Abstract
As a consequence of the institutional preconditions applying to the strategic manoeuvring taking place in specific communicative activity types, certain context-dependent argumentative patterns of argument schemes and argumentation structures can be observed in argumentative discourse. Pragma-dialecticians are interested in discovering these patterns and in determining to what extent they are stereotypical of the communicative activity types associated with a specific communicative domain. This paper focuses on the way in which argumentation by analogy manifests itself in argumentative practice and the stereotypical argumentative patterns it is part of in various communicative domains. In the process, the pragma-dialectical view of argumentation by analogy is explained.
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Notes
- 1.
What is involved in characterizing a communicative activity type argumentatively is explained in van Eemeren (2010, pp. 146–151).
- 2.
The critical questions that are relevant here need to be envisaged in the specification that is pertinent to the implementation of the argument scheme concerned in the specific macro-context of the communicative activity type in which the argumentation is put forward.
- 3.
The argumentative patterns that can be observed in argumentative discourse can be viewed as empirical analogues of the patterns of analytically relevant moves in a critical discussion that are on theoretical grounds distinguished in dialectical profiles. For the notion of dialectical profile see van Eemeren (2010, pp. 98–100).
- 4.
If an argument in defense of a standpoint is expected not to be accepted immediately, more arguments needs to be advanced, which leads to an argumentative pattern with a complex argumentation structure.
- 5.
The underlying assumption here is that in the argumentation stage protagonists may in principle be supposed to aim for making the strongest case in the macro-context concerned by trying to advance a combination of reasons that will satisfy the antagonist by leaving no critical doubts unanswered. In the process they may be expected to exploit the argument schemes they consider most effective in the situation at hand and to use all multiple, coordinative and subordinative argumentation that is necessary to respond to the critical reactions the antagonist may be expected to come up with.
- 6.
The stereotypical argumentative patterns pragma-dialecticians are interested in result from the use of certain modes of strategic manoeuvring instrumental in reaching the institutional point in accordance with the institutional preconditions of the communicative activity type and responding to the exigencies of the communicative domain.
- 7.
See Fearnside and Holther (1959, p. 23) for a similar representation of the internal organization of this variant of analogy argumentation.
- 8.
A special case of the normative analogy is the technique of refuting arguments that is called parallel reasoning (Juthe 2009). Parallel reasoning boils down to refuting in the case of two arguments which are structurally similar one of the arguments by showing that the other one is flawed.
- 9.
Even more basic is the question of whether there is in the discussion concerned intersubjective agreement about the use of the rule of justice. It is in principle possible that one of the parties refuses to agree with the use of this rule.
- 10.
The principles at work in reconstructing figurative analogies are very similar to Searle’s principles of metaphorical interpretation (Searle 1979, pp. 103–112). According to Searle, the interpretation of a metaphorical statement such as “Sam is a pig” as “Sam is filthy, gluttonous and sloppy, etc.” is possible because of Principle 2: “Things which are P are contingently R. (…) if the metaphor works, the property R should be a salient or well-known property of P things” (p. 107). It is a well-known and salient property of pigs (P) that they are filthy etc. (R). The same applies to the phoros used in a figurative analogy.
- 11.
An argumentative pattern resembling this one is the combination of pragmatic argumentation and argumentation by example. As we have shown in van Eemeren and Garssen (2010), in political discourse pragmatic argumentation is frequently encountered in combination with other types of argumentation, especially argumentation by example and analogy argumentation. In debates in the European Parliament about agricultural legislation, for instance, the Members of the European Parliament often resort to arguments by example to show that certain measures defended by pragmatic argumentation will in fact be disastrous. It depends on the nature of the causal claim whether analogy argumentation or argumentation by example is used to support it. General causal claims need to be defended by argumentation by example. Singular causal claims can be defended by analogy argumentation. Note that the causal claim is in this case a specific one: it only refers to the United States. If the causal claim had been general (Gun control generally leads to fewer casualties), argument from example instead of analogy argumentation would have been needed.
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van Eemeren, F., Garssen, B. (2014). Argumentation by Analogy in Stereotypical Argumentative Patterns. In: Ribeiro, H. (eds) Systematic Approaches to Argument by Analogy. Argumentation Library, vol 25. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06334-8_3
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