Abstract
According to the dominant traditional account of perception in the medieval period, the senses receive the form of an external object, and this reception actualizes the sense power’s potentiality to perceive. Dominant as this Aristotelian account was, it overshadows an alternative way to describe the act of perception that is found in the tradition of medieval Augustinianism. According to this tradition, the object offers the occasion for the soul to form or found in and by itself the images of the object. It is by reacting to the bodily affection caused by the object that the soul becomes aware of the external thing. The theory integrates the causal relation of the Aristotelian account in explaining the interaction between material things—object and sense organ—but denies that this physical causality is the cause of perceptual acts. Here I focus on a strand in this tradition, which understands perception as the result of sense objects acting upon sense organs in such a way as to excite the soul.
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Notes
- 1.
Even authors not belonging to this tradition identify the theory with Augustine: see e.g. Albert the Great 1968, II.3.6, 105–106. See Pattin (1988), v–vi; 1–3. The fact that the same passages are quoted in support suggests the existence of a textbook of Augustinian sentences on different topics in the manner of the Auctotitates Aristotelis. I am unaware of the discovery of such a work, but its existence seems likely.
- 2.
i.e. Whether there is a physiological change in the sense organ or just an intentional or spiritual change.
- 3.
Aquinas 1961/1967, II.82.12, 270. See Aristotle, De anima II.5, 418a3. See also Albert the Great (De anima II.3.6, 107) who, when explaining the way sensible things actualize sense powers, states that he is following “directe Peripateticorum sententiam”. At roughly the same time (ca. 1256), Robert Kilwardby identified such a view as being of the Aristotelici, see Silva and Toivanen (2010, p. 252).
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
Matthew of Aquasparta presents this argument in an eloquent way in Qdfc 3, #20, 253. From the fourteenth century onwards, the debate over the agent sense displaced the Augustinian active theory. The existence of an agent sense was raised by Averroes and further developed at the beginning of the century by John of Jandun (see Brenet’s contribution to this volume).
- 7.
According to this tradition, due to the conjunction (colligacione) of the soul to the body, the body, can act upon the soul by resisting its ruling of the soul by its natural inclination to sensuality. See, e.g. John of la Rochelle 1995, pp. 48, 153.
- 8.
The author of this chapter is currently writing a monograph on the notion of active perception from Augustine to the fourteenth century. He gratefully acknowledges audiences in Helsinki, Rome, Paris, Jyväskylä, and Uppsala for their comments on previous versions of it.
- 9.
Pasnau (1997, p. 125).
- 10.
Boethius 1984, Book 5, Meter 4, transl. W.V. Cooper (London: J. M. Dent and Company, 1902), pp. 156–157.
- 11.
He does refer to Thomas Aquinas’ SCG III.84.10 but with respect to the passivity of the intellect, not of the senses, see 129–130.
- 12.
For these aspects and a detailed summary of the Stoic view of perception, see Lokke (2007, p. 35).
- 13.
See Colish (1990, pp. 270–271). The problem the Stoic account raises about the certainty of knowledge in that all perceptions are contingent and particular and devoid of the kind of certainty innate notions are endowed with seems not to play a major role here.
- 14.
Boethius 2001, Book 5, Meter 4, pp. 139–140.
- 15.
An essential feature of late medieval discussions is whether this relation between the presence of the object to the perceiver implies the formation of this image and whether the image could be formed without an external correspondent object; this discussion is related to the capacity of God to create in the human soul images of non-existent objects.
- 16.
Are these forms the “common notions” he identifies with Plato’s innate ideas? On this identification, see Colish (1990, p. 279).
- 17.
Auvergne 1674, (Du, hereafter) II.3, 118.
- 18.
Auvergne 1674, (DA, hereafter, 194).
- 19.
“… illae non sunt notae nisi per signa & impressiones quas faciunt in organis sensuum”, DA 102; William of Auvergne 2000, p. 145.
