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Towards Practical Deployment of Post-quantum Cryptography on Constrained Platforms and Hardware-Accelerated Platforms

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Innovative Security Solutions for Information Technology and Communications (SecITC 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 12001))

Abstract

Most of the cryptographic constructions deployed in practical systems today, in particular digital signatures and key-establishment schemes, are vulnerable to attacks using quantum computers. Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) deals with the design and implementation of cryptographic algorithms that are resistant to these attacks. In this paper, we evaluate the NIST’s PQC competition candidates with respect to their suitability for the implementation on special hardware platforms. In particular, we focus on the implementability on constrained platforms (e.g., smart cards, small single-board computers) on one side and on the performance on very fast hardware-accelerated platforms (i.e., field-programmable gate arrays - FPGAs) on the other side. Besides the analysis of the candidates’ design features affecting the performance on these devices and security aspects, we present also the practical results from the existing implementation on contemporary hardware.

This work is supported by the National Sustainability Program under grant LO1401 and Ministry of Interior under grant VI20192022126.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Brno University of Technology, Technicka 12, Brno, Czech Republic

    Lukas Malina, Sara Ricci, Petr Dzurenda, David Smekal, Jan Hajny & Tomas Gerlich

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  1. Lukas Malina
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  2. Sara Ricci
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  3. Petr Dzurenda
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  4. David Smekal
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  6. Tomas Gerlich
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Lukas Malina .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Polytechnic University of Bucharest, Bucharest, Romania

    Emil Simion

  2. École Normale Supérieure, Paris, France

    Rémi Géraud-Stewart

A Post Quantum Cryptography Size Requirements

A Post Quantum Cryptography Size Requirements

This section discusses the current size requirements of the 2nd round NIST competitors. Our overview on current PQC schemes deals with implementations on devises which have limited memory capacity. Therefore, the suitability of a PQC scheme depends at first on its memory requirements. If the scheme is too demanding, it can not be directly implemented. Table 6 shows key pair, signature and ciphertext sizes of 2nd round NIST schemes. Regarding signature schemes, Dilithium and Falcon are the proposals which require less storage. Note that both the schemes belong to LBC group.

In case of KEM schemes, ROLLO-I and Round5 are the most promising ones. Therefore, the less demanding schemes between LBC and CBC groups have comparable memory requirements for KEM. Observe that NewHope also demands small memory capacity.

Table 6. Size requirements of 2nd round NIST signature schemes and KEM/Encryption schemes.
Full size table

It is important to notice that memory capacity is only one of the component which have to be taken in consideration when schemes are compared.

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Malina, L., Ricci, S., Dzurenda, P., Smekal, D., Hajny, J., Gerlich, T. (2020). Towards Practical Deployment of Post-quantum Cryptography on Constrained Platforms and Hardware-Accelerated Platforms. In: Simion, E., Géraud-Stewart, R. (eds) Innovative Security Solutions for Information Technology and Communications. SecITC 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12001. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41025-4_8

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