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The Legal Framework for the European System of Central Banks

  • Chapter
Central Banking and Financial Stability in East Asia

Part of the book series: Financial and Monetary Policy Studies ((FMPS,volume 40))

Abstract

The Treaty of Maastricht imposed the strict obligation to establish an economic and monetary union as an integral part of the EU. The single currency was to become the currency of the EU and the legal tender in all Member States unless an exemption was explicitly granted.

Consequently, the primary law systematically only speaks of economic policy or monetary policy which is the task of the Eurosystem, consisting of the ECB and the central banks of the Member States whose currency is the euro. Although the national central banks of all the Member States together with the ECB constitute the European System of Central Banks, only the ECB is granted legal personality.

General economic policy is not a task of the EU, but has been retained by the Member States. Exceptions have to be provided explicitly in the primary law. EU law, however, contains a host of rules to prevent excessive debt and deficits on the part of the Member States.

Price stability has been set as the “primary objective”. The term has to be interpreted as close to zero per cent inflation. To safeguard the primary objective, a comprehensive guarantee of the independence of the ESCB, the ECB, and the members of its organs has been provided for.

Exit from the Monetary Union while remaining a EU Member State is not possible. The introduction of a parallel currency is prohibited. If a new currency in substitution of the euro or parallel to it is introduced, all claims denominated in euro will remain in euro and, economically, the burden will most likely even increase.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a more comprehensive description, see Helmut Siekmann (2012). Some of the following is derived from this work.

  2. 2.

    Commission Memorandum to the Council on the co-ordination of economic policies and monetary co-operation within the Community, submitted on 12 February 1969, Bulletin of the EC No. 1, 1971. A predecessor was the “Marjolin Memorandum” of the Commission, see Hanspeter K. Scheller (2006, p. 17); André Szás (1999, pp. 8, 9). Upon the basis of the “Barre Report”, a more specified three-step plan was developed by the prime minister of Luxembourg, Pierre Werner. The final design was framed in a plan delivered by the then President of the Commission, Jacques Delors; see Helmut Siekmann (2013, Einführung [introduction], No 10–26).

  3. 3.

    Signed 7 February 1992, Official Journal, 29 July 1992, C 191/1.

  4. 4.

    Now Article 3(1) lit. c TFEU.

  5. 5.

    Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal of 26 October 2012, C 326/01.

  6. 6.

    More Sect. 4 below.

  7. 7.

    Paul de Grauwe (2010, p. 31).

  8. 8.

    Critical: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report, February 1992, p. 53; Peter J. Tettinger (1992, p. 10), with further references; defending the creation of the Monetary Union at an early stage Gert Nicolaysen (1993, pp. 10–18). A topic which was treated by Otmar Issing, leading economist, former member of the board of the Deutsche Bundesbank and of the Executive Board of the ECB, see, e.g., Otmar Issing (2008a); Idem (2008b, p. 297).

  9. 9.

    See, for example, J. E. Meade (1957, p. 388); the references given by Gert Nicolaysen (1993, p. 7 note 2); see, also Christoph Degenhart (2012, p. 158 et seq.); for a balanced discussion with mild scepticism, see Otmar Issing (2008c, pp. 227–236).

  10. 10.

    Described by Otmar Issing (2008b, p. 299 et seq.).

  11. 11.

    Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, Official Journal C 326/230 of 26 October 2010; afterwards referred to as “Statute ESCB/ECB”.

  12. 12.

    Now Part III, Title VIII of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), consolidated version, Official Journal, 30 March 2010, C 83/1 (96).

  13. 13.

    The wording of Article 3(4) TEU is somewhat murky: “The Union shall establish an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro”. The EMU has been established by the Treaty itself but the introduction of the single currency needed additional measures; see also European Commission (2006).

  14. 14.

    Otmar Issing (2008b, p. 301).

  15. 15.

    Charles Proctor (2012, nos. 31.09 and 31.10).

  16. 16.

    Literal translation of Christian Calliess (2011b, Article 2 margin no. 9) with further references.

  17. 17.

    Permanent Court of International Justice—PCIJ, Judgment of 12 July 1929, case concerning the payment of various Serbian loans issued in France, Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A—Nos. 20/21, p. 44: “It is indeed a generally accepted principle that a State is entitled to regulate its own currency.” The same wording is used in the judgment of the same day on the case concerning the payment in gold of Brazilian federal loans contracted in France, id. p. 122. See, in detail, Frederick A. Mann (1992, pp. 14, 16 and 18); Fred Hirsch (1967, p. 30); Herrmann Fögen (1969, p. 35); Robert A. Mundell (1997, p. 16) with a detailed description of the development in history (pp. 9–15); Rosa María Lastra (2006, p. 16); Frank Vischer (2010, section 15 II); Christoph Herrmann (2010a, pp. 99–102) with further references; Charles Proctor (2012, p. 526); tentatively German Federal Constitutional Court [GFCC] of 20 July 1954, BVerfGE [Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court] 4 [volume], 60 [page].

  18. 18.

    Helmut Siekmann (2014, Article 88 margin no. 107; and Sect. 3.3. below).

  19. 19.

    BVerfGE 89, 155; 97, 350; Helmut Siekmann (2014, Article 88 margin nos. 30, 33).

  20. 20.

    Georg Friedrich Knapp (1905, pp. 1, 20). This insight had been publicised almost a generation earlier by a much less famous author: Gustav Hartmann (1868, pp. 12, 58, 64, 112): “Da der Satz, daß eine bestimmte für unseren Verkehr eigens geschaffene Münzsorte ‘Geld’ (…) sein sollte, juristisch nur auf einen besonderen Act unserer Rechtsordnung zurückgeführt werden kann.”

  21. 21.