- 20.
DA 5.8, 123.
- 21.
Guillaume d’Auvergne, De l’âme (VII, 1–9), transl. J.-B. Brenet (Paris: Vrin, 1998).
- 22.
In DA 1.3, 67 William defines the human soul as the “operator” of the instrumental body.
- 23.
Matthew of Aquasparta expressed the same idea in Quaestiones disputatae de fide et de cognitione, pp. 394–400 (hereafter, Qdfc).
- 24.
“… intellectus noster non est recipiens a rebus sensibilibus, & materialibus similitudines earum”, Du II.74, 929. See also Du II.55, 914: “… neque enim animae nostrae a rebus sensibilibus aliqua reciperent, nisi per organa sensuum venirent ad illas passiones ab ipsis: sic neque passiones hujusmodi aliquid operarentur in animabus nostris, nisi ipsa organa hujusmodi alligata essent eisdem”.
- 25.
“Differ autem exemplum istud a designationibus, que fiunt in intellectu, quia designatio hujusmodi figurarum ad placitum, vel ex placitum est, et pacto: illae autem quae fiunt in intellectu, sive apud intellectum, per ipsum ex natura, & per naturam fiunt, natura inquam intellectus, quia mira velocitate, atque agilitate format apud semetipsum designationes, quas a rebus non recipit, sed leuissime commotus, exilissimeque excitatus ab illis, res ipsas sibi ipsi exhibet, & praesentat, & earum species ipse sibi ipsi in semetipso format.” Du III.3, 1018, (emphasis added). See also Du II.74, 929–930: “Licet autem in explicandis occasionibus istis, sive excitationibus, per quas novae vel cogitiones, vel cogitationes”. See Marrone (1983, p. 58) who identifies Augustine as the reference in this passage.
- 26.
“Aranea quippe, licet dici non posset proprie, quod a musca per motum telae suae recipiat aestimationem, vel imaginationem casus ipsius muscae, aut captionis ejusdem, fit tamen per occasionem motus hujusmodi in ea praedicta imaginatio, vel aestimatio, cum manifestum sit ipsam muscam necdum visam, nec alio sensu apprehensam impressionem facere non posse”, Du II.76, 930.
- 27.
Marrone (1983, p. 61–62).
- 28.
“& ad hunc modum se habet de aranea, & de aliis, quibus lumina naturalium quarundam scientiarum quaedam videntur indita, vel impressa. Eorum igitur duntaxat scientia hujusmodi substantiis est a creatore naturaliter insita, vel innata, quorum cognitio ad regendam vitam ipsarum, & dirigendas operationes necessaria, & conveniens est.” Du II.64, 913.
- 29.
“Sensibilia gignendo ex se similitudines suas, et per sensus immittentes eas in nobis, eas imprimunt in instrumento sensus communis, id est in ultimo sentiente, scilicet in corde; ex qua impressione efficitur ut anima, eo quod sit illi parti corporis maxime unita, intelligat illud cuius similitudo in corde fuit impressa. Nostra enim cognitio incipit a sensu. Et ideo dicit quod deficiente sensu necesse est scientiam deficere, in Posterioribus analyticis”, Richard Fishacre 2008, pp 334–340.
- 30.
“Respondeo. Cum verbum quo se loquitur res exterior mihi, scilicet species rei, pervenerit ad intimum sentiens, non procedit ulterius ut intret gignendo se in mentem. Sed, ut dicit Augustinus, anima miris modis et mira quadam velocitate efficit in se simile ei quod est in organo intimo, hoc est assimulat se ille speciei susceptae et conformat, ut lux aquae cui contiguatur”, Richard Fishacre, In Primum Librum Sententiarum, ed. Long (1968), (hereafter, InISent 3, *24).
- 31.
The sentence he uses is equivocal, but I think it should be read in the way I propose: “Sic in anima naturaliter infinitae sunt similitudines rerum, et tamen unam earum intuemur actualiter sine alia”, InISent 3, *25.
