Abstract
Heidegger connected his name with the endeavor of renewing the question regarding Being (Seinsfrage). In BT (1927), he attempted to bring the issue of Being and everything concerning it back to the fore, by investigating the question of what the things themselves (die Sache selbst) are in its case. In this way, he managed to maintain his distance from the inherited and uninterpellated theories and speculations around “Being” (εἶναι). At the time, he continued to think that the precondition for arriving at the very things themselves was—more or less—the phenomenological method that Husserl introduced in his breakthrough phenomenological opus, the Logical Investigations (1900–01). On this basis, in his “What is Metaphysics?” (1929) (WM), Heidegger explicitly maintained that the truth with regard to the issue of Being could and should be mediated—no matter how paradoxical this may sound—through the question regarding Nothing (Nichts).
Parmenides, to be sure, had warned that nothing (μηδέν) is not, for that which is the ἐόν, and that only with what is can understanding (νοεῖν) and speaking (λέγειν) be correlated. The possibility of arriving at truths depends on propositions that say “is” with regard to what is, and “is not” with regard to what is not. Heidegger, however, thought that the most important issue for philosophy as ontology (but even for humans as beings engaged in praxis) was Nothing (Nichts)—and, moreover, Nothing as Being!
But how could someone conceive of and bring to language these obviously limit subject matters? Haven’t we seen that Logic, following Parmenides’ instruction, has progressively burked all talk of Being, and barred all talk about Nothing?
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Notes
- 1.
According to a clarification that Heidegger himself offers us in the 1943 edition of the text, this term is placed within inverted commas, in order to show that by it, only one possible interpretation (Auslegung) of the essence of thought is meant (WM, 85/109 n. b). As Borgmann (1968) notes, Heidegger’s criticism of the logistic conception of language (λόγος), that is, of the project that wants to reduce philosophy to Formal Logic—a criticism which started with his 1915 Habilitationsschrift on Duns Scotus’ theory of categories and meaning and was extended through his subsequent thought as a whole—moves along the following lines. First, Heidegger raises objections against the view that the totality of rational thought can be reconstructed in the form of a calculus. For example, as Borgmann notes, we know that material implication and counterfactual conditionals offer unsurpassable resistance to such a possibility of reduction. Second, Formal Logic did not succeed in becoming either an exhaustive or even an indeed elucidatory basis for the reduction of Mathematics. Third, much like Husserl, Heidegger claimed that Formal Logic did not succeed in becoming a complete philosophy of science in general. Fourth, the sovereignty that Logic experienced during the twentieth century, connected with developments in technology, enabled it to raise highly questionable claims as to the in-principle equalizability between human beings and calculating machines, as well as between language and the sequences and combinations of symbol rows (see Borgmann 1968, 148–9). Nevertheless, in this chapter, we will try to deal with something perhaps more fundamental, namely Heidegger’s view of the look and the presuppositions of one of the most elementary and fundamental subject matters or constituents of Logic itself: negation. (Note also that in all the following cited passages, some silent changes may have been made. In particular, the term “Nichten” is here rendered as “noning” and not as “nihiliating” or “noth-ing,” etc. The reason will become apparent in the sections that follow.)
- 2.
In the rather hostile recent readings of Heidegger, especially on the issue of Nothing and its relation to Logic, we find Philipse (1998; on our subject matter, see pp. 9–15, 203–204, 331ff in particular) and Witherspoon (2002). Defences of Heidegger in response to Carnap’s reproach are offered in Inwood (1999, 272–5) and Kaüfer (2001, 470ff). Of special interest here is also an incident in the analytic bibliography that has been generally suppressed. In 1965, the journal Philosophical Review published, in bilingual format, a very interesting short text written by Wittgenstein in 1929. This text is a letter that Wittgenstein sent to Weismann. In the original text, Wittgenstein speaks in very positive terms about Heidegger’s concepts of anxiety and Nothing, having in mind, according to all indications, the latter’s WM. It has generally gone unnoticed, however, that in the aforementioned publication of that letter, Wittgenstein’s positive references to Heidegger were eliminated. (Apparently, this was perhaps a more effective elimination of ‘metaphysics’!) On this, see also Murray 1974.