    Now Articles 3(4) TEU, 119 (2), 140 (1) TFEU in conjunction with Protocol (No 13) on the convergence criteria; without reservation: Charles Proctor (2012, margin no. 31.44); Bernard Kempen (2012, Article 119 margin no. 6); in favour of a strict interpretation, see Werner Heun (1998, p. 866).

  22. 22.

    Protocol (No 15) on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Official Journal of 26 October 2010, C 326/284: “1. Unless the United Kingdom notifies the Council that it intends to adopt the euro, it shall be under no obligation to do so. (…) 3. The United Kingdom shall retain its powers in the field of monetary policy according to national law.”

  23. 23.

    The exemption had the effect that all Articles and provisions of the Treaty and the Statute of ESCB/ECB referring to a “derogation” should be applicable to Denmark. The admission procedure of Article 140 TFEU should only be initiated at the request of Denmark, No 1 and 2 of the Protocol (No 16) on certain provisions relating to Denmark, Official Journal of 26 October 2010, C 326/287.

  24. 24.

    More details Sect. 3.1 below.

  25. 25.

    Article 3(5) TEU, cf. Helmut Siekmann (2013, Article 3 margin nos. 9–12).

  26. 26.

    Signed on 13 December 2007 and entering into force on 1 January 2009, Official Journal C 306/1 of 17 December 2007; rectification on 30 April 2008, Official Journal C 111/56 of 6 May 2008; rectification on 27 November 2009, Official Journal C 209/1 of 6 May 2008.

  27. 27.

    Part III, Title VIII, Chapter 4, Articles 136–138 TFEU. Under certain provisions an “enhanced cooperation” had also been generally acknowledged, Part VI, Title III, Articles 326–334 which served as justification for secondary legislation of the Union concerning only Member States whose currency is the euro aiming at preventing and solving financial crises.

  28. 28.

    Protocol (No 14) on the Euro Group, Official Journal C 326/283 of 26 October 2010.

  29. 29.

    Article 139(1) TFEU: “Member States in respect of which the Council has not decided that they fulfil the necessary conditions for the adoption of the euro shall hereinafter be referred as ‘Member States with a derogation’.”

  30. 30.

    Article 139(3) and (4) TFEU, Article 42.3. and Article 42.4. Statute ESCB/ECB.

  31. 31.

    Ulrich Häde (2011, Article 139 at margin no. 4).

  32. 32.

    For example, deficit control pursuant Article 126 (9 and 11) and special wording for the UK.

  33. 33.

    See Bernard Kempen (2012, Article 139 margin no. 6).

  34. 34.

    See, for reference, footnote 25 above.

  35. 35.

    For quite some time in the past price stability, growth, and (full) employment had been designated as objectives of equal rank, for details see: Sachverständigenrat (1965), preface at no. 3; Alex Möller (1969, p. 91 et seq.); Hans-Heinrich Hansmeyer (1972, pp. 133–139), with some reservations; Helmut Siekmann (1985, pp. 148, 151 et seq.); Werner Heun (1998, p. 869); see, also, Markus Wiebel (1968, p. 904 et seq.).

  36. 36.

    Werner Heun (1998, p. 869).

  37. 37.

    Jörn Pipkorn (1994, p. 285); Jean-Victor Louis (1995, p. 59); René Smits (1997, p. 399); Helmut Siekmann (2013, Article 119 margin no 98); partially disagreeing, see Rainer Stadler (1996, p. 101 et seq.): relativization by goals of Article 2 TEEC.

  38. 38.

    Federal Reserve Act, Section 2A. Monetary policy objectives: “The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates [emphasis added].”

  39. 39.

    In October 1998 the Governing Council of the ECB defined price stability as “a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2 %” and added that price stability “was to be maintained over the medium term”. The Governing Council confirmed this definition in May 2003 following a thorough evaluation of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. On that occasion, the Governing Council clarified that “in the pursuit of price stability, it aims to maintain inflation rates below but close to 2 % over the medium term”; European Central Bank, Press Report of 8 May 2003, Monthly Bulletin, June 2003, p. 87; European Central Bank (2011b, p. 69); Hanspeter K. Scheller (2006, p. 80); see, also, Helmut Siekmann (2013), at Art. 119 TFEU margin no. 49; Alexander Thiele (2013, p. 30).

  40. 40.

    ECB Monthly Bulletin, October 2014, p. XIV: “Price stability: as defined by the Governing Council, a year-on-year increase in the HICP for the euro area of below 2 %. The Governing Council has also made it clear that, in the pursuit of price stability, it aims to maintain inflation rates below, but close to, 2 % over the medium term.”

  41. 41.

    Cf. Gert Nicolaysen (1993, p. 39); for references, see also Helmut Siekmann (2014, at Art. 88 margin no. 92). Also, non-German scholars preferred originally a margin of “less than 2 %” [René Smits (1997, p.185)] with further references.

  42. 42.

    See, for example, ECB vice president Constancio in an interview with Börsen-Zeitung of 11 September 2014: “(…) is the responsibility of monetary policy to reach the inflation goal”, available at: (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/inter/date/2014/html/sp140911.en.html); see, also, Mark Schröers (2014) citing the critique of Otmar Issing, who had, initially, shaped the monetary policy of the ECB.

  43. 43.

    Hermann Remsperger (2013, pp. 2 et seq., 10 et seq.).

  44. 44.

    Helmut Siekmann (2014, Article 88 margin no. 91).

  45. 45.

    Often labelled as the “no bail-out clause”, which is, to a certain extent, at least misleading.

  46. 46.

    Title VIII: Economic and Monetary Policy Chapter 1: Economic Policy Chapter 2: Monetary Policy.

  47. 47.

