Abstract
In the view of many commentators and pundits, all citizens have an entitlement to be relieved of their poverty, and this may best be accomplished by throwing other people’s money at the poor. This chapter makes the case that not only do the impoverished not have any such right, but the attempt to furnish them with wealth earned by others constitutes theft, and does not help them in any case. Given, however, that such entitlements exist, how is the moral person to react to them? In order to approach an answer to this question, this chapter defines and then applies to it “libertarian class analysis,” and derives from this some counterintuitive conclusions regarding poor welfare recipients and reparations for past invasions of person and property.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Observe that this conclusion is similar—but not precisely equal—to the vision of appropriate entitlements as provided for in the US Constitution. There, in addition to the aforementioned courts, armies, and police, the citizen is also entitled to a post office and other public enterprises. These services and institutions would be strictly prohibited under a libertarian limited government vision, the model we shall assume for the purpose of this chapter.
- 2.
Now and henceforth, we use the term “entitlement program” to refer to other initiatives of the state over and above armies, courts, and police. These latter three we characterize not as entitlement programs, which are always illegitimate uses of government force, but as the sole legitimate functions of government. For a critique of this limited government philosophy from within libertarianism, see Bruce L. Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State (San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute, 1990); “The Impetus for Recognizing Private Property and Adopting Ethical Behavior in a Market Economy: Natural Law, Government Law, or Evolving Self-Interest,” The Review of Austrian Economics 6, 2 (1993): 43–80; “Customary Law as a Social Contract: International Commercial Law,” Constitutional Political Economy 2 (1992): 1–27; “An Evolutionary Contractarian View of Primitive Law: The Institutions and Incentives Arising under Customary Indian Law,” The Review of Austrian Economics 5, 1 (1991): 41–65; “Enforcement of Private Property Rights in Primitive Societies: Law Without Government,” The Journal of Libertarian Studies IX, 1 (Winter 1989): 1–26; “Legal Evolution in Primitive Societies,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 144 (1988): 772– 88; “The Lost Victim and Other Failures of the Public Law Experiment,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 9 (1986): 399–427; Anthony De Jasay, The State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985); David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, 2nd ed. (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989); “Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case,” Journal of Legal Studies 8 (1979): 399–415; Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property: Studies in Political Economy and Philosophy (Boston: Kluwer, 1993): “The Economics and Sociology of Taxation,” in Taxation: An Austrian View, ed. L. Rockwell (Boston: Dordrecht, 1992); A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism: Economies, Polities, and Ethics (Boston: Kluwer, 1989); David Osterfeld, “Anarchism and the Public Goods Issue: Law, Courts, and the Police,” The Journal of Libertarian Studies 9, 1 (Winter 1989): 47–68; Joseph R. Peden, “Property Rights in Celtic Irish Law,” The Journal of Libertarian Studies 1, 2 (Spring 1977): 81–96; Murray N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty (New York: Macmillan, 1973); Power and Market: Government and the Economy (Menlo Park, Calif.: Institute for Humane Studies, 1970); The Ethics of Liberty (Atlantic Highlands, N.H.: Humanities Press, 1982); Lysander Spooner, No Treason (Larkspur, Co.: Tannehill, Morris, and Linda, 1966 [1870]); The Market for Liberty (New York: Laissez-Faire Books, 1984); William C. Woolridge, Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1970).
- 3.
For an alternative Marxist perspective, one which analyzes welfare as enabling capitalists to control labor markets, see Piven and Cloward, 1971.
- 4.
See Thomas Sowell, The Vision of the Anointed (New York: Basic Books, 1995); Race and Economics (New York: Longman, 1975); Ethnic America (New York: Basic Books, 1981); The Economics and Politics of Race: An International Perspective (New York: Morrow, 1983); A Conflict of Visions: Ideological Origins of Political Struggles (New York: Morrow, 1987); Race and Culture: A World View (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy from 1950 to 1980 (New York: Basic Books, 1984); In Pursuit: Of Happiness and Good Government (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990); Walter F. Williams, “Good Intentions—Bad Results: The Economic Pastoral and America’s Disadvantaged,” Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, and Public Policy 2, 1 (1985): 179–99; Gary M. Anderson, “Welfare Programs in the Rent Seeking Society,” Southern Economic Journal 54 (1987): 377–86; Martin Anderson, Welfare: The Political Economy of Welfare Reform in the United States (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978); Marvin Olasky, The Tragedy of American Compassion (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1992).
