Abstract
In this chapter I argue that a weak version of the principle of the uniformity of nature is a necessary truth. According to this principle, every reality for which the question of its subjection to natural laws can arise is subject to natural laws. I argue that this question arises only for a subject who knows of the existence of objective reality, qua objective. I show that a necessary condition this knowledge is that the subject can acquire knowledge of past and future events, which he does not perceive directly through his senses, and that only natural (contingent) regularities enable the subject to do so. The necessary features of reality, which are uncovered in the previous chapters, are sufficient for raising the question whether reality is subject to natural laws. Hence, the conclusion of this chapter is that every possible reality is subject to natural laws.
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Notes
- 1.
Hume, who came up against this question while analyzing the concept of causation, associated this question with the justification of induction, which he thought necessary for identifying the relation of cause and effect. Unfortunately, associating the question of the lawfulness of nature with the analysis of causation and the justification of induction masks the independent importance of this question. Whether or not causation should be analyzed in terms of regularity, that is, constant conjunction between cause and effect, as Hume believed (1978, p. 87), and even if inductive reasoning does not assume the principle of the uniformity of nature (Okasha 2001), and even if science does not rely on induction (Popper 1972), the question whether reality is subject to natural laws remains one of major importance.
- 2.
This is true even if there are inductive inferences that do not assume the uniformity of nature, for such inferences are not acceptable in the context of justifying the principle of the uniformity of nature (see, Lange 2002, pp. 231–232). Any attempt to establish the uniformity of nature empirically is therefore circular.
- 3.
- 4.
Another exception to the prevailing tendency is Strawson. Although Strawson does not explicitly claim that the principle of the uniformity of nature is a conceptual truth, following Kant he offers an interesting line of thought to that effect. In Chap. 2 (“Sounds”) of his Individuals (1959), Strawson attempts to build an objective reality, composed solely of sounds, with the help of a reoccurring sequence of sounds, whose regularity simulates the regularity which is established by natural laws. However, although this line of thought is fascinating, it hardly proves that objectivity assumes natural laws.
- 5.
I do not attempt to confront directly the claim that the principle of the uniformity of nature is a contingent truth. Disproving the arguments of your opponents is always the easiest way to support your own view. However, in the present context I believe that the burden of proof lies on the shoulders of those who believe that the principle of the uniformity of nature is a conceptual truth. I agree with Hume that it seems to us as though we can conceive a change in the course of nature. Although this is merely a subjective fact, it is sufficient to shift the burden of proof to those who believe that the principle of the uniformity of nature is a conceptual truth.
- 6.
This may be all there is to causal laws. However, this question extends beyond the scope of this Chapter.
- 7.
This includes Kant's dubious category of the synthetic-a priori, which, following Bennett, is interpreted in the present context as referring to truths about non-trivial conceptual connections (Bennett 1966, p. 43). Thus, although Kant himself rejects this classification, I construe him in what follows as arguing that the principle of the uniformity of nature is a conceptual truth.
- 8.
“The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object. It is therefore entitled objective…” (B139).
- 9.
Kant's argument focuses on the concept of change. However, his argument makes a general point, which relates to the ability to distinguish between simultaneous and successive (objective) events.
- 10.
This demand for justification is general, and is not committed to any specific account of knowledge (For example, it does not exclude reliabilist-externalist theories of justification). However, my use of the term “knowledge” obviously contradicts accounts which deny that knowledge can be analyzed in terms of justified belief (see, for example, Williamson 2000).
- 11.
This conclusion might seem trivial, because of the tendency to interpret the principle of the uniformity of nature in spatio-temporal terms. According to this interpretation, the uniformity of nature implies that space and time are causally inert. The inertness of space and time enables us to formulate laws of nature, which apply equally to an indefinite number of cases, regardless of their spatio-temporal position. According to this interpretation of the principle of the uniformity of nature, either time or space is a necessary condition for raising the problem of the uniformity of nature. However, although I find this interpretation insightful, it is not as obvious as it may seem, and I do not rely on this interpretation in my analysis.
- 12.
I do not assume a foundationalist conception of knowledge, for I do not suggest that our whole knowledge is based on perceptions alone. Furthermore, this premise does not imply a denial of the possibility that the propositions which are based on perceptions would be dismissed based on a variety of different considerations.
References
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Hume, D. (1978). A treatise of human nature. In L. A. Selby-Bigge (Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Yehezkel, G. (2014). Natural Laws. In: The Conceptual Structure of Reality. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07185-5_7
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