    Emphasised by the GFCC: “According to Title VIII of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and notwithstanding the special powers expressly assigned to the Union (e.g., Art. 121, 122, 126 TFEU), the responsibility for economic policy lies clearly with the Member States. In this field of economic policy, the European Union is—apart from individual exceptions that are in particular regulated in Part III of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union—essentially limited to a coordination of Member States’ economic policies” (judgment of 14 January 2014, cases: 2 BvR 2728/13, 2 BvR 2729/13, 2 BvR 2730/13, 2 BvR 2731/13, 2 BvE 13/13, available at: [http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2014/01/rs20140114_2bvr272813en.html?nn=5403310] [OMT-judgment] margin nos. 39, 63, 68; = BVerfGE 134, 366 [margin nos. 39, 63, 68]).

  48. 48.

    Emphasis added. Furthermore, the Council is to “adopt measures specific to those Member States whose currency is the euro: (a) to strengthen the coordination and surveillance of their budgetary discipline; (b) to set out economic policy guidelines for them (…)”, Article 136(1) TFEU.

  49. 49.

    Hermann-Josef Blanke (2012, p. 80 et seq.); Helmut Siekmann (2013, Article 119 at margin nos. 22, 24, 26).

  50. 50.

    Alexander Thiele (2014a, p. 694).

  51. 51.

    See Helmut Siekmann (2013, pp. 112–113):

    − 2 May 2010, pledge of financial support for Greece by Member States through bilateral  agreements, Statement by the Eurogroup;

    − 11 May 2010, general (temporary) support by the EU (European Financial Support Mechanism - EFSM), Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism, Official Journal of 12 May 2010 L 118/1;

    − 7 June 2010, general (temporary) support by Member States (European Financial Stability Facility - EFSF), EFSF Framework Agreement, draft of 20 May 2010, Executive Version of 7 June 2010;

    − 11 July 2011/2 February 2012, (permanent) European Stability Mechanism (ESM).

  52. 52.

    For details, see Helmut Siekmann (2015, Section 2.4.2. and 3.3.1.).

  53. 53.

    ECJ, decision of 27 November 2012 in the proceedings Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland Case C-370/12 for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Supreme Court (Ireland), Reports of Cases ECLI:EU:2012:756, margin nos. 53, 92, 96, 108, 114. A very lax delineation is given by Alexander Thiele (2014a, pp. 694–697): The monetary goal shall be decisive. The ECB commands wide discretionary power in defining it. Effects on government finances shall be irrelevant and it shall not be forbidden to undermine economic and fiscal policy. This attempt is clearly oriented at the goal to justify the debated and questionable measures of the ECB, cf. Helmut Siekmann (2015, Section 2).

  54. 54.

    GFCC, OMT-judgment (footnote 47 above), margin no. 63.

  55. 55.

    Margin no. 64; following Pringle (footnote 53 above) at nos. 56 and 97.

  56. 56.

    Margin no. 65; following Pringle (footnote 53 above) at no. 57.

  57. 57.

    Margin no. 67.

  58. 58.

    Margin no. 66.

  59. 59.

    GFCC, OMT-judgment (footnote 47 above), margin no. 39: “It [the European Central Bank] is not authorised to pursue its own economic policy.” See, also, margin no. 68: “The authority to support the general economic policies of the Member States at Union level (Art. 127 sec. 1 sentence 2 TFEU) does not justify any steering of economic policies in the System of European Central Banks.”

  60. 60.

    See, for details, Helmut Siekmann (2015, Section 3.3.).

  61. 61.

    René Smits (1997, p. 77); Thomas Mayer (2010, p. 49); Helmut Siekmann (2010).

  62. 62.

    On the safeguards to guarantee permanent stability of the EMU Sect. 1.3.4. above.

  63. 63.

    Jean-Victor Louis (2010, p. 979).

  64. 64.

    Structural funds: Framework regulation 1993/2081, Official Journal of 31 July 1993, L 193/5; Coordination regulation 1993/2082, Official Journal of 31 July 1993, L 193/20; ERDF regulation 1993/2083, Official Journal of 31 July 1993, L 193/34; ESF regulation 1993/2084, Official Journal of 31 July 1993, L 193/39; EAGGF, Guidance Section regulation 1993/2085, Official Journal of 31 July 1993, L 193/44; FIFG regulation 1993/2080, Official Journal of 31 July 1993, L 193/1; Cohesion Fund: Regulation establishing the Cohesion Fund, 1994/1164, Official Journal of 25 May 1994, L 130/1; Regulation establishing a financial Cohesion Instrument.

  65. 65.

    Hermann-Josef Blanke (2012, p. 107) provides 35 per cent as number.

  66. 66.

    Common and general provisions regulation—CPR: Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006, Official Journal of 20 December 2013, L 347/320.

  67. 67.

    Period of 2014–2020.

  68. 68.

    ERDF regulation: Regulation (EU) No 1301/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the European Regional Development Fund and on specific provisions concerning the investment for growth and jobs goal and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1080/2006, Official Journal of 20 December 2013, L 347/289.

  69. 69.

    ESF regulation: Regulation (EU) No 1304/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the European Social Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1081/2006, Official Journal of 20 December 2013, L 347/470.

  70. 70.

    EAFRD regulation: Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005. Official Journal of 20 December 2013, L 347/487.

  71. 71.

    EMFF regulation: Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2328/2003, (EC) No 861/2006, (EC) No 1198/2006 and (EC) No 791/2007 and Regulation (EU) No 1255/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Official Journal of 20 May 2014, L 149/1.

  72. 72.

    Cohesion Fund regulation: Regulation (EU) No 1300/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the Cohesion Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1084/2006, Official Journal of 20 December 2013, L 347/281.

  73. 73.

    ETC regulation: Regulation (EU) No 1299/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on specific provisions for the support from the European Regional Development Fund to the European territorial cooperation goal, Official Journal of 20 December 2013, L 347/259.