- 5.
Observe how the illegitimate entitlement of the dole is incompatible with the legitimate state function provided by the courts, armies, and police. One protects person and property from attack; the other exacerbates these problems.
- 6.
Anderson, “Welfare Programs in the Rent Seeking Society.”
- 7.
Of course, as the old adage goes, “The road to hell is paved with good intentions.”
- 8.
This is a debatable point.
- 9.
Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Vintage, 1989).
- 10.
This phraseology is particularly unfortunate because it implies that while there is something perverse about robbing the poor to enrich the wealthy, no such opprobrium applies to stealing from the rich and giving their money to the poor. However, at least for the classical liberal, theft is theft, no matter what the income status is of the victim or the recipient of the stolen goods.
- 11.
Terry Anderson and P. J. Hill, The Birth of the Transfer Society (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1989).
- 12.
This is perhaps the most egregious and deceitful entitlement plan in that all experts know full well the effects of minimum wages on the poor. See Walter F. Williams, The State Against Blacks (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982).
- 13.
Thomas J. DiLorenzo, “Competition and Political Entrepreneurship: Austrian Insights into Public Choice Theory,” The Review of Austrian Economics 2 (1988): 59–71; James M. Buchanan, Cost and Choice: An Inquiry into Economic Theory (Chicago: Markham, 1969); James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1971); Robert Lloyd and Joseph P. McGarrity, “A Profit Analysis of the Senate Vote on Gramm-Rudman,” Public Choice 85 (November 1995): 81–90; Kevin B. Grier and Joseph P. McGarrity, “The Effect of Macroeconomic Fluctuations on the Electoral Fortunes of House Incumbents,” Journal of Law and Economics XLI (April 1993): 143–61; James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1980).
- 14.
Nor can our agreement to abide by majority rule be predicated on the fact that we continue to reside in the United States. Some might argue, “If you do not like the way we run things here, you are always free to leave. Since you choose to stay, this indicates your willingness to be bound by electoral processes.” As Spooner (Spooner, Lysander. 1870 [1973] No Treason No. VI: The Constitution of No Authority at 15, in No Treason: The Constitution of No Authority and A Letter to Thomas F. Bayard. Ralph Myles Publisher
1966 [1870]), makes clear, many present residents can trace their property titles, in an unbroken chain, back to a time before the birth of our nation. The government, presumably, is set up to safeguard our property. How, then, can such people be told to leave if they do not support democratic conclusions? - 15.
It is impossible for the entire middle and upper classes to benefit at the expense of the poor. By definition, the poor have little that can be taken from them. The former cannot exploit them to a great degree since “you can’t get blood out of a stone.” But different categories of the rich and middle classes most certainly enrich themselves at the expense of other members of society. Agricultural subsidies, for example, benefit wealthy and middle class farmers. The same is true for tobacco subsidies, automobile subsidies, subsidies to scientific research and development, and so forth. When all of the taxes and subsidies are taken into account, there are only two possibilities: (1) everyone ends up with exactly what he had before, rendering the whole process absurd and nugatory; or (2) there are winners and losers. The contention here is that elements of the rich and middle class are the main beneficiaries, not the poor. See Franz Oppenheimer, The State (New York: Free Life Editions, 1975 [1914]).
- 16.
In the economic literature there are numerous attempts to justify entitlements. For a criticism of these attempts, see Robert McGee, “Mergers and Acquisitions: An Economic and Legal Analysis,” Creighton Law Review 22, 3 (1938): 665–93; Jack High, “Bork’s Paradox: Static Versus Dynamic Efficiency in Antitrust Analysis,” Contemporary Policy Issues 3 (1984–1985): 21– 34; Walter Block, “Total Repeal of Anti-Trust Legislation: A Critique of Bork, Brozen, and Posner,” The Review of Austrian Economics 8, 1 (1994): 1–64; Fred McChesney, “Antitrust and Regulation: Chicago’s Contradictory Views,” Cato Journal 10 (1991): 775–98; Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism; “Fallacies of the Public Goods Theory and the Production of Security,” The Journal of Libertarian Studies IX, 1 (Winter 1989): 27–46; Jeffrey Rogers Hummell, “National Goods Versus Public Goods: Defense, Disarmament, and Free Riders,” The Review of Austrian Economics 4 (1990): 88–122; Walter Block, “Public Goods and Externalities: The Case of Roads,” The Journal of Libertarian Studies 7, 1 (Spring 1983): 1–33; David Osterfeld, “Anarchism and the Public Goods Issue: Law, Courts, and the Police,” The Journal of Libertarian Studies 9, 1 (Winter 1989): 47–68; Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974).
