Abstract
This Chapter is the introduction. Here I lay out the principal aims of the book, which are to investigate the way that evidence is gathered and used to confirm the kinds of hypotheses that are commonly found in clinical medical science, and to introduce and defend a new theory that I call the “weight of evidence” account. I present some notions that have been offered of what we should expect from a theory of evidence. In the book I discuss five theories of evidence that have been proposed, namely hypothetico-deductivism, Bayesianism, Carl Hempel’s “satisfaction” theory, Deborah Mayo’s “error-statistical” theory, and Peter Achinstein’s theory. I also consider Inference to the Best Explanation to the extent that it can be considered a method of theory choice. I advance reasons why I do not believe that previous theories satisfactorily explain confirmation in clinical medical science. I briefly outline the contents of the other chapters.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
I use the expressions “theory of evidence ” and “theory of confirmation” interchangeably (e.g., see Achinstein 1983, 351).
- 2.
In a note, Achinstein states that more accurately, it is the fact that e, rather than the sentence describing that fact, that constitutes the evidence , but that he is following standard philosophical practice of speaking of the sentence e.
- 3.
By “explanation” here is meant what is ordinarily construed as explanation, i.e., that it is context-dependent and dependent on the particular interests of persons. It may not necessarily pertain to the notion of explanation used by Achinstein in his “explanatory connection,” as I later argue.
- 4.
An N of 1 study is a study involving a single person.
References
Achinstein, Peter. 1983. The nature of explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2001. The book of evidence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2005. Four mistaken theses about evidence, and how to correct them. In Scientific evidence. Philosophical theories and applications, ed. Peter Achinstein, 35–50. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Boden, William E., Robert A. O’Rourke, Koon K. Teo, Pamela M. Hartigan, David J. Maron, William J. Kostuk, Merril Knudtson, et al. 2007. Optimal medical therapy with or without PCI for stable coronary disease. New England Journal of Medicine 356: 1503–1516.
Glymour, Clark. 1980. Theory and evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hempel, Carl G. 1945a. Studies in the logic of confirmation (I). Mind 54: 1–26. Reprinted, with some changes, in Hempel 1965, 3–51
———. 1945b. Studies in the logic of confirmation (II). Mind 54: 97–121. Reprinted, with some changes, in Hempel 1965, 3–51.
———. 1965. Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science. New York: The Free Press.
Mayo, Deborah G. 1996. Error and the growth of experimental knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Popper, Karl. 1992. The logic of scientific discovery. New York: Routledge.
Prasad, Vinay, Andrae Vandross, Caitlin Toomey, Michael Cheung, Jason Rho, Steven Quinn, Satish Jacob Chacko, et al. 2013. A decade of reversal: An analysis of 146 contradicted medical practices. Mayo Clinic Proceedings 88: 790–798.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Pinkston, J.A. (2020). Introduction. In: Evidence and Hypothesis in Clinical Medical Science. Synthese Library, vol 426. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44270-5_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44270-5_1
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-44269-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-44270-5
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)