- 3.
With regard to the difficulty we have in defining Being, see also BT, §1.
- 4.
Independently of this, in his lecture course Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (WS 1927–28), Heidegger declares that he is not satisfied with Kant’s treatment of Nothing. In Kant, Heidegger says, Nothing is still considered a concept (see GA 25, 204). Heidegger connects Nothing with a supposed intuitional phenomenon, which can appear as an intentional correlate in a very special thymotic experience: anxiety. Regardless of whether Heidegger is here doing justice to Kant or not (I believe not), we will see what he means by all this in what follows.
- 5.
Here, I connect lichten primarily to the light (Licht) and mediately with the clearing (Lichtung) as openness (das Offene). More specifically, by “light,” in this case, I do not mean a light beam that emanates from a source and makes this or that being visible in the openness; rather what is intended is the self-luminosity of what makes manifest that openness in its horizonality.
- 6.
Analogous is the meaning of the reference to anxiety and ‘nothing’ (Nichts) on pp. 245/266, 315/343 of BT. Here, we find the connection with the thematic of Nothing as it is introduced in WM (1929) (see also Inwood 1999, 289). In fact, anxiety is connected, in Heidegger, not only with the ontological function, which we are here trying to elucidate, but also with a fundamental praxial function (of which we were given a hint just above in the main text). For further development of this praxial function of anxiety, however, a separate treatment would be necessary.
- 7.
We will see that this mention of the beings-in-their-totality creates problems in our understanding of Heidegger’s analyses regarding Nothing. Problems like this, together with others concerning the polysemy of Nothing and of the lethe (λήθη) of Being, make us recognize that the difficulty of our subject matter is intensified by a certain vacillation by Heidegger himself with respect to the issue of Nothing, its relation with Being, and the ‘essence’ of these notions. See also the next note.
- 8.
Despite the possible agreement with Sheehan (2001) on the meaning of Logic’s unsuitability for thematizing Nothing, and the dependence of negation upon the presupposed experience of Nothing, our views on the meaning and function of anxiety vis-à-vis Nothing diverge. Here is how Sheehan, in the section “What the Nothing Does: It relegates openness to what-is,” interprets (renders) the cited passage from GA 9, 114: “In dread we ‘draw back from….’ This is not flight, but the calmness of wonder. This movement ‘back from’ is initiated by the nothing. The nothing does not draw us into itself; rather, its essence is to push us away. In pushing us back away from itself, it directs us to the receding beings that it lets slip away in terms of their whole. This business of pushing us back and directing us toward the beings that are slipping away as a whole, is the way the nothing presses in upon openness during dread.” The difference in our perspectives is palpable. For Sheehan, Nothing is something that could draw us “into” itself, but pushes “us” back away “from itself,” and “direct us to the receding beings.” In the following, the difference in our readings will become more visible.
- 9.
This characterization of Nothing/Being as a “phenomenological residuum” in anxiety is not accidental. In the wider context of the way the function of anxiety in Heidegger’s Phenomenology is here understood, anxiety should be considered as having a role analogous to that which transcendental reduction has in Husserl’s Phenomenology. From a certain perspective, the role of both is to make the a priori intuitable. A more extended explanation of this idea, however, cannot be given here. In this chapter, I focus strictly on the meaning of the connection between Nothing/Being and the aforementioned totality or, better, structural wholeness of the beings that became insignificant or meaningless in anxiety.
- 10.
See P, 90/114.
- 11.