  74. 74.

    EGTC regulation: Regulation (EU) No 1302/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 1082/2006 on a European grouping of territorial cooperation (EGTC) with regard to the clarification, simplification and improvement of the establishment and functioning of such groupings, Official Journal of 20 December 2013, L 347/303.

  75. 75.

    Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism, Official Journal of 12 May 2010 L 118/1, recital 1; for details see note 51 above.

  76. 76.

    Kurt Faßbender (2010, p. 800 et seq.); Walter Frenz and Christian Ehlenz (2010, pp. 213–215), specifically criticising the foundation of the EFSM on Article 122(2) TFEU (p. 212 et seq.); Hanno Kube and Ekkehart Reimer (2010, p. 1914); Kai Hentschelmann (2011, pp. 295–300, p. 304); Doris Hattenberger (2012, margin nos. 6, 9, 12); Hermann-Josef Blanke (2012, p. 106); Christian Calliess (2013, p. 99 et seq.); Michael Potacs (2013, p. 137 et seq.), not objecting: GFCC judgment on support for Greece, BVerfGE 129, 124; comment by Michael Elicker and Veris-Pascal Heintz (2012); justification also by: Alberto de Gregorio Merino (2012, p. 1634), as Member of the Legal Services of the Council of the European Union; Christian Herrmann (2010b, p. 416); idem (2012, pp. 807, 808); Martin Nettesheim (2012, pp. 66–73). The ECJ differentiates explicitly between setting up a stability mechanism and the power to grant assistance upon the basis of Article 122(2) TFEU which may only be used to grant temporary assistance but may not be used as basis for setting up a permanent mechanism, ECJ Pringle (note 53 above) at nos. 64, 65, 116. For more details, see note 89 below.

  77. 77.

    See note 51 above.

  78. 78.

    For details, see Helmut Siekmann (2013, pp. 132–137).

  79. 79.

    Vestert Borger (2013, p. 120), emphasises an interpretation of Article 125 TFEU as “the basic agreement” in contrast to Article 143(2) and Article 122(2) TFEU as its exceptions.

  80. 80.

    For more details regarding them, see Sect. 1.2.3. above.

  81. 81.

    Kurt Faßbender (2010, p. 800): Article 125 TFEU interdicts any kind of support; Walter Frenz and Christian Ehlenz (2010, pp. 212 et seq.); Hanno Kube and Ekkehart Reimers (2010, p. 1914); Martin Seidel (2011, p. 241); Daniel Thym (2011, p. 169); Christoph Degenhart (2012, p. 161) with further references: incompatible with Article 125 TFEU; Idem (2013, p. 96): interdiction to grant aid.

  82. 82.

    Not objecting voluntary support: GFCC judgment on support for Greece, BVerfGE 129, 124: Alberto de Gregorio Merino (2012 [member of the Legal Services, Council of the European Union], p. 1627), under the condition of budgetary adjustments; Werner Heun and Alexander Thiele (2012, p. 979); in favour of granting loans as compatible Jochen Wieland (2011, p. 341); in effect also René Smits (1997, p. 77) only interdicting the assumption of liabilities which follows already from the explicit wording of the clause.

  83. 83.

    Ulrich Häde (2010, pp. 859–862).

  84. 84.

    ECJ Pringle (note 53 above) at no. 132; supporting explicitly the opinion of the court: Christian Calliess (2013, pp. 99, 103); Martin Nettesheim (2013, p. 14 et seq.); Michael Potacs (2013, pp. 134, 141 et seq.); Wolfgang Weiß and Markus Haberkamm (2013, p. 97 et seq.); questioning the ECJ’s interpretation of Article 125: Vestert Borger (2013, p. 133 et seq.); Ulrich Palm (2014, Article 136 TFEU, margin no. 45 et seq.).

  85. 85.

    ECJ Pringle (note 53 above) at no. 136.

  86. 86.

    ECJ Pringle (note 53 above) at no. 137.

  87. 87.

    Helmut Siekmann (2013, pp. 134–137); Vestert Borger (2013, pp. 134–137).

  88. 88.

    European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro (2011/199/EU), Official Journal of 6 April 2011, L 91/1; entering into force on 1 May 2013, BGBl II [Federal Law Gazette II], p. 1047.

  89. 89.

    ECJ (note 53 above), at margin nos. 1 and 2, after an contradicting evaluation by the Supreme Court of Ireland; supporting: Christoph Herrmann (2012, p. 807 et seq.), Vestert Borger (2013, p. 127); critical: Christoph Degenhart (2012, p. 162); idem (2013, pp. 95–97); Ulrich Palm (2014, Article 136 TFEU, primarily margin nos. 45–47); only in view of the reasoning of the court, Matthias Ruffert (2013, p. 258); Martin Nettesheim (2013, pp. 14–17).

  90. 90.

    GFCC, judgment of 18 March 2014 upon the basis of the oral hearing of 11 and 12 June 2013, cases: 2 BvR 2728/13, 2 BvR 2729/13, 2 BvR 2730/13, 2 BvR 2731/13, 2 BvE 13/13, available at: ((www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20140318_2bvr139012en.html) (in English)) [ESM final judgment], in specific margin no. 177 et seq.

  91. 91.

    The new paragraph reads as follows: “The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality.”

  92. 92.

    The ECJ (note 53 above) assesses a wide range of financial aid as compatible with Article 125 TFEU but inconsistently examines the compatibility of the new Article 136(3) with the primary law (margin no. 131 et seq., 138–143); consenting Daniel Thym (2013, p. 262). This argumentation is highly questionable from a methodological point of view as the new article is primary law and must not be judged by a norm of the same level. Primary law may be changed by primary law at the discretion of the competent organs and institutions as long as the competences and procedures are obeyed.

