

    Hage (2004); Hage (2007), pp. 24–31.

  82. 82.

    See a.o.: Dennett (1987), Libet (1999), Wegner (2002), Morse (2008), Swaab (2010), Lamme (2010) and Verplaetse (2011).

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van der Kaaij, H.D.S. (2019). Introduction and Method. In: The Juridical Act. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 129. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15592-6_1

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