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Presumptions of Innocence

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Abstract

This chapter introduces the Epistemic non-Distinctiveness thesis, the view that the cognitive convictions of the Christian and other religions enjoy evidential parity with everyday commitments. It argues that establishing the EnD is central to fulfilling the two requirements outlined in Chapter 1 and helping bring “epistemic peace” to the reflectively religious. It goes on to explore how the EnD might be established by analysing some contemporary analytic responses to scepticism about the external world in the light of the analogy drawn in Chapter 2.

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Correspondence to Neil Gascoigne .

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Gascoigne, N. (2019). Presumptions of Innocence. In: Rorty, Liberal Democracy, and Religious Certainty. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25454-4_3

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