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Conditionally Coordinating Contracts in Supply Chains

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Frontiers of Dynamic Games

Part of the book series: Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications ((SDGTFA))

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Abstract

The chapter revisits the supplier-retailer supply chain game and investigates target sales rebate and buyback contracts, which motivate participants for both individual rational and Pareto optimal behavior. The research considers the Stackelberg model in supply chain under condition of fixed retail price and stochastic demand. Authors proposed the algorithm of the conditionally coordinating problem solving for both types of contracts. A general framework is introduced, the condition for achieving the coordinating equilibrium is characterized, and a special case for uniformly distributed demand is analyzed. The models with uniformly distributed demand demonstrate that the conditional coordination can be achieved, and examples show that the problem of establishing contract parameters is a problem of sharing of supply chain expected profit under a compromise between supplier and retailer.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia

    Nikolay A. Zenkevich, Irina Berezinets, Natalia Nikolchenko & Alina Rucheva

Authors
  1. Nikolay A. Zenkevich
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  2. Irina Berezinets
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  3. Natalia Nikolchenko
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  4. Alina Rucheva
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Nikolay A. Zenkevich .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia

    Leon A. Petrosyan

  2. Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelia Research Center of RAS, Petrozavodsk, Russia

    Vladimir V. Mazalov

  3. Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia

    Nikolay A. Zenkevich

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Zenkevich, N.A., Berezinets, I., Nikolchenko, N., Rucheva, A. (2019). Conditionally Coordinating Contracts in Supply Chains. In: Petrosyan, L., Mazalov, V., Zenkevich, N. (eds) Frontiers of Dynamic Games. Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications. Birkhäuser, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_16

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