Abstract
The criminal process can be considered as a battle between public authorities (e.g., public prosecutors, the police, administrative authorities), on one hand, and persons under suspicion or investigation, on the other hand. While public authorities aim at obtaining information in order to override the presumption of innocence, the person investigated is interested in controlling the information flows and ensuring that adverse evidence does not fall into the hands of prosecutors. But this battle has its own rules even in the case where information is obtained through an internal channel or investigation managed by a corporation. This contribution is focused on the problems arisen with this kind of information obtained through corporation’s channels (e.g., whistle-blowing, corporate internal investigations) and, more specific, with its “transfer” to a criminal proceeding. The main conclusion drawn is that the basic guarantees of the criminal justice process must be also respected in these cases. For this reason, corporate regulation on whistle-blowing and internal investigations must be inspired by the basic safeguards of the rule of law with logical and necessary nuances.
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Notes
- 1.
In economic criminal law, the most complicated problems regarding this fundamental right emerge when the public administration, as part of its powers of investigation, obliges corporations to hand over documents which they are legally obliged to produce. An analysis of this problem from a European perspective can be found in Nieto Martin and Blumenberg 2010, p. 397–420.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
For an overview of different strategies in the fight against corporate crime in the USA, as well as the underlying changes in incentive policy (where the benefits they may confer have shifted from the determination of the penalty to the procedural field), see Griffin 2007, p. 311.
- 5.
For a general discussion of the different situations this strategy can produce, see Laufer 2008, p. 99.
- 6.
This was the first path followed by whistle-blowing laws. The most draconian sanctions are foreseen in the § 806 SOA, regarding criminal protection: see Rodríguez Yagüe 2006, p. 447; Ragués i Vallès 2006, p. 3. Firstly, the protection of whistle-blowers depends on whether the employee’s behavior was appropriate with respect to labor and criminal law. With regards to the former, see for example Article 9 of the French Act nº 2007/1598, 13 November 2007, reforming the Code du Travail in order to ensure the protection of whistle-blowers in the workplace. The situation is not so positive, for example, in Switzerland, where whistle-blowing can even be considered a disclosure of trade secrets offense, as happened in the recent Falciani case.
- 7.
- 8.
See, for example, in Germany, § 4 Abs. 5, nº 10, sentence 3 of the EStG, which obliges tax authorities to inform the public prosecutor about any facts that might provide evidence of bribery.
- 9.
OECD 2009: “Member countries should require the external auditor who discovers indications of a suspected act of bribery of a foreign public official to report this discovery to management and, as appropriate, to corporate monitoring bodies.”
- 10.
According to the Wallstreet Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 21 July 2010, Sects. 992 and 748, incentives have been established by the SEC in the Bounty Program. Before the Dodd-Frank Act, the Federal False Claims Act paid whistle-blowers in cases of fraud against public administration. Regarding this and other US laws which offer these kind of incentives, see Schemmel et al. 2008, p. 182; González de León Berini 2013, p. 131, 137.
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
On German regulations on whistle-blowing (§ 46 b StGB) and its implications for compliance, see Dann 2010, p. 30.
- 14.
On internal investigations in general, see Molo et al. 2008; on EU countries, see Moosmayer and Hartwig 2012. Regarding Article 31bis of the Spanish Criminal Code, see Bajo Fernández et al. 2012, p. 190; Gascón Inchausti 2012, p. 119. An introduction to its legal problems can be found in Moosmayer 2013, p. 137.
- 15.
See, for example, in the USA, US Sentencing Commission, Organizational Guidelines—USSC Guidelines Manual—§ 8 A1.2.3, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/Organizational_Guidelines/index.cfm, accessed 16 July 2013. Similarly in the UK, see Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010—Guidance—Principle 1 Proportionate Procedures, 22, http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf, accessed 16 July 2013.
- 16.