White (1985) refers to this relation between Nothing and Being, understanding it as an unexplainable relation of mutual implication or inclusion (Nothing is a part of Being) (52, 56, 214 n. 6). Elsewhere, Being is supposedly “limited by the active presence of Nothing” (53), in the sense that Nothing constitutes the receding of the totality of beings and, thus, delimits or restricts Being as its coupling, as it were, state; for this reason Nothing merely stands on the same ontological level as Being as such (55). From the point of view of what we have seen up to this point, this view is not quite correct. Nothing does not amount to or constitute something like the nothing of beings, in the sense of their “not” qua denial or absence of beings-in-their-totality (it is not their οὐδέν—i.e., it does not mean “not a single being”). Such an understanding of Nothing does not yet distinguish it from logical negation (even if we assume that we do not have to do with the nothing of one particular being, but with the nothing of a group of beings). From this point of view, as we will also see below (§9.8), White’s understanding of Nothing still appears ontic, not ontological. This is why, given that Heidegger actually identifies Nothing with (ontological) Being, White justifiably wonders how is it possible that Nothing could constitute “a factor within the totality of beings” (56).
- 12.
In Chap. 8, §§8.6, 8.7 and 8.8, we have already seen what such research can yield with regard to Being as sense.
- 13.
See, e.g., CP, 136/173–4, 174/222–3, 208–9/295–7.
- 14.
- 15.
This subsection is re-arranged and orientated, in comparison to the corresponding Greek original publication.
- 16.
Sein überhaupt. Remember the marginalium of the Hütte copy of the BT, where Heidegger makes clear that by “überhaupt” he means the καθ’ ὅλου, the universal, the in itself—not, that is, something genological or generic, something like ‘genus’ (see SZ, 17 note a). Thus, it would have been better if instead of Being in general, we referred to Being universally, or to Being in itself, or to Being as such, or to Being itself.
- 17.
As is sometimes clarified, e.g., in the “Postscript” of the WM (233/306 n. b). See also the relevant references in the second half of §9.5.
- 18.
These meanings are suggested by Heidegger himself, in the fifth edition of WM (see P, 114 n. b).
- 19.
“Nothing” also has the same sense in the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (1928) (GA 26, 252), while, as Heidegger explains in his “Zur Seinsfrage” (1955), in WM, having as his audience mainly scientists who think that truthful is only the being(s) and “beyond that nothing,” Nothing is the most convenient way of introducing them to that which is not (a) being, but rather is the condition for the possibility of being(s), i.e., to the Being of being(s) (P, 316–7/418). In the literature, there is always some uncertainty when someone has to refer more determinatively to the Being about which Heidegger talks either before or after the notorious “turn” in his thought. For the time being, let what is already said here and in Chap. 8 be considered sufficient. See, however, also Theodorou 2010a.
- 20.
See, e.g., the pages of BT regarding anxiety (“the ‘nothing’ and ‘nowhere’” within the opened up world) or of WM (P, 90 n. b/114 n. a, 234/307). In WM, Heidegger already talks about another thymotic disposition in which we are set before the wholeness of beings. When authentic boredom bursts out, “drifting here and there in the abysses of our existence like a muffing fog” (P, 87/110), the beings in their entirety are pushed aside into sheer indifference. Boredom, though, must not be confused with anxiety itself, in which Nothing makes its appearance. Nothing, as Heidegger makes explicitly clear, is not the result of negating (saying “not” to) the totality of the beings as they have been put together or grouped in the indifference of boredom, or even of joy (P, 87/110). We will see how very different the indifference about beings in their entirety during boredom is (or even the negation of the thusly grouped beings) from the fundamental loss (Ausfall) of beings in anxiety, which discloses Nothing to us. Hence, it is an issue whether Heidegger ever replaces the treatment of anxiety with that of boredom or, at least, whether he equates them with one another or not. That there exists a substantial difference between anxiety and boredom has been rightly pinpointed by Käufer (2005, 486–7); below, I refer to Käufer’s view regarding what happens in anxiety. Inwood, for his part, despite distinguishing the function of anxiety from that of boredom (Inwood 1999, 274–5), erroneously suggests that this distinction does not hold in Heidegger (ibid., 285–6).
- 21.
