Abstract
The prosecutor’s impact on the outcome of the proceedings is most visible when he has the power to enter into an agreement with the defendant, on the basis of which in exchange for a specific conduct of the defendant (usually pleading guilty), the outcome of the proceedings becomes more favourable for him compared to the one that could have been expected otherwise. The power to terminate proceedings in a consensual way can be regarded as the prosecutor’s impact on the intensity of criminal prosecution and on the severity of the penal response. The key issue here is finding what significant concessions the prosecutor may offer to the defendant. Taking into consideration the functions of international criminal tribunals and the role they are intended to play, as well as the type of offences falling under their jurisdiction, we have to ask a question: is “bargaining over criminal responsibility” the right way to proceed? As we will see, the model of accusation before the ICC does not provide for an option for a consensual termination of proceedings pursuant to an agreement concluded between the ICC Prosecutor and the defendant, nor it envisages any basis for the guilty plea to have procedural effects such as elimination of a trial or reduction of a sentence.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
In a wide range of different types of procedural agreements this group is defined as “final agreements”, as they relate to adjudicating on the issue of criminal responsibility of a defendant: e.g. Waltoś (2000), p. 24.
- 3.
Turner and Weigend (2013), p. 1376.
- 4.
Institution of plea bargaining was developed in the nineteenth century. It became a response to an increasing burden of some case loads. Up till this moment, criminal proceedings were short and not complicated and there was no need to speed up the proceedings. It was only when the defence counsels appeared in the courts, together with introducing more safeguards for the defendