Abstract
Priest holds anti-exceptionalism about logic. That is, he holds that logic, as a theory, does not have any exceptional status in relation to the theories of empirical sciences. Crucial to Priest’s anti-exceptionalism is the existence of ‘data’ that can force the revision of logical theory. He claims that classical logic is inadequate to the available data and, thus, needs to be revised. But what kind of data can overturn classical logic? Priest claims that the data is our intuitions about the validity of inferences. In order to make sense of this claim, I will appeal to the Madhyamaka Buddhist philosopher Candrakīrti. I will then pose a problem for Priest’s anti-exceptionalism. Finally, I will suggest a way out of the problem for Priest. Whether or not he accepts my solution, I will let him decide.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Quine’s ultimate view on this issue might be complicated. Shapiro (2000), for instance, casts doubt on this interpretation of Quine.
- 3.
This is, in fact, a controversial view. For an opposing view, see Harman (1986).
- 4.
- 5.
In the case of Sorites argument, one may reject the premises instead of rejecting the inference in order to resolve the paradox. I am here raising a possible reaction one can have in response to Sorites arguments.
- 6.
Bealer and BonJour do not discuss our intuitions invalidating the currently accepted logic. That is, they are not anti-exceptionalists. Nevertheless, it is still the case that they as well as Priest appeal to intuitions as doing the groundwork for logical theorisation.
- 7.
While this is true in Tibet, it is actually not clear what the level of Madhyamaka’s influence has been in China, Korea and Japan. Also, as contemporary scholars agree, Candrakīrti was a minor figure in India until his texts went to Tibet where he became an important thinker. I am here following the conventional wisdom of contemporary scholarship.
- 8.
For instance, the Cowherds (2011).
- 9.
I follow the contemporary convention of using ‘Madhyamaka’ as referring to the school of thought and ‘Mādhyamika’ as referring to the thinker who belongs to the school.
- 10.
Later Mādhyamikas seem to have developed different kinds of analyses based on different semantic accounts. See Tanaka (2014). But early Mādhyamikas seem to recognise only reductive analyses. In fact, without making this assumption, Nāgārjuna’s argument for emptiness and Candrakīrti’s lokaprasiddha account of truth and knowledge are implausible.
- 11.
In fact, Candrakīrti has an elaborate discussion of logical principles based on his lokaprasiddha account of truth. See Tillemans (2016). That discussion goes in a different direction from the current discussion about Priest’s anti-exceptionalism. Here I deviate from Candrakīrti’s thought about logical matters expressed in his writings.
- 12.
See also Tanaka (2015).
- 13.
- 14.
Many thanks go to an anonymous referee who brought out this feature of the lokaprasiddha account of validity.
- 15.
My teaching experiences are limited to Australia and New Zealand. There might be some cultural differences but I am putting aside that issue from consideration for now.
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Tanaka, K. (2019). Priest’s Anti-Exceptionalism, Candrakīrti and Paraconsistency. In: Başkent, C., Ferguson, T. (eds) Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency. Outstanding Contributions to Logic, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25365-3_7
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