See §9.5 above. This means that as a rule, within such an interconnection between the thematics of BT and of WM, Nothing is basically understood via BT, i.e., as being apparently identical with Being as sense.
- 22.
See White 1985, 50–1.
- 23.
See White 1985, 53, 55; see also notes 11, 41 in this chapter. As long as no clear distinction is made between the wholeness (or whole or, even better, as is here already marked, structural wholeness or web-context) of the beings and their totality as entirety, the content of the experience of anxiety, i.e., the essence of Nothing, will remain confused.
- 24.
See Käufer 2005, 483–4, 501 n. 7.
- 25.
See also Chap. 8, §8.6 of the present book. Moreover, we must abstain from the particulars of this approach, i.e., from the idea that in anxiety the significance of the beings recedes, in the sense that it gets lost, as it were, with the beings now shining forth even more intensely as an absolutely sovereign holistic totality of entities in themselves. What I have already said up to this point suffices to make the difference in perspective visible. To be sure, Käufer characterizes this holistic totality of the remaining and magnified or emphasised beings as the background of our comportment toward the beings; a background of meaning-conditions that make the beings be (2005, 483–4). However, he conceives it as the background comprised by the “rest of the beings” when we relate ourselves directly with one of them in their world (ibid., 484). At the crucial moments of explanation, Käufer makes do with pinpointing such a holistic conception of the beings. A holistic unity of beings, though, is nothing more than a being. Thus, his explanation of Nothing in WM remains (i) ontic, since it does not fully meet the exigencies of the phenomenon Heidegger describes, (ii) one-dimensional, because it restricts itself solely to Heidegger’s suggestion regarding the identification between Nothing and Being and the description of abweisende Verweisung as contained in the main text of WM, and (iii) misleading, due to the way in which this latter peculiar referentiality is ultimately interpreted.
- 26.
See Inwood 1999, 275, 278–9, 284.
- 27.
This is why the confusion with regard to the relation between negation and Nothing, detected earlier in White (1985), is further intensified when he undertakes the task of comparing and fully paralleling the problem of Nothing in Heidegger and the problem of the non-being in the Platonic Sophist (1985, 63).
- 28.
This is the core of Heidegger’s approach to the question of whether there is an all-inclusive condition (of utmost ‘generality’ or, better, universality) for the possibility of beings, i.e., a meaning of “Being” from which all other meanings of “Being” take their origin in whatever way. Perhaps a better way to conceive of this problem may be considered; better than the traditional Platonic geno-logical or generic conception. Heidegger, however, was never clear on what this way could be. It may, moreover, be questioned whether this sought-after (and still unavailable) alternative way would truly be better than Aristotle’s analogical conception of Being. For the time being, let us stop with this provisional comment. In Chap. 10, §10.5, we will have the opportunity to examine some further points concerning the precise position and limitations of anxiety within Heidegger’s original phenomenological and post-phenomenological questioning regarding Being.
- 29.
In studying BT, it is not difficult to feel one’s attention caught by the fact that in various places of that work where Heidegger refers to Being, he later adds, in the margins, questions of the sort: “which Being?”, “Dasein’s Being?”, “Being as sense?”, “Being as Being?”, “Being as such?”, etc. This is a reflection of the ambivalence we previously discussed.
- 30.
As in our times (in our καιρός), let us say, which seem to harbour new sense-givings, a new era, and a new actual worldliness (nobody can know yet if that is for good or bad—Heidegger thinks “for good,” since he accepts Hölderlin’s view, in his “Patmos,” that “But where danger is, / the salvatory power grows too”; my trnsl.). By the way, we can also add an intermediate meaning of Nothing here: that of the infinitely thin border, limit, or verge that separates the at-each-time disclosed Being (as sense) from the limitless abysmal source of all such Beings, i.e., from Being as such or Being as Being (see P, 234/307–8, 237/311, 238/312). Heidegger even refers to Nothing as the “veil” that hides Being as Being (Seyn). These latter ‘two plus one’ meanings of Nothing (C, D, and the ‘intermediate’ one just mentioned) will become very important for the (no longer phenomenological) way in which Heidegger treats Being after WM.