- 32.
“Vel melius: anima a creatione sua habet forte in se multas species rerum”, InISent 3, *31.
- 33.
“Cum ergo species sensibiles veniunt ad cor, excitatur anima per has ad intuendum species intelligibiles in se ipsa”, InISent 3, *31. This conception could be inspired by Augustine’s analysis of the disembodied soul’s punishment by fire in City of God 21. That is, at least, how John of la Rochelle understood it in stating it that one way the soul is punished by fire is when the fire of Hell conjures up in it (excitentur in anima) images of sufferance (Summa, 49, 157).
- 34.
Long (1968, p. 95).
- 35.
Robert Kilwardby (1987, p. 9), (hereafter, DSF), transl. A. Broadie 1993, p. 73.
- 36.
- 37.
Pecham (1970, I.27, p. 109).
- 38.
QdA 9, 85.9–11.
- 39.
Pecham (1989, 17.6, p. 214).
- 40.
Pecham 1918, 10, 89.8–9 (hereafter, QdA).
- 41.
“Anima transformat se in similitudinem rei cuius species est in organo”, TdA 4.4, 14. See also Quodlibet IV, 17.6, 213.
- 42.
TdA 3.2–3; and Quodlibet IV, 17.7, 214.
- 43.
“Vis igitur animae organum, sibi intimae unitum, perficit et movet; et ideo naturali perlustratione necesse est animam advertere omnes mutationes factas in organo et naturali colligatione in illius similitudinem se transformare, et proportionaliter corpori se immutat”, Tractatus de anima, ed. G. Melani (Florence: Biblioteca di Studi Franciscani, 1948), 4.2, 13 (hereafter, TdA). All the translations are mine, except when otherwise indicated.
- 44.
This can be said even without considering the question of whether the image is distinct from the act itself.
- 45.
Although in this question Matthew is primarily concerned with the intellect and the role of intelligible species in cognition, there is enough evidence of sensory cognition.
- 46.
- 47.
Matthew dwells longer on this question in QdA6, 239–240.
- 48.
“Et quod corporeum in rem incorpoream agat aut imprimat actione naturali, non videtur multum consonum rationi, et multum videtur derogare nobilitati substantiae spiritualis.” Matthew of Aquasparta, Qdfc 3, responsio, 257.
- 49.
See also QdA6 3, ad 23, 288.
- 50.
A similar description of the Aristotelian way is to be found in Robert Kilwardby—see Silva and Toivanen (2010), for references. The attribution proposed by the editors of Matthew’s text and followed by Beha (1961, p. 9) of this first theory to Bonaventure and the second to Thomas Aquinas and Roger Bacon seems to some extent at least, misplaced, as Mazzarella (1969) convincingly shows.
- 51.
“Ideo alii dicunt quod anima sive intellectus nihil omnino a rebus recipit, nisi sola excitationem”, Qdfc 257. See also Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones disputatae de anima separate, ed. PP. Collegii and S. Bonaventurae, in Quaestiones disputatae de anima separate, de anima beata, de ieiunio et de legibus (Florence: Quaracchi, 1959), 4, 65.
- 52.
“Agens per modum efficientis vel inducentis habet utique formam quam efficit, sed agens per modum excitantis non; verbi gratia, ova confota calore solis pullifficant acsi cubarentur a gallina, sed ille calor non efficit aut formam inducit, sed tantum excitat formam quae latebat, et ideo non oportet quod habeat illam formam”, Matthew of Aquasparta, QdA6, 4, ad 8, 303.
- 53.
This could be the theory of Robert Grosseteste (1168/1175–1253). See his Grosseteste (1981, p. 216): the aspectus, excitatus by the corporeal things turns itself towards its own light. See Spruit (1994), 125–126. Beha refers to Thomas of York (9) but a clear proponent of such a theory was Richard Fishacre.