See, for example, in Italy, the compliance model proposed by Confindustria, Linee Guida per la costruzione dei modelli di organizzazione, gestione e controllo ex D.Lgs. n. 231/2001, 45., http://www.confindustria.it/Aree/lineeg.nsf/(WebDataIST)?OpenView&MenuID = 572E9F6FDD21FCBCC1256F90002FB00E. Accessed 16 July 2013. Regarding whistle-blowing channels, see the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Sweden, ICC Guidelines on Whistleblowing, http://www.icc.se/mutor/whistleblowing.pdf, accessed 16 July 2013.
- 17.
In the Spanish case, see Emisores Españoles, Grupo de trabajo sobre responsabilidad penal de las personas jurídicas, Informe Final −12 de diciembre de 2012, 37. http://www.emisoresespanoles.es/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Responsabilidad-Penal-Personas-Juridicas-Informe-final.pdf, accessed 16 July 2013. Here, it is shown that almost 100 % of corporations studied had a whistle-blowing channel.
- 18.
With regards to these labor issues in Spanish doctrine, see Goñi Sein 2011, p. 320; Nieto Martín 2012, p. 105. In Germany, where doctrine has addressed this issue on many occasions, see Maschmann 2012, p. 98; Schemmel et al. 2008, p. 233; Fritz 2009, p. 111. A comparison between German—and European—law and US law can be found in Graser 2000.
- 19.
Article 29 Working Party; see the European Commission, Opinion 1/2006 on the application of EU data protection rules to internal whistle-blowing schemes in the fields of accounting, internal accounting controls, auditing matters, fight against bribery, banking and financial crime, adopted on 1 February 2006, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2006/wp117_en.pdf, accessed 16 July 2013. The Spanish agency on data protection is even more strict on some points: see Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Creación de sistemas de denuncias internas en las empresas (mecanismos de “whistleblowing”), http://www.agpd.es/portalwebAGPD/canaldocumentacion/informes_juridicos/otras_cuestiones/common/pdfs/2007-0128_Creaci-oo-n-de-sistemas-de-denuncias-internas-en-las-empresas-mecanismos-de-whistleblowing.pdf, accessed 16 July 2013.
- 20.
About the importance of the “if in doubt, report” approach in the Australian law on whistle-blowing, see Brawn 2008.
- 21.
Regarding the UK and the Public Interest Disclosure Act, 1998, which enshrined the reasonable belief standard, see Gobert and Punch 2000, p. 36.
- 22.
- 23.
On weighing up the advantages of both systems, see Schemmel et al. 2008, p. 178.
- 24.
Sect. 301 SOA. Regarding this matter, see among others Schemmel et al. 2008, p. 69.
- 25.
See Not. 25, Article 29 Working Party; see also European Commission, Opinion 1/2006 (n. 21 to this chapter).
- 26.
The review of the guidelines performed in 2004 established expressly that in addition to implementing elements of their compliance program, the corporation should “otherwise promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law.” This aspect was especially emphasized by the Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Organizational Guidelines: see The US Sentencing Commission, Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/Organizational_Guidelines/Special_Reports/Advisory_Group_Organizational_Guidelines.cfm, accessed 16 July 2013. Regarding this, see Kaplan and Murphy 2009, § 7. On the distinction between compliance programs based on ethical values and those aimed at the formal compliance of law, see Treviño and Weaver 2002, p. 89.
- 27.
It could be useful to consider the jurisprudential criteria establishing when an anonymous report can initiate the criminal process: see Gascón Inchausti 2012, p. 128.
- 28.
- 29.
Judgment of the ECJ (Grand Chamber), 14.9.2010, case C-550/07 P. 14.9.2010.
- 30.
See EUR-Lex, Access to European Union law, Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 1–25, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:001:0001:0025:EN:PDF, accessed 16 July 2013.
- 31.
See The European Association of Chemical Distributors (Fecc), Compliance matters: What companies can do better to respect EU competition rules, November 2011, http://www.fecc.org/fecc/images/stories/downloads/NEWS/compliance_matters_en.pdf, accessed 16 July 2013.
- 32.