- 31.
From the above, of course, it is implied that, in essence, the fundamental meanings (C) and, most basically, (D) of Nothing are both already present in BT. It is possible that this may raise the objection that, if true, then the thematic of the self-concealing/self-disclosing Being can already be found in BT and is not a radically novel element in Heidegger’s thought after the so-called “turn” of the early 1930s. Indeed, as I see it, in BT there is enough evidence to help us understand that in the already published part of that work, the analyses are conducted—even if from an as yet not totally decided point of view—from within the scheme of the turn from the self-disclosing/self-enclosing kairological Being as Being to the disclosed historical Being as sense. The present context, however, is not the place for a further elaboration of this point. Meanwhile, and solely indicatively, one can look at Marx 1971, Richardson 1963, Pöggeler 1963, and Capobianco 2010.
- 32.
We will return to this issue in Chap. 10.
- 33.
For exceptions, see von Hermann 1993 and De Gennaro 2008. It is a bit of a surprise that Richardson’s tradition of Heidegger interpretation does not seem to have fully entered the sphere of the difference under discussion. To refer to its most recent exposition, Capobianco (2010), although an elegant treatment (that is close to Heidegger’s thinking) of some crucial key-concepts, one of which is that of Being, special care is taken only to separate Being from beingness, and not Being as sense from Being as such (or Being itself or Being in general or Seyn, etc., that is, Nothing). See Capobianco 2010, Chap. 1 and, especially pp. 8–9.
- 34.
I have my reservations about Sheehan’s identification of Heidegger’s Befragtes with “das Sein selbst: The very being [of things] is under investigation.” (ibid., 258). The Befragtes is simply the particular being that a phenomenologist has to interrogate in order to arrive to the first and closer appearance of Being as Being of the beings, or Being as sense or as truth and, from it, to Being as such. The Gefragtes is clearly Being and the Erfragtes is the point of view from which we are interested into this Being, i.e., from the point of view of its meaning. This is why Heidegger says that he is after the meaning of Being, which he generally discovers to be time-like. When he tries to be more specific, he also tells us that Being as sense always has the meaning of some historical understanding of the time character “Zeitlichkeit,” the time in which we run our lives. In contrast, when the question turns to Being as such, we are forced to speculate another time-character, that of Temporalität, the time in which the Ereignis happens qua ‘essencing’ of Being as such in the historical state of some Being as sense, understood and appearing in the clearing of the historical Dasein. The question of whether Heidegger remained a phenomenologist, as Sheehan suggests, in his quest of Being as such, is one we will return to in Chap. 10.
- 35.
See Fay 1977, 39, 45.
- 36.
See Fay 1977, 42.
- 37.
- 38.
Let us recall here Käufer’s idea that in Heidegger, Nothing concerns the beings in their holistic—unfortunately not further specified—totality (see §9.7 above here).
- 39.
See Fay 1977, 35.
- 40.
Sheehan (2014) refers to this, and sees only the hiddenness of Being as sense, which was already explicitly thematized in BT.
- 41.
If these two different kinds of lack of awareness with regard to Being (and Nothing) are not kept distinct, the meaning of Heidegger’s claim concerning the foundedness of the logical negation upon Nothing remains confused. In chap. 1 of Fay’s book (1977), we start with indistinctively parallel references to these two kinds of unavailability (until p. 14), while later we turn exclusively to the first. Chapter 2 of the same work starts with the second thematic, and two pages later we are brought back to the first, just in order to continue again with the second (on p. 32). The same occurs in chap. 3 (as can be characteristically certified, in e.g., the transitions from pp. 38–39 and pp. 44–45). Chapter 3 is of special interest to us here, since it concerns the special issue of the relation between Logic and Being. The vagueness regarding these thematics is detectable also in other scholars. Cf. also Sheehan 1998, §§4–7.
