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Conclusion

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Substance in Aristotle's Metaphysics Zeta
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Abstract

There is an interpretation that fits what is said throughout Z. According to it, Z.1–11 allows individual composites to be basic constituents; some of Z.13’s arguments make individual composites basic constituents, and Z.17 is compatible with this. One can then go back and take Z.1 to endorse individual composites as basic constituents, and one can understand why Aristotle argues extensively against Z.13’s Platonic target. If the argument for that target were to go through, Aristotle would be committed to Forms or Form-like entitles. Does this interpretation cohere best with what is said throughout Z? A reader will decide this for herself or himself. I will be pleased if he or she agrees that this interpretation deserves to be taken seriously.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    According to Z.4, strictly speaking, only substantial species have and are essences. But given the distinction between species and form commentators have found in Z.11, this conclusion needs to be modified to say that, strictly speaking, only substantial forms have and are essences. What follows observes this modification.

  2. 2.

    That primary things are not one thing said of another raises the question of whether a substantial form can be primary since it is one thing said of another—its differentiae said of its genus. However, not only is the essence of a form said of it simply in virtue of itself, the differentiae of a form are not said of its genus in the way pale is said of man. So, it can be a primary thing when it comes to having an essence.

  3. 3.

    Note that if one adds this to what follows from Z.15’s conclusion—that no individual basic constituent is composed entirely of universals—the Z.13 Platonic view is again committed to the bases of Z.13’s aporia , and that aporia again poses a problem for it.

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Correspondence to Norman O. Dahl .

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Dahl, N.O. (2019). Conclusion. In: Substance in Aristotle's Metaphysics Zeta. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22161-4_18

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