- 54.
The point, discussed by other authors, refers to the capacity to understand the truth of a proposition when considering it—such as when the soul understands the proposition “the whole is bigger than its part” and its truth. Matthew stresses here that knowledge of the terms of the proposition (“whole” and “part”) needs to be acquired through perception (Matthew of Aquasparta, Qdfc 3, 259).
- 55.
Matthew notes that the soul is connected, united, with the body and not mixed—a mixture implies a change in that which is changed, which clearly does not take place with the soul in its union or colligantia with the body (QdA6 3, ad 9, 283).
- 56.
“Quando ergo fit aliqua immutatio in organo sensus, puta in organo virtutis visivae, per aliquam speciem alicuius visibilis, anima, quae secundum illam virtutem est perfectio et motrix organi illius, commonita, excitat et pulsate ex organi immutatione, configurat se et assimilate sive coaptat illi motui proportionaliter et immutatur consimili immutatione; et illud est quod dicitur ‘sentire’”, Matthew of Aquasparta, Qdfc 3, 260. Beha identifies this theory with John Pecham and William of Auvergne.
- 57.
“Praetera, si anima format de se talem speciem sive similitudinem, per talem similitudinem potius deveniret in cognitionem sui quam in cognitionem rei, quia similitudo ab aliquo originata magis representat suum originale principium quam aliquid aliud”, Matthew of Aquasparta, Qdfc 261.
- 58.
For a different account (although with similar conclusions), see Beha (1961), 4–11. Her account is sometimes misleading because it tends not to distinguish which operations belong to the intellect and which to the sensory soul—a distinction that is quite clear in the text.
- 59.
See Augustine, De Trinitate 9.3.
- 60.
This expression can be found in Thomas Aquinas, e.g., Quodlibet 8, 2.1c: “Anima humana similitudines rerum quibus cognoscit, accipit a rebus illo modo accipiendi quo patiens accipit ab agente”. See Pasnau (1997), 126–130.
- 61.
Spruit (1994), 127, remarks that the “colligatio” is found already in John of la Rochelle 1995, p. 194 (hereafter, Sda).
- 62.
“Homo enim intelligit ex intellectu coniuncto et ideo oportet quod habeat organa et instrumenta corpori apta ad exequendum opera intellectus”, Matthew of Aquasparta, QdA6 245. See also question III, ad 16, 286.
- 63.
“Quando autem fit immutatio in aliquo organo corporeo per aliquam speciem, non potest latere animam secundum illam potentiam organi perfectricem et motricem, sed statim percipit eam; percipiendo vero format eam in se secundum illius organi proportionem, ita quod vel sensibilem vel imaginabilem.” Matthew of Aquasparta, Qdfc 3, 262.
- 64.
“Nam, ut vult Augustinus et videtur velle Avicenna, potentiae sensitivae non tantum sunt passivae, immo et activae.” Matthew of Aquasparta, Qdfc 3, 262–263.
- 65.
Matthew of Aquasparta, Qdfc 3, 263.
- 66.
However, this seems to prove the opposite in that the soul is unable to concentrate (in itself) because it is distracted by images that are presented to the senses (see Qda6 283).
- 67.
On Augustine on this chain of species, see De Trinitate 11.9.16.
- 68.
Matthew of Aquasparta, Qdfc 3, 265. According to Matthew, we know things because all things generate and diffuse the species or likenesses, which are that by means of which they can be cognized (Ibid., 266).
- 69.
Matthew of Aquasparta, Qdfc 3, 267.
- 70.
See footnote 7 above.
- 71.
Peter John Olivi 1922–1926, tom. III, question 72, 1 (hereafter, QInIIS).
- 72.
QInIIS 72, 9; see also QInIIS 72, 11.
- 73.
See Perler (2001, p. 49).
- 74.
- 75.
