Abstract
In this chapter, I apply the interactionist concept of stigma politics to study the (re-)construction of Indian deviant identity following the 1998 Pokhran-II nuclear tests. In particular, I analyze the ways how international society (re)imposed stigma on India for its violation of the nonproliferation norm; how India dealt with the shame through the combined stigma management strategies of neutralization and normalization of its nuclear status; and how some states, the United States in particular, strategically reversed their earlier position and sought to destigmatize India and normalize its position as a “responsible” nuclear power in the contemporary nuclear order. Furthermore, I discuss the link between the stigma politics in India’s case and the dynamics of the rules of the nonproliferation game.
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Notes
- 1.
A substantially revised version of this chapter was published in the Journal of International Relations and Development (Smetana 2018).
- 2.
However, India only weaponized its arsenal in the late 1980s and, according to the latest evidence, was not able to technically deliver the weapons until the mid-1990s (Kampani 2014). See the Appendix for the chronological account of the Indian case from 1974 until 2018.
- 3.
In nuclear scholarship and policy analysis, the 1998 tests conducted by India are usually referred to as Pokhran-II or Operation Shakti. The 1974 test is mostly referred to as Pokhran-I or Smiling Buddha. Both series of tests were carried out in Pokhran testing site in Rajasthan in western India.
- 4.
The history of and rationale behind the development of Indian nuclear program are discussed in greater depth elsewhere. See, for example, Abraham (1998), Perkovich (2001), Weiss (2010), Paul (1998), SarDesai and Thomas (2002), Sagan (1996, pp. 65–69), Sidhu (1997, Chapter 1), Biswas (2001), or Das (2015). For the literature on the nuclear dimension of Indian-Pakistan rivalry, see, for example, Sagan (2009), Kapur (2005), Ganguly and Wagner (2004), Ganguly and Kapur (2010, 2015), Ganguly (2013), Ganguly and Hagerty (2012), Rajain (2005), Dittmer (2005), or Mistry (2009).
- 5.
Since the 1998 nuclear tests, India and Pakistan fought a 1999 “Kargil war” along the Line of Control in the disputed Kashmir region and got engaged in a serious military standoff in the 2001–2002 crisis. On the nuclear aspects of these encounters, see Tellis et al. (2002), Kapur (2003), Kapur and Ganguly (2009), Sidhu (2000), Raghavan (2009), Kalyanaraman (2002), Bratton (2010), Ganguly and Kraig (2005), or Ganguly et al. (2019).
- 6.
For a comprehensive study of Indian opt-out from the CTBT, see Möller (2014).
- 7.
For a detailed overview of sanctions imposed on India and the discussion on their impact, see Morrow and Carriere (1999), Mistry (1999), Rennack (2003), or Wagner (2001).
- 8.
These steps later became known as “non-proliferation benchmarks” in the US-Indian negotiations over the lifting of sanctions. See Mistry (2014, p. 36).
- 9.
On the development of Indian nuclear doctrine, see, for example, Sagan (2009b), Pant (2005, 2007a), Chari (2000), Kanwal (2001), Dasgupta and Cohen (2011), Narang (2013), or Liebl (2009).
- 10.
For the scholarly debate on the desirability and the (expected) impacts of the US-Indian nuclear deal, see, for example, Pant (2011), Kapur and Ganguly (2007), Fitzpatrick (2008), Perkovich (2010), Kienzle (2014), Abraham (2007), Ganguly and Mistry (2006), Paul (2006), Carranza (2008), Warburg (2012), or Paul and Shankar (2007). For the meta-analysis of this debate, see Bhatia (2012).
- 11.
Kapur (2002) even highlights some small indirect positive economic effects on sanctions, as they facilitated political agreement on economic reforms within the ruling coalition at the time.
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Smetana, M. (2020). India and the Aftermath of Pokhran-II Nuclear Tests. In: Nuclear Deviance. Palgrave Studies in International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24225-1_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24225-1_7
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