Abstract
In this chapter I identify the conceptual tools needed to establish claims for the existence of conceptual ties, along with the principles governing the use of those tools, and present a model of conceptual analysis. I identify and justify those principles in the light of the conditions for the meaningfulness of expressions in language, which I extract from an analysis of the concept of meaning. The conclusions of this analysis are organized into a schematic model of the workings of a language. According to this model, the meaning of every word in any language is determined by its role in the systematic mapping of all possible states of affairs included in its conceptual scheme.
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Notes
- 1.
The first part of Strawson's Individuals presents an impressive variety of techniques for revealing conceptual ties, which exemplify both types of instances. On the one hand are the claims for the existence of conceptual ties that seem to rely on verificationist assumptions, for example the analysis of the connection between the concept of self and other minds (Strawson 1959, Chap. 3. For a similar claim, see Stroud 1968). On the other hand, in Strawson's analysis of the conceptual tie that holds between space and objectivity (in which he attempts to find room for the idea of the existence of unperceived particulars, via the idea of reidentification, in a sound-world whose features provide an analogy of space), Strawson frankly admits “Some might find it less persuasive than others. I can imagine one who is not disposed to be at all persuaded by it …” (Strawson 1959, 79), and “I do not think there is any test beyond what we find it satisfactory to say. One can certainly influence the finding by pointing to respects in which the parallel holds or fails to hold—and can also suggest improvements. But no more” (Strawson 1959, p. 81).
- 2.
My discussion assumes that we can talk about meanings, and even about meanings of individual words, and not just about the meanings of sentences. I am aware that this assumption has been famously criticized by Quine (1960, Chap. 3; 1970). I do not attempt, in the scope of this book, to confront Quine's criticism, which has itself been extensively discussed and criticized, especially with regard to its physicalist and behaviorist assumptions, some of which I also do not accept (see, for example, Chomsky 1969). My hope is that the model I present in this chapter goes some way in convincing its readers that talk about the meanings of words (and about conceptual analysis) is philosophically worthwhile.
- 3.
- 4.
This thesis goes back to Frege, who based it on the ability to understand new propositions (Frege 1984, p. 390).
- 5.
This consideration can be seen as supporting Frege's famous claim: “Only in a proposition have the words really a meaning” (Frege 1980, p. 71 [Sect. 60]).
- 6.
- 7.
It is a standard convention that the implication of not including a predicate in a proposition is a way of refraining from affirming or denying the property. My analysis, however, is not affected by the existence of exceptions to this convention. There is another way to refrain from affirming or denying a property, useful in propositions in which omitting the predicate will ruin the proposition, for example in the proposition “Dan's car is red,” simply by saying “Dan's car is red or not red.” The impossibility of omitting the predicate in a certain proposition is discussed later on.
- 8.
In the present context I relate only to the idea of conceptual necessity, and ignore the possibility of a necessity which is not based on meaning, as suggested, for example, by Kripke (1980, pp. 38–39). I do not claim that a necessity which is not conceptual is impossible. This possibility, however, is irrelevant for the present discussion.
- 9.
It is possible to follow Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and say that contradictions (and tautologies) are senseless, but not nonsensical (Wittgenstein 1963, proposition 4.461). It is not necessary, however, to go that far, because I have accepted the idea that the ability to describe may be only one aspect of meaning. In this context it is important to mention an interesting attempt to explain Wittgenstein's claim in the Tractatus that philosophical propositions are nonsense (on the basis of the idea that in philosophy words are used in a manner that prevents them from contributing to the meaning of any sentence) with the help of considerations similar to those presented here (Carruthers 1989, Chap. 6). This interpretation is based on the claim that a symbol is a sign that contributes to the sense of sentences in which it occurs (based on proposition 3.31 in the Tractatus), and therefore its sense is dependent upon its ability to occur in sentences in which it can contribute to their sense, and this does not include, for example, contradictions and tautologies, that have no sense. The example given is of the predicate “object”: in “Mary is an object,” the predicate “is an object” makes no contribution to the sense of this sentence which has not already been made by the name “Mary” (Carruthers 1989, p. 63).