  93. 93.

    Granting loans may have been compatible with Article 125 TFEU without Article 136(3) TFEU, Werner Heun and Alexander Thiele (2012, p. 979), with further references; also in favour of differentiation, Vestert Borger (2013, p. 125).

  94. 94.

    GFCC, ESM final judgment (note 90 above), at margin no. 180: “(…) constitute indeed a fundamental reshaping of the existing Economic and Monetary Union, because it detaches its concept, albeit to a limited extent, from the principle of independence of the national budgets which had characterised it before (cf. on this BVerfGE 129, 124 <181 and 182>; 132, 195 <248>, n. 128; cf. however ECJ, Judgment of 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12—Pringle –, n. 73 et seq.)”; agreeing Christian Calliess (2013, p. 104); Matthias Ruffert (2013, p. 259); see, also, Christian Calliess (2011a, p. 279); Hanno Kube (2012, p. 245).

  95. 95.

    The following draws from Helmut Siekmann (2012, section D V); id. (2013, pp. 126–129).

  96. 96.

    Now Article 126 TFEU and Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure, Official Journal of 26 October 2010, C 326/279.

  97. 97.

    Article 126(1) TFEU. The United Kingdom watered this clause somewhat down as it promised only to “endeavor to avoid an excessive government deficit”; No 5 of Protocol (No 15) (note 22 above).

  98. 98.

    Article 140(1) indent 2 TFEU.

  99. 99.

    Not unfrequently, the criteria used to judge whether a Member State fulfils the necessary conditions to adopt the euro are also called “Maastricht Criteria”; see, for example, Charles Proctor (2012, margin nos. 26.13 and 26.14). The naming of these four criteria, laid down in Article 140(1) TFEU and further developed in Protocol (No 13) on the convergence criteria (Official Journal of 26 October 2012, C 326/281), should, however, follow the terminology of the primary law. They are to be called “convergence criteria”. This also helps to avoid confusion.

  100. 100.

    Article 126(2) TFEU.

  101. 101.

    Article 1 Protocol (No 12) (note 96 above).

  102. 102.

    Article 51 TEU.

  103. 103.

    Following Article 126(6) TFEU.

  104. 104.

    ECJ, judgment of 13 July 2004—C-27/04 (Commission vs. Council), Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 2004, p. 465; Juristen Zeitung, 2004, p. 1069 with comment, Markus Kotzur (2004); see, also, Dimitrios Doukas (2005); Barbara Dutzler and Angelika Hable (2004); Gert Nicolaysen (2004, pp. 1322, 1325); Christoph Degenhart (2012, p. 161).

  105. 105.

    Article 126(7–9) TFEU.

  106. 106.

    Article 126(11) sub-paragraph 1.

  107. 107.

    Paul Kirchhof (1994, p. 72); probably also Christoph Herrmann (2010b, p. 417); for more details, see Sect. 4.3. below.

  108. 108.

    Franz-Christoph Zeitler (1995, p. 1611).

  109. 109.

    Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 of 22 November 1993 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Official Journal of 31 December 1993, L 332/7; amended several times, codified version: Council Regulation (EC) No 479/93 of 25 May 2009, on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Official Journal of 10 June 2009, L 145/1; Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty, Official Journal of 31 December 1993, L 332/1.

  110. 110.

    A “Stabilitätspakt für Europa” was presented by the German Minister of Finance on 10 November 1995; see for details, Ulrich Palm (2000, pp. 44 et seq., 142); Ulrich Häde (1996, p. 139); extensively on this and the origins of the Stability and Growth Pact, Kai Hentschelmann (2009, pp. 205–285).

  111. 111.

    For the following, see, already, Helmut Siekmann (2012, Section D V 2).

  112. 112.

    Explicitly expressed in recital no. 2 of both regulations, notes 115 and 116 below.

  113. 113.

    Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact Amsterdam of 17 June 1997, Official Journal of 2 August 1997, C 236/1.

  114. 114.

    But allegedly a “political” obligation, see Hugo J. Hahn and Ulrich Häde (2010, p. 318) with further references for varying opinions.

  115. 115.

    Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, Official Journal of 2 August 1997, L 209/1.

  116. 116.

    Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, Official Journal of 2 August 1997, L 209/6.

  117. 117.

    For details, see Charlotte Gaitanides (2013, Article 126 TFEU margin no. 162 et seq).

  118. 118.

    Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies of 27 June 2005, Official Journal of 7 July 2005, L 174/1; Council Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure of 27 June 2005, Official Journal of 7 July 2005, L 174/5.

  119. 119.

    Critical namely: Deutsche Bundesbank (2005a, p. 42; 2005b, p. 21), also European Central Bank (2011a, p. 113) with reference to European Central Bank (2005), where the criticism is indirect and rather mild; for more details, see Charlotte Gaitanides (2013, margin no. 23 et seq.).

  120. 120.

    Regulation No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, Official Journal of 23 November 2011, L 306/12 (strengthens the preventive surveillance and coordination instruments of the Stability and Growth Pact); Regulation No 1177/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, Official Journal of 23 November 2011, L 306/33 (aims to improve the effectiveness of the corrective measures in case of an excessive deficit by providing stricter requirements for the stages of the deficit procedure pursuant to Art. 126 TFEU).

  121. 121.

    Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, Official Journal of 23 November, L 306/8 (provides a system of sanctions for the effective correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area [Art. 1]). Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, Official Journal of 23 November 2011, L 306/25 (sets out detailed rules for the detection of macroeconomic imbalances, as well as the prevention and correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances within the Union [Art. 1 sec. 1]).

  122. 122.

    Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011, on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, Official Journal of 23 November 2011, L 306/1 (sets out a system of sanctions for enhancing the enforcement of the preventive and corrective parts of the Stability and Growth Pact in the euro area [Art. 1]). Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of Member States, Official Journal of 23 November 2011, L 306/41 (aims to ensure transparency and availability of the necessary data, which are a requirement for compliance with and enforcement of the obligations under the Treaties regarding the avoidance of excessive budgetary deficits, with detailed requirements for, inter alia, public accounting systems, the use of numerical fiscal rules, medium-term budgetary forecasts and the implementation of independent analysis and monitoring).

  123. 123.

    For more details on them, see Sect. 1.2.3. above.

  124. 124.

    Critical in-depth assessment by Schuknecht/Moutot/Rother/Stark (2011); for details see Hermann-Josef Blanke (2012, pp. 83–95), judging the measures as not going far enough (p. 94).

  125. 125.

    Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, Official Journal of 27 May 2013, L 140/1; Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area, Official Journal of 27 May 2013, L 140/11; critical assessment: European Central Bank (2013).

  126. 126.

    Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Economic governance review, Report on the application of Regulations (EU) No 1173/2011, 1174/2011, 1175/2011, 1176/2011, 1177/2011, 472/2013 and 473/2013, 28. November 2014, COM(2014) 905 final, p. 4.

  127. 127.

    Article 4 regulation 1173/2011 (supra footnote 122); for details, see Charlotte Gaitanides (2013, margin no. 45 et seq.).

  128. 128.

    European Commission (2014a, Annex 1).

  129. 129.

    Ibid.

  130. 130.

    Ibid.

  131. 131.

    Ibid., p. 3 and footnote 4.

  132. 132.

    Regulation 472/2013 (note 125 above).

  133. 133.

    European Central Bank (2013, p. 54).

  134. 134.

    Regulation 473/2013 (note 125 above).

  135. 135.

    European Central Bank (2013, p. 53).

  136. 136.

    European Commission (2014a, p. 5). Detailed and disaggregated numbers within the context of fiscal surveillance can be found in the 2014 report on public finances of the European Commission (2014b), especially in Part III.

  137. 137.

    EUCO 10/1/11 REV 1, Annex I.

  138. 138.

    GFCC ESM final judgment (note 90 above, margin no. 18); see, for details, BVerfGE 131, 152 et seq.

  139. 139.

    More details Sect. 1.2.1. above.

  140. 140.

    ECJ, Case C-524/04, Test Claimants, reports 2007, I-2107 margin nos. 49, 53; ECJ Pringle (supra footnote 53) at nos. 68, 98, 101; Koen Lenaerts and Piet Van Nuffel (2011, margin nos. 22–110); Christian Tietje (2011, p. 10 et seq.); Rudolf Streinz (2012b), margin nos. 524, 526 specifically for the fiscal treaty.

  141. 141.

    Section 1.1. above.

  142. 142.

    Section 1.4.1. above.

  143. 143.

    As the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic objected an amendment of the primary law the way of a separate treaty or compact had to be chosen, Frank Schorkopf (2012, pp. 3, 14, 17).

  144. 144.

    Adopted and transformed into German law by act of 13 September 2012, BGBl II [Federal Law Gazette II] 2012, p. 1006, giving the text of the treaty also in English.

  145. 145.

    BGBl II [Federal Law Gazette II] 2013, p. 162. The Act on the National Implementation of the Fiscal Compact entered into force on 19 July 2013, BGBl I [Federal Law Gazette I] 2013, p. 2398.

  146. 146.

    Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Finland, and Slovenia. Finland deposited its instrument of ratification 21 December 2012.

  147. 147.

    Frank Schorkopf (2012, pp. 6, 14).

  148. 148.

    This is a contractual obligation: Doris Hattenberger (2012, Article 126 TFEU margin no 70); Rüdiger Bandilla (2012, Article 126 TFEU margin no 120).

  149. 149.

    Article 3(2) sentence 1 fiscal compact; see, also, press release of the EU-Commission, 21 December 2012, 18019/12, PRESSE 551.

  150. 150.

    For more details, see: Frank Schorkopf (2012); Hermann-Josef Blanke (2012); Charlotte Gaitanides (2013, margin nos. 169–190).

  151. 151.

    Article 282(1) sentence 2 TFEU.

  152. 152.

    For details, see p. 54 above.

  153. 153.

    Article 282(2) sentence 1 TFEU.

  154. 154.

    Gert Nicolaysen (1993, p. 29).

  155. 155.

    For an in-depth analysis of the independence guarantee, see Barbara Dutzler (2003, pp. 88–109); Charlotte Gaitanides (2005, pp. 199–279); Werner Heun (1998, p. 874 et seq.); Helmut Siekmann (2013, Article 130 TFEU).

  156. 156.

    Section 1.4. above.

  157. 157.

    Harold James (2012, p. 313); see, also, Christos Hadjiemmanuil (1996).

  158. 158.

    Stefan Glatzl (2009, p. 257); Harold James (2012, pp. 292, 315).

  159. 159.

    René Smits (1997, pp. 335–337).

  160. 160.

    Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/103 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, Official Journal of 29 October 2013, L 287/63; Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the conferral of specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, Official Journal of 29 October 2013, L 287/5; for more details, see Alexander Thiele (2014b, pp. 521–523).

  161. 161.

    Section 1.2.2. above.

  162. 162.

    Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of the Council of 3 May 1998, Official Journal of 11 May 1998, L 139/1.

  163. 163.

