Abstract
Mind is usually considered to be a property of the brain or, sometimes, a property of the body. This approach is, however, based on the dichotomy of external and internal established by René Descartes . The alternative is to consider mind a property of organism environment interaction.
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Määttänen, P. (2015). Mind and Interaction. In: Mind in Action. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17623-9_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17623-9_5
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