Abstract
In this chapter, I consider three theories of evidence, namely, hypothetico-deductivism, Carl Hempel’s “satisfaction” theory, and Deborah Mayo’s “error-statistical” theory. These theories are considered together because they share the characteristic that hypotheses themselves do not have probabilities (in contrast to those that do, i.e., p(h) = r; 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, which are considered in Chap. 3). I discuss hypothetico-deductivism mainly using Karl Popper’s approach to this theory. I attempt to explicate these theories in sufficient detail so that in later chapters I will be able to argue that they do not satisfactorily explain confirmation in clinical medical science, and that the “weight of evidence” account does this more satisfactorily. I also include some objections to these theories that have been offered by others.
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Notes
- 1.
This book originally appeared in German in 1934. The first English translation was in 1959 with the title The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1959).
- 2.
In a note, Popper cites several sources for this quotation, which I do not repeat here.
- 3.
For the conclusion form “almost certainly, or probably, a is not G,” see Toulmin (1958, 139).
- 4.
Hempel (1960, 441) notes that he has slightly modified the phrasing of Cooley’s example to more closely fit the pattern of the other examples.
- 5.
Hempel cites several references from Rudolf Carnap for this quotation, which I do not repeat here.
- 6.
- 7.
The tea tasting example is usually attributed to R.A. Fisher (1947). As Mayo notes, she has slightly modified Fisher’s presentation.
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Pinkston, J.A. (2020). Theories of Confirmation in Which Hypotheses Do Not Have Probabilities. In: Evidence and Hypothesis in Clinical Medical Science. Synthese Library, vol 426. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44270-5_2
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