This is precisely the issue in question 72: “an corpora possint agere in spiritum et in eius potentias apprehensivas et appetitivas” (QInIIS, 1–51).
- 76.
According to Olivi, the representation of the object is the result of the perceptual act conforming to the object present to the attention of the soul (QInIIS 72, 82). In other words, by being directed to (and determined by) the object, the perceptual act becomes the likeness of the terminative object. This is very close to Augustine’s intention.
- 77.
Olivi had a narrow understanding of sensible species in that he took them to be material—i.e. extended (QInIIS 72, 31)—and to be representative only of part of the object (QInIIS 72, 40–6). This was part of his attempt to reject them (see QInIIS 72, 47–8).
- 78.
James of Viterbo (1968), Quodlibet 1 (hereafter, Q.1), q.13, 184.
- 79.
One could call this the “proportionality and similarity principle”.
- 80.
Q.1, q.7, 91.402–5.
- 81.
This principle does not preclude that each of the soul’s powers (intellect, senses and will) has passive and active aspects. A power is more active the higher its place in the hierarchy of the soul (Q.1, q.12, 168.371–74), in which the will comes first, then the intellect and finally the senses.
- 82.
Q.1, q.12, 166.313–16.
- 83.
“Sed huiusmodi actiones animae sunt manentes in anima, et ipsam perficientes.” Q.1, q.12, 166.321–22.
- 84.
“… sensus excedit sensibile, quia sensus est virtus vitalis. Sensibile autem est non vivum, et sensibile est cum material; sensus autem suscipit sine materia. Aeque enim videtur inconveniens dicere quod actio sensus causetur a sensibili secundum se”, Q.1, q.12, 164.237–40.
- 85.
This says nothing, of course, about the vital operation to be determined by a particular thing, although James is not arguing against external things playing any role—he just dismisses their role as the cause of such acts of the soul.
- 86.
Q.1, q.12, 166.319–24.
- 87.
“A rebus vero causatur scientia in nobis dupliciter. Uno modo, in quantum mediantibus potentiis sensitivis, ipsae res sensibiles excitant intellectum ad hoc ut se moveat. Alio modo, in quantum anima movetur, ut ipsis rebus assimiletur et conformetur in actu. Et sic causa cognitionis per modum termini, et inde sequitur quia anima assimilatur rebus, non autem res animae assimilantur.” Q.1, q.12, 177.663–68.
- 88.
“… anima se habet respectu ipsarum [actiones] sicut efficiens et agens”, Q.1, q.12, 166.317–18.
- 89.
“Quod patet, si consideretur qualis est illa potentia, secundum quam dicitur anima potentia intelligens vel sentiens. Est enim quaedam actualitas incompleta, pertinens ad secundam speciem qualitatis, quae est potentia naturalis, considerata secundum exordium et praeparationem quandam respectu actus ulterioris. Unde dicitur aptitudo et idoneitas naturalis ad completum actum. Illud autem, quod sic est in potentia secundum actum quemdam incompletum, movetur ex se ad completum actum, non quidem efficienter, sed formaliter”, Q.1, q.12, 166–67.329–36, (emphasis added). There is an equivalence between aptitude (aptitudo), natural potency (potentia naturalis), and incomplete act (actus incompletus) (Q.1, q.12, 170.461–62).
- 90.
Q.1, q.7, 92. They are called potencies because (i) they dispose the power to act and (ii) are perfected by the acts (Q.1, q.7, 93.472–73); and dispositions because of their permanence (Q.1, q.7, 94.479–80).
- 91.
Q.1, q. 12, 167.344–50.
- 92.
Q.1, q.12, 167.344–50.
- 93.
“… nata est perfici per ulteriores actus”, Q.1, q.12, 167.355–56. The soul is naturally endowed with an aptitude to be perfected by the full knowledge of sciences and the virtues (Q.1, q.7, 92). On James of Viterbo on aptitudes, see Coté (2009).