- 17.
By stipulation, we cannot ignore paying for these programs since they are foisted on us. But there is no law compelling us to take part in them as recipients.
- 18.
Murray N. Rothbard and Jerome Tucille, eds., Left and Right: Selected Essays, 1954–1965 (New York: Arno Press, 1972); Rothbard, For a New Liberty; Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Marxist and Austrian Class Analysis,” in Marxism: Economics, Religion, Politics, and Philosophy, ed. Yuri Maltsev (Boston: Dordrecht, 1992).
- 19.
Marxists have given ruling class theory, as they have everything else they have touched, a bad name. In their view, to employ someone is to exploit him, and thus to be a member of the ruling class. For a critique of this viewpoint, see Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Capital and Interest, trans. George D. Hunke and Hans F. Sennholz (South Holland, Ill.: Libertarian Press, 1959 [1884]), particularly Part I, Chapter XII, “Exploitation Theory of Socialism-Communism.”
- 20.
Conservatives often ridicule the notion of ruling class. While their criticisms do indeed refute the Marxist version, they leave libertarians unscathed. Consider the following statement by Horowitz (David Horowitz, “Clarence Page’s Race Problem and Mine,” Heterodoxy (May/June 1996): 6.): “The very phrase ‘institutional racism’ is, of course, of leftist provenance. It is also a totalitarian term. Like ‘ruling class’ it refers to an abstraction, not a responsible individual being. You are a class enemy (or in this case a race enemy) not because of anything you actually think or do, but ‘objectively’—because you are situated in a structure of power that gives you (white skin) privilege.” This author is clearly denigrating Marxist ruling class theory but not the libertarian variety. For in the latter case, it is one’s actions and not status that is responsible for membership in the ruling class. For classical liberals, it is not sufficient (nor, even strictly speaking, necessary) to be rich to be included in this category. All one need do is engage in theft, which is certainly something a person of any background can actually do.
- 21.
Hitler himself may have never directly or personally killed a single Jew but he gave the orders to do so. Commands of this sort must be distinguished from free speech, at the very least, on the ground that the former implies physical threat while the latter does not.
- 22.
Randy Barnett, “Pursuing Justice in a Free Society, Part One: Power vs. Liberty,” Criminal Justice Ethics 4 (1985): 50–72; The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Randy Barnett and John Hagel, eds., Assessing the Criminal (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1977); Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property; Rothbard, For a New Liberty, op cit.
- 23.
Curiously, several classical liberal writers have rejected the notion of reparations. They did so not for slavery, but for land theft perpetrated on the peasants by the conquistadors in Latin and South America, a case certainly analogous to slavery. Included here are Milton Friedman, David Friedman, Walter Berns, and Edmund Opitz. See Walter Block, Geoffrey Brennan, and Kenneth Elzinga, eds., Morality of the Market: Religious and Economic Perspectives (Vancouver, B.C.: The Fraser Institute, 1985), 495–508. For a response to the anti-reparation position, see Walter Block and Guillermo Yeatts, “The Economics and Ethics of Land Reform: A Critique of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace’s Toward a Better Distribution of Land: The Challenge of Agrarian Reform,” Journal of Natural Resources and Environmental Law 15, 1 (1999–2000): 37–69; and Walter Block, “On Reparations to Blacks for Slavery,” Human Rights Review, Vol. 3, No. 4, July–September, pp. 53–73.
- 24.
This lends support to Malcolm X’s claim for reparations to blacks. See Malcolm X, Malcolm X Speaks: Selected Speeches and Statements, ed. George Breitman (New York: Merit Publishers, 1965).
- 25.
To be sure, there are practical objections to reparations. Enacting them is certain to create hard feelings and to rekindle ancient animosities. But we are concerned here with justice not practicality. We are analyzing payments from a moral point of view and not necessarily from a practical one. In any case, a large part of the present conflict is due to occurrences that took place a long time ago. It is possible that reparations might also reduce hard feelings and not exacerbate them.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Block, W.E. (2019). The Moral Dimensions of Poverty, Entitlements, and Theft. In: Property Rights. Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28353-7_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28353-7_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-28352-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-28353-7
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)