    Council decision (2000/427/EC) of 19 June 2000 in accordance with Article 122(2) of the Treaty on the adoption by Greece of the single currency on 1 January 2001, Official Journal of the European Communities of 7 July 2000 L 167/19; Council Regulation (EC) No 2169/2005 of 21 December 2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 974/98 on the introduction of the euro, Official Journal of 29 December 2005 L 346/1; for the legislative history cf. EU Bulletin 5—2000, point 1.3.5: 3 May 2000 “the Commission adopts a proposal for a Council decision aiming the adoption by Greece of the single currency on 1 January 2001. On the basis of the report of the European Central Bank (adopted on 27 April 2000) and of its own 2000 convergence report, the Commission has concluded that Greece fulfils the necessary conditions for the adoption of the single currency and is proposing a Council decision abrogating Greece’s derogation from its obligations regarding the achievement of economic and monetary union. The derogation would be abrogated with effect from 1 January 2001. The report (document COM(2000) 274) was endorsed by the European Parliament on 18 May”.

  164. 164.

    Notes 22 and 23 above.

  165. 165.

    Automatic consequence of the decision of the EU Council of 3 Mai 1998 and Article 121 para. 1 phrase 3 TEC.

  166. 166.

    For more details, see Sect. 1.2.3. above.

  167. 167.

    Now Article 128 para. 1 TFEU.

  168. 168.

    In Europe: Macedonia and Bosnia & Herzegovina (indirectly via the former Deutsche Mark); in Africa: Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, the Comores, and all countries using the CFA.

  169. 169.

    For details and references see: Monetary and exchange rate arrangements of the euro area with selected third countries and territories, European Central Bank (2006, p. 87); Helmut Siekmann (2013), Einführung [introduction], margin no. 58 and 59.

  170. 170.

    Montenegro, Kosovo.

  171. 171.

    For example, in Zimbabwe, or on the British military bases Akrotiri and Dekelia on Cyprus, although the UK does not belong to the eurozone.

  172. 172.

    For details, see Helmut Siekmann (2012, pp. 359, 360); id. (2013, Einführung [introduction] nos. 53–59); id., Protocol (No 17) nos. 6–8; id., Protocol (No 18) nos. 14, 15, 18, 20, 21.

  173. 173.

    Section 2.1. above.

  174. 174.

    Section 1.2.2. above.

  175. 175.

    Beatrice Weder di Mauro (2010, p. 99 et seq.), points out that monetary systems that provide an exit option are inherently instable. Hal S. Scott (1998) discusses the situation “when the euro falls apart” pretending this would be the natural (and legal?) course of the development. Implicitly he assumes that a withdrawal is legally possible as he assesses the consequences of a withdrawal or breakup. This was written, however, before the introduction of Article 50 TEU.

  176. 176.

    Note 26 above.

  177. 177.

    Rudolf Streinz (2012a, Article 50 TEU, margin no. 3) with further references.

  178. 178.

    Oliver Dörr (2011, Article 50 TEU, margin no. 3); Koen Lenaerts and Piet Van Nuffel (2011, margin nos. 6–015); Helmut Siekmann (2012, p. 376).

  179. 179.

    Chapter XXIII Title 23.1 of 23 May 1969, entry in force on 27 January 1980; official publication in three languages as appendix to: Gesetz zu dem Wiener Übereinkommen vom 23. Mai 1969 über das Recht der Verträge vom 3. August 1985, Federal Law Gazette, Part II (Bundesgesetzblatt Teil II) 1985, p. 926.

  180. 180.

    Claudia Annacker (1998, pp. 59–61), denies the validity of the rules of the law of nations inside a supranational organisation, i.e., among the members inter se; Christian Calliess (2011b, Article 50 TEU margin no. 13), understanding the consent of Member States to the Treaty of Lisbon as an implicit renunciation of any exit rights; Ulrich Becker (2012, Article 356 TFEU margin no. 5) without reservation; disagreeing: Bernhard Kempen (2012, Article 140 TFEU margin no. 32) without regarding Article 50 TEU; Ulrich Häde (2011, Article 140 TFEU margin no. 63) without reasoning; Oliver Dörr (2011, margin nos. 3 and 4) but still considering the provision as constitutive; Michael Rodi (2012, Article 140 TFEU margin no. 4) without considering Article 50 TEU.

  181. 181.

    Section 3: Termination and Suspension of the Operation of Treaties.

  182. 182.

    Cf. the material presented by Ralf G. Wetzel and Dietrich Rauschning (1978, pp. 390–395); Hal S. Scott (1998, p. 241), discussing in depth Article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties expressing doubts whether the provisions of paragraph 1 of the article are met regarding the EU law but does not come to a clear result (p. 214). This was, however, before the insertion of Article 50 TEU.

  183. 183.

    This article is considered to be a codification of the general law of nations: Jörg P. Müller (1971, p. 217).

  184. 184.

    For details, see Jörg P. Müller (1971, pp. 217–226).

  185. 185.

    Christian Calliess (2011b, Article 50 TEU margin no. 13).

  186. 186.

    Section 1.3.4. above.

  187. 187.

    Section 1.4.3. (1) above.

  188. 188.

    More Sect. 4.2. below.

  189. 189.

    With in-depth analysis: Chiara Zilioli (2005, pp. 126, 132); Phoebus Athanassiou (2009, p. 21); Siekmann (2013, Einführung [introduction] margin no. 48); in effect similarly: Paul Kirchhof (1994, p. 72); Hugo J. Hahn and Ulrich Häde (2010, § 26 margin no. 7 et seqq.; disagreeing—although hesitating—without any legal reasoning: Martin Seidel (2007, p. 617): despite the distinct missing of an exit clause like in the system of the European Monetary System (EMS): probably enabled by “unwritten community law”; questioning but without a clear solution Behrens (2010, p. 121); unclear: Ulrich Häde (2011, Article 140 TFEU margin no. 59 and no. 63). The GFCC mentions in its Maastricht-judgment a right or even an obligation to leave the EMU as ultima ratio, however, only as an obiter dictum without sufficient reasoning, BVerfGE 89, 155 (204). From its Lisbon-judgment can be gathered on the other side that an exit would not be compatible with German constitutional law, BVerfGE 123, 267(346 et seq.).

