Abstract
In order to make public good theory applicable to the republican discourse, it needs to be revised. This chapter illustrates especially the dichotomy and definition problem of public good theory. The dichotomy problem is solved by combining public good theory with political philosophy. The classical public good characteristics of non-excludability and non-rivalry are now derived, building on Searle’s social constructivism, from the characteristics of a mental and a material word. Building on this new viewpoint of public good theory, the concept of a hierarchy of nested social institutions and public goods is developed that needs to be delivered by a sovereign. This approach allows to combine economic and political science theory and to explain European integration under the republican viewpoint of a res publica of public goods.
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Notes
- 1.
Samuelson advanced a Keynesian view on economics.
- 2.
In a judgement taken already in the 1980s, the German constitutional court argued that in a situation in which a citizen does not know anymore who holds which information about him, the single person will probably adopt his behaviour to this uncertainty. This adoption of behaviour undermines basic democratic processes of decision-making (see Volkszählungsurteil, BVerfG, Urteil v. 15. Dezember 1983, Az. 1 BvR 209, 269, 362, 420, 440, 484/83).
- 3.
Furthermore, the refugee crisis has shown that it is a club with rather high costs of exclusion.
- 4.
Literally it says “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”. It has historical origins in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, when (protestants) tried to limit the authority of the King and contain Catholic influence.
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Zimmermann, T. (2019). A Political Philosophy of Public Goods. In: European Republicanism . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25935-8_7
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