- 10.
It may be suggested that it is possible to replace the predicate “red” with a different predicate. That possibility, however, raises issues which require separate discussion, and is discussed later.
- 11.
The contribution of word from different categories is not always as straightforward as in the case of predicates, as I show with regard to names. Therefore, it is not always easy to determine how to deny that contribution.
- 12.
The idea of “conceptual dimensions” I explain and elaborate on in Sect. 2.4.
- 13.
Some may object that this analysis of the function of negation fails to explain the proposition “The concept five is not red,” because this proposition surely does not imply that the concept five is of a different color than red. To this objection I reply that in this alleged counterexample the phrase “not red” does not contribute to meaning of the sentence, because there are not two possibilities, of the concept five being red and not being red, such that the occurrence of the phrase “not red” designates which of these possibilities is realized. My analysis, therefore, which relates to the meaning of negation, that is, to its contribution to the meaning of propositions, is not affected by this alleged counterexample.
- 14.
This claim is surely not new to those familiar with what has became known as the Generality Principle, first introduced by Strawson (1959, p. 99). The consideration behind Strawson's principle is however different (perhaps influenced by Kant's distinction between concepts and intuitions) and based on the claim that “the idea of a predicate is correlative with that of a range of distinguishable individuals of which the predicate can be significantly […] affirmed” (Strawson 1959, p. 99 n. 1). Evans’ Generality Constraint, on the other hand, should not be confused with the present principles, because it is a constraint on the explanation of the ability to understand an existing conceptual complexity of a language, and not a constraint on the existence of that complexity (Evans 1982, pp. 100–105).
- 15.
It is also possible to simplify the notation, and stress the similarity between names and predicates, by the convention that adding the negation “not” to the name “Socrates,” that is, “not-Socrates is Greek,” would mean “Someone that is not Socrates is Greek.”
- 16.
It must be said that there is a difference between the negation of the contribution of subject and that of a predicate. For example, the propositions “Socrates is Greek” and “not Socrates is Greek” are consistent, but the propositions “Socrates is Greek” and “Socrates is not Greek” are not consistent. This difference, however, has no bearing on the analogy between predicate and name/subject, with regard to the conditions for a word to contribute to the meaning of a sentence.
- 17.
According to Russell's theory of descriptions, for example, the proposition “Socrates is Greek” actually contains more than two components (for example, it might be claimed that the underlying structure is “The philosopher that drank the poison is Greek”). This analysis, however, does not affect the conclusions of my analysis, because the analysis and its conclusions apply to every meaningful constituent of a proposition, whether it is simple or complex. The proposition “Someone that is not Socrates is Greek” should be analyzed, according to that suggestion, as “Someone that is not the philosopher that drank the poison is Greek.”
- 18.
It is possible to think of features of a word as contributing to the meaning of a proposition. We can use, for example, a notation in which the order of the names “Dan” and “Dana” is written in italics: the proposition “Dan is taller than Dana” and “Dana is taller than Dan” would mean, in that notation, what we mean by the proposition “Dan is taller than Dana.” This means, of course, that in that notation word order is not a conceptual component of the proposition, that is, it does not contribute to the meaning of the sentence.
- 19.
In this respect the conceptual dimensions of subjects is different from that of predicates, because in the conceptual dimensions of subjects the possibilities are not conflicting: “Socrates is Greek” and “Someone that is not Socrates is Greek” can be both true.
- 20.
Assuming the occurrence of the predicate in that proposition is meaningful, that is, that predicate is ascribed to something that can, conceptually, be single or not single.
- 21.
Only “as if,” because, naturally, if the elimination would be so drastic, the concept y would not be included in the resulting conceptual scheme, and therefore these propositions would be meaningless in that conceptual scheme, and neither conceptually true or false.
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Yehezkel, G. (2014). Meaning. In: The Conceptual Structure of Reality. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07185-5_2
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