Abstract
In this piece, Rasmussen takes a step back to see some of the larger issues at stake. He begins by separating certain versions of theism from a more fundamental, core ontology. By seeing this core, Rasmussen hopes to remove unnecessary barriers to a more unifying vision of the foundation of existence, a vision that sets the stage for the rest of the inquiry. Rasmussen also addresses Leon’s worry about the limits of the problem of arbitrary limits. Here, Rasmussen proposes a non-arbitrary terminus for explanation seeking. To conclude the chapter, Rasmussen reviews some things he has learned from this first section of the exchange. Here, Rasmussen displays some of the fruits of a peaceful, productive inquiry into the deepest part of existence.
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Notes
- 1.
There is also the option that there is no foundation—i.e., no ultimate explanation or ground of things. However, even in the case where each layer of reality is grounded in a more fundamental layer, ad infinitum, still, the entire bottomless ground would itself be ultimate and fundamental (without a transcendent explanation). Note that the total ground has no external explanation whether we treat it as an individual layer or as a plural of dependent layers.
- 2.
Schaffer (2018).
- 3.
For example, there is the proto-panpsychist naturalism articulated by Chalmers (1996).
- 4.
As before, I am assuming the parallel postulate is implicitly about non-curved space.
- 5.
Examples include Hume’s riddle of induction and Goodman’s new riddle. See Vickers (2014).
- 6.
Ward (2012), for example, provides a Bayesian solution to Goodman’s new riddle of induction.
- 7.
Thanks to Dustin Crummett for helping me weed out infelicities from a previous iteration of this section. Any remaining infelicities are my fault.
- 8.
Similar remarks may apply to Goodman’s riddle of induction involving “grue” and “bleen” on the assumption that propositions are divisible into more basic parts or constituents. For a defense of this assumption, see Rasmussen (2013, pp. 85–119).
- 9.
On the grounding side, I have in mind, for example, Schaffer’s arguments for an explanatory foundation (in terms of grounding) that mereologically overlaps every concrete thing. See Schaffer (2018).
- 10.
As before, nominalists may give a nominalist translation from type talk to talk of extensions of predicates.
- 11.
- 12.
Weaver and I develop this argument in “Why is there anything?” (forthcoming).
- 13.
Thus, for example, if a Trinitarian theory of the divine realm implies inexplicable arbitrariness with respect to the number of divine persons (as Leon hints), then a more monistic theory should be preferred. Alternatively, as noted in my previous chapter, a Trinitarian could seek to have an explanation of the divine persons in terms of more basic features of totality of the ground. Cf. Swinburne (1994) (on an explanation in terms of the requirements of maximal love).
- 14.
I do not claim that the obstacles are unavoidable, or that there is not more to say. There is certainly more to explore on that path. Rather than work in those weeds, however, my hope in this exchange is to highlight another path, which appears to me to be more ontologically inclusive.
- 15.
See, for example, Oppy (2009).
References
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Vickers, John. 2014. “The Problem of Induction.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/.
Ward, Barry. 2012. “Explanation and the New Riddle of Induction.” The Philosophical Quarterly 62: 365–385.
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Rasmussen, J. (2019). Argument from Arbitrary Limits. In: Is God the Best Explanation of Things?. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_6
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