See, for example, Schemmel et al. 2008, 311, which mentions the possibility of having an outsourced lawyer or ombudsman in charge of the whistle-blowing channel, admitting however that the client–attorney privilege also has important limitations on this point. In Germany, the judgment of Ladgerichts Hamburg has been specially important (NJW, no. 3501 (2011), pp. 942 ff.). The relevant facts are the following: The Monitoring Council of the HSH Nordbak asked a law firm to carry out an internal investigation on some millionaire loans that the board of directors had awarded. The results of the investigations were given to the prosecutor and he then asked the company to provide other documentation of the investigation (for example, the proceedings of the interviews carried out). When the lawyers declined to hand over this information, the prosecutor ordered it. The court refused the lawyers’ claims, invoking the client–attorney privilege. The argument was that the legal privilege only applies in the framework of the criminal process.
- 33.
For a comparison with the other privileges, see Kaplan and Murphy 2009, § 5.38, p. 5–75.
- 34.
See Mongillo 2012, p. 57.
- 35.
See Moosmayer 2013, p. 137.
- 36.
- 37.
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen, to US Attorneys, Regarding Principles of Federal Prosecutions of Business Organizations. See University of Albany, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General to Heads of Department Components US Attorney—January 20, 2003, http://www.albany.edu/acc/courses/acc695spring2008/thompson%20memo.pdf, accessed 16 July 2013.
- 38.
- 39.
Regarding the legitimacy of internal investigations, see Reeb 2012, p. 58.
- 40.
Stein v. USA, 440 F. Sup. 2006.
- 41.
Griffin 2007, p. 59. See especially the draft law: Attorney–Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008, 10th Congress 2d Session s. 3217, presented by Senator Specter.
- 42.
- 43.
For a comparison of the USA and the EU, see Mackintosh and Angus 2004, p. 31.
- 44.
On the role of the in-house lawyer during investigation and as a part of the investigation team, see Moosmayer 2013, p. 128.
- 45.
See Beulke et al. 2009, p. 23. Regarding the lawyer, it may be necessary to distinguish between two possible scenarios: where the corporate lawyer is, in fact, acting as a lawyer, and where he is acting as a legal adviser. In the latter case, according to the proportionality principle, legal privilege can be restricted.
- 46.
Regarding how to coordinate public and private investigations, see Hartwig and Moosmayer 2012, p. 33.
- 47.
In this regard, Hartwig and Moosmayer 2012, p. 33.
- 48.
Cf. Hartwig and Moosmayer 2012, p. 34.
- 49.
- 50.
Regarding the equivalent distinction between internal audit and internal investigation, see Bührer 2012, p. 106.
- 51.
An example can be found in Biegelman and Biegelman 2010, p. 304; see also American Bar Association (ABA), Upjohn Warnings: Recommended Best Practices when Corporate Counsel Interacts with Corporate Employees—ABA WCCC Working Group, 17 July 2009, http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CR301000/newsletterpubs/ABAUpjohnTaskForceReport.pdf, accessed 16 July 2013.
- 52.
Upjohn v. US, 449 U.S. (1981).
- 53.
Nieto Martín 2012, p 38; Montiel 2012, p. 193. The need for adapting internal investigations to the guarantees of due process has been supported by a document presented on this topic in the German Bar Association, Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer (BRAK-Stellungnahme-Nr. 35/2010, Thesen der Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer zum Unternehmensanwalt im Strafrecht, November 2010), Thesis nº 3: (2) The corporate lawyer will comply with the general rules and standards derived from the rule of law in the internal investigations, especially during the employees’ interviews. (3) The corporate lawyer will carry out the investigation without affecting the quality and utility of evidence.
- 54.
- 55.
- 56.
In favor of applying theory on forbidden evidence, see Reeb 2012, p. 109.
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Martín, A. (2014). Internal Investigations, Whistle-Blowing, and Cooperation: The Struggle for Information in the Criminal Process. In: Manacorda, S., Centonze, F., Forti, G. (eds) Preventing Corporate Corruption. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04480-4_5
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