Abstract
This chapter defines the key concepts to understand a fishery game. In particular, the concepts of game, strategy, and the representation of a game in strategic and extensive forms. The most widely used solution concept in game theory, the Nash equilibrium, is presented as well as arguments that support its applicability. The two basic approaches in game theory, non-cooperative games and cooperative games, are outlined. Finally, the North Sea herring fishery is presented as an illustrative case study.
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Notes
- 1.
A more formal definition in the context of two-player games is provided in Chap. 4.
- 2.
With the exception of a brief period in the mid-2000s (Dickey-Collas et al. 2010, p. 1882).
- 3.
Not just in the biological sense. If one views the resource as a form of natural capital, the implication is that non-cooperation would lead to extensive disinvestment in the natural capital that would be decidedly non-optimal. At worst, it could lead to outright liquidation of the natural capital.
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Grønbæk, L., Lindroos, M., Munro, G., Pintassilgo, P. (2020). Basic Concepts in Game Theory. In: Game Theory and Fisheries Management . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40112-2_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40112-2_2
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