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Society and Market

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Market-Based Fisheries Management

Part of the book series: MARE Publication Series ((MARE,volume 16))

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Abstract

This chapter begins by discussing what a market is and examining the relations between society, state, and market. This discussion serves to broaden fisheries policy design as a social and cultural object of inquiry, seeing regulations as related to social groups and cultural forms and their agency. The chapter continues by examining the policy design of the Danish market-based fisheries management system. The chapter asks what is at stake when a market is introduced and further evaluates the concrete design of safeguards and anti-concentration rules. Rather than a best-case example, the chapter shows that the Danish Vessel Quota Share system is full of flaws and contradictions in its basic design.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    It should be noted that the VQS were given as private property to the operators with the condition that they could be revoked with an 8-year notice. It should also be noted that most people in the sector consider this scenario unrealistic under the current political setup. Reasons for this include general path dependency, the investments made in quota, its use as collateral, and the simple fact that few operators and their banks are likely to push for changes.

  2. 2.

    To my knowledge the term rights holder is a rhetorical way to avoid talking about owners. See previous note.

  3. 3.

    “Fish shall follow the tonnage.” It is interesting to note that one of the first public texts on the New Regulation did not talk about “access” or “fishing rights” but already had the “fish” phrase established.

  4. 4.

    http://www.inshore-ireland.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1010&Itemid=154 (Accessed June 01, 2012).

  5. 5.

    “Please do not force us into a box” was the wish, according to the Danish Fishermen’s Organization.

  6. 6.

    This database is far from perfect, and in the data used to determine each vessel’s gear type, I have observed a number of mistakes. The tendency is that vessels registered as gillnetters have changed gear without this information added to the database. Also in each area a portion of the VQS was given to nonexisting vessels, socalled Flying Dutchmen, which are papers holding rights but without a gear type registered nor any actual catch. Flyshooting is a method similar to Danish seine, but with the vessel moving forward while dragging in the seine. These are registered as Danish seine, but my knowledge of the vessels has led me to include flyshooting, which is not a category in the EU fleet register.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Ethnology Saxo Institute, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark

    Jeppe Høst

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  1. Jeppe Høst
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Correspondence to Jeppe Høst .

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Høst, J. (2015). Society and Market. In: Market-Based Fisheries Management. MARE Publication Series, vol 16. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16432-8_3

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