- 94.
“Et hoc modo ponere scientiam innatam vel habitualem, scilicet secundum idoneitatem et aptitudinem, quae est actualitas quedam incompleta, non est inconveniens.” Q.1, q.12, 171.493–95.
- 95.
Q.1, q.12, 170.459–66.
- 96.
A major axiom of thirteenth-century natural philosophy is that God creates and infuses the human soul at a certain moment of foetal development; in this context, the soul cannot pre-exist.
- 97.
Q.1, q.12, 171.481–95.
- 98.
Q.1, q.12, 168–69.399–408.
- 99.
“Anima autem movetur principaliter, a Deo quidem efficienter, qui ipsam producit, a se ipsa vero formaliter; a sensibus vero et a sensibilibus movetur non principaliter, sed per modum excitationis et inclinationis cuiusdam, ut dictum est”, Q.1, q.12, 175.614–16, (emphasis added).
- 100.
“Sensibilia autem immutant organa sensuum; quibus immutatis, propter coniunctionem organi cum potentia, et propter similitudinem ipsius immutationis, quae facta est in organo, cum aptitudine quae est in sensu, sive cum eo ad quod sensos natus est se movere, sensos ipse inclinatur et excitatur ut se moveat ad cognitionem actualem.” Q.1, q.12, 172.515–20.
- 101.
“Ad hoc autem, quod aliquid moveat aliud hoc modo, requiritur quod id quod movet, sit coniunctum ei quod movetur, et sit in actum secundum aliquid, quod habeat convenientiam vel habitudinem aliquam ad id, secundum quod illud, quod movetur, natum est esse in actum.” Quod. I, q. 12, 172.
- 102.
“Attentione autem dignum est ne forte intelligere et videre non sint pati et informari solum. Sed habent quandam intrinsecus excitatam operationem, secundum quam fit perceptio”, Q.1, q.12, 174–75.596–98. See also Q.1, q.12, 174.583–84.
- 103.
“Si autem positis speciebus in anima, non est necessarium ponere alias species acquisitas, praeter operationes et actus. Non enim est necessarium propter repraesentationem et motionem ipsius intellectus; quia ad hoc sufficiunt aptitudines inditae cum fantasmatibus excitantibus.” James of Viterbo, Quod. I, q.13, 187.
- 104.
Phantasms are likenesses of particular things, hence being endowed with material conditions (Q.1, q.12).
- 105.
For an analysis of Durandus’ theory of perception, see Solère (2012).
- 106.
Durand of St. Pourçain (2012), (hereafter, S) II.3, q.5, 152.
- 107.
“Vult dicere (…) quod sensibile non agit in potentiam sensitiuam, set in organum ratione qualitatum disponentium ipsum, que actio, cum sit presens sensui, non latet ipsum, et ideo sentitur, nec est aliud sentire nisi sensibile presens not latere sensum”, S II.3, q.5, 162.
- 108.
The argument Augustine uses in De Libero Arbitrio (see Silva’s chapter on Augustine in this volume).
- 109.
The species is (i) the natural form of the thing, (ii) the likeness of the natural thing impressed in the sensory part of the soul, (iii) the quiddity or the essence of the thing: Vital du Four (1927), question II, section 1, 199 (hereafter, Qd). The action of light is also necessary for allowing the medium to receive the impressed species (Qd II.1, 191).
- 110.
Vital du Four 1927, Qd II.1, p. 189.
- 111.
“facit eam [potentia] esse intentam ad percipiendum”, Qd II.1, 187.
- 112.
This is also how the “excitation” of visual power by the reception of the seen object is understood in the Anonymi Magistri Artium, Lectura in librum de anima, II.10.3, 277.
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Silva, J. (2014). Medieval Theories of Active Perception: An Overview. In: Silva, J., Yrjönsuuri, M. (eds) Active Perception in the History of Philosophy. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 14. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04361-6_7
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