- 42.
In the explanations of the interpreters concerning the priority Heidegger attributes to Nothing over logical negation (of the “not”), no particular distinction is made with regard to the different moves that are involved in the two negations. See, e.g., Tugendhat 1970 and Philipse 1998 (specifically p. 12).
- 43.
Some interpreters tend toward a rounding of the subject matter to such a degree that it loses its significance. White (1985), for instance, thinks that WM concerns Nothing, “i.e., negation as such” (1985, 46). After this, his analysis is restricted to Heidegger’s reference (P, 85/109) that “Nothing is the full negation of the totality of beings” and parallels Nothing with propositional falsehood, which “conceals beings as a totality” in the sense that it “hides Being from the scope of its extension” or, more specifically, in the sense that it constitutes the false in contraposition to the true (1985, 48–9). It is then suggested that we should understand Nothing as “that which is not true,” “that which does not appear as true.” Thus, even though White touches upon the issue that according to Heidegger, Nothing founds logical negation (1985, 53), he simply thinks that logical negation is the formal version of negation, i.e., that which concerns (linguistic) judgments, irrespective of their content, whereas Nothing is the material version of negation, i.e., that which concerns beings. This analyses, however, barely approaches the hard phenomenological core of Heidegger’s views on the matter.
- 44.
For all this see P, 272–3/359.
- 45.
On this, see P, 273/360. In the “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” however, Heidegger calls renouncing or away-sending (Abweisung) the nihiliating that a self-posited subjectivity commits as annihilating (P, 273/360). We must keep in mind, though, that in that work this renouncing or away-sending (Abweisung) is used in order to maintain the priority of Nothing over ontic negation in Logic. In the 5th edition of the WM, Heidegger notes that the No(n)- consists in this double movement: “away-sending: [from] beings by themselves; re-ferring: in [or better: to] the Being of the beings [ab-weisen: das Seinde für sich; wer-weisen: in das Sein des Seinden].” (P, 90/114).
- 46.
Before moving to the last section of this Chapter, there is another approach to the present issue that demands a comment. Tugendhat (1970) reaches the point of claiming that in reality, what is given in the experience of anxiety can be described by the—semantically ontic—proposition “there is nothing from which I can hold on” (“es gibt nichts, woran ich mich halten kann”). Heidegger, though, being totally hostile to the logical (das Logische), does not want to simply articulate his idea in one clause, and thus sets himself in search of its contentful meaning (1970, 156–7). In other words, while Heidegger actually means that in anxiety we have the experience of the state of affairs that is expressed in the universal negative existential proposition “there is not something” (“es gibt nichts”), he chooses to talk about “the Nothing” because he wants to refer us to the very beings that are lost for us within the complete indifference of anxiety. In a way, in that very anxiety we have the experience of Nothing, whereas in its linguistic expression, the content of this experience takes the (supposedly) equipotential form “there is not something” (cf. ibid., 158 n. 22). This, Tugendhat continues, can be fully paralleled with Heidegger’s tactic of saying “the being is” (“das Seinde ist”), instead of the universal affirmative existential proposition “there is something” (“es gibt etwas”) (ibid., 157). Generally, then, from the perspective of his rather linguistic-analytical approach, Tugendhat claims that the expression “the Nothing” is the objectified reference of that which is meant by the universal negative existential proposition, just as, supposedly, the expression “the Being” is the objectified reference of that which is meant in the universal affirmative existential proposition “there is something” (ibid., 160). It is difficult here for a phenomenologist to make his mind up as to what to wish for; Tugendhat’s being correct, despite the ensuing demythologization of Phenomenology, or Heidegger’s having indeed discovered genuinely novel phenomena, no matter how dark his reports on these might have been.
- 47.
On this see, e.g., P, 250/328.
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Theodorou, P. (2015). The Phenomenology of Anxiety and of Nothing: Ontology and Logic in Heidegger. In: Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction, Primordiality, and the Categorial. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 83. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16622-3_9
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