  190. 190.

    More Sect. 4.5. below.

  191. 191.

    For example Thomas Mayer (2014, p. 35), idem (2015).

  192. 192.

    Article 2 sentence 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 on the introduction of the euro, Official Journal of 11 May 1998, L 139/1; cf. Charles Proctor (2012), margin no. 29.13 emphasizing that the euro has been made the sole currency in the participating Member States judging it as the lex monetae of the eurozone (margin no. 29.10).

  193. 193.

    Charles Proctor (2012, margin no. 31.10).

  194. 194.

    Koen Lenaerts and Piet Van Nuffel (2011), margin nos. 6-014; in general, also: Christian Calliess (2011b, Article 50 TEU, margin nos. 12, 13) but exception for extreme cases.

  195. 195.

    Juliane Kokott (2012, Article 356 margin no. 6); partially disagreeing: Rudolf Streinz (2012a, Article 50 TEU margin no. 13), considering it for an exclusion from the EU (not the EMU!) in “extreme cases”; also Matthias Pechstein (2012, Article 7 margin no. 23) without reasoning; unclear Christian Calliess (2011b, Article 50 TEU margin nos. 17, 21 (advice to withdraw pursuant Article 50 TEU)).

  196. 196.

    Peter Behrens (2010, p. 121); Christoph Herrmann (2010a, b, p. 417).

  197. 197.

    Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 on the introduction of the euro, Official Journal of 11 May 1998, L 139/1.

  198. 198.

    This is true even if Article 3 TEU may not be interpreted as a general interdiction of regression in the course of European integration, see, for this Ulrich Becker (2012, Article 3 TEU margin no. 10), but without reasoning.

  199. 199.

    Charles Proctor (2012), margin no. 29.10; Christoph Herrmann (2010a, b, p. 417).

  200. 200.

    Christian Calliess (2011b, Article 1 TEU margin no. 12): interdiction of regression.

  201. 201.

    Article 1 of the decision (note 163 above).

  202. 202.

    The questionable actions of the Greek government to obtain admittance are described by the Commission in its “Report on Greek Government Deficit and Debt Statistics” of 8 January 2010, COM(2010) 1 final; detailed analysis by: Theodore Pelagidis and Michael Mitsopoulos (2014); George C. Bitros (2013), especially pp. 13–17.

  203. 203.

    Article 48.

  204. 204.

    Article 49.

  205. 205.

    Article 60.

  206. 206.

    Accepted by the law of nations as general principle, see Franz Pfluger (1936, p. 129) also already mentioning the exit from a multilateral agreement (p. 131 et seq.).

  207. 207.

    Ibid., pp. 78–88.

  208. 208.

    Ibid., pp. 88–91.

  209. 209.

    Ibid., pp. 91–93.

  210. 210.

    Regulated in Article 45 of the Vienna Convention.

  211. 211.

    In general, Claudia Annacker (1998, p. 273 et seq.).

  212. 212.

    Generally accepted Jörg P. Müller (1971, p. 227 et seq.).

  213. 213.

    Article 7 TEU margin no. 3 with some caveats; Article 356 TFEU margin nos. 5, 7 with further references; in general also Matthias Ruffert (2011, Article 7 TEU margin no. 31 et seq.), with further references.

  214. 214.

    Koen Lenaerts and Piet Van Nuffel (2011, margin nos. 6-014); Juliane Kokott (2012, Article 356 TFEU margin no. 6) with further references.

  215. 215.

    Ulrich Häde (2011, Article 140 TFEU margin no. 60).

  216. 216.

    For an extensive analysis of the severe consequences, in specific for all contractual obligation denominated in euro, see Wolfgang Ernst (2012, pp. 50, et seq., 57); Frank Vischer (2010, Section 18).

  217. 217.

    Section 1.2.1. above.

  218. 218.

    For definition and function, see, already, Frederick A. Mann (1992, pp. 219 et seq., 272, 278); later: Charles Proctor (2012), margin no. 32.16; Frank Vischer (2010 margin no. 358–364); Wolfgang Ernst (2012, pp. 52–55).

  219. 219.

    Without referring to this crucial clause Hal S. Scott (1998, p. 223) comes to a similar conclusion: “Note that if reference was made to EU law as lex monetae, […] re-denomination would be ineffective.” Nevertheless, he does not state a clear result because of the lack of precedents in the case of a surviving monetary union. Arthur Nussbaum (1925, p. 161) is searching for a line of discrimination when a sovereign ruler introduces a new currency but only in a fraction of the territory and the old currency continuing to exist in the rest of the territory. He pre-supposes, however, that the change of the monetary system has been performed lawfully by exercising a sovereign right.

  220. 220.

    Already described by Arthur Nussbaum (1925, pp. 228–231).

  221. 221.

    Hal S. Scott (1998, p. 223) supposes that only foreign courts would apply the lex monetae. This is, however, an irrevelant guess in delivering an opinion on the merits of a legal question. He cites Frederick A. Mann for leaving the decision to the proper law of the contract. In fact it is, in the first place a question of the sovereign right which has been decided by the primary law of the Union.

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  1. Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    Helmut Siekmann

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  1. East Asia Institute, Ludwigshafen, Germany

    Frank Rövekamp

  2. Interdisc. Centre for East Asian Studies, Frankfurt University, Frankfurt, Germany

    Moritz Bälz

  3. German Institute for Int. Security Affairs, Berlin, Germany

    Hanns Günther Hilpert

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Siekmann, H. (2015). The Legal Framework for the European System of Central Banks. In: Rövekamp, F., Bälz, M., Hilpert, H. (eds) Central Banking and Financial Stability in East Asia. Financial and Monetary Policy Studies, vol 40. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17380-1_4

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