Abstract
For any system with a desired set of assurances, the trusted computing base (TCB) includes every component that needs to be trusted to realize the desired assurances. In other words, the assumptions regarding the integrity of the TCB components, and more importantly, only the assumption of integrity of the TCB is required to realize all desired assurances for the system.
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Notes
- 1.
Notable exceptions to this rule are the infamous WEP [104] protocol, and the Xbox hack [105] that exploits a weakness in the Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) cipher [106].
- 2.
Typically the manufacturer of the TPM chip.
- 3.
For example, a file hash, or signature, or current balance, or a DNS record, etc.
- 4.
Intangible assumptions regarding the integrity of such “other” components can turn out to be incorrect.
- 5.
In practice the delegation may occur in a hierarchical manner, through multiple levels of registrars and ISPs.
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© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
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Ramkumar, M. (2014). Universal Trusted Computing Bases. In: Symmetric Cryptographic Protocols. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07584-6_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07584-6_10
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Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-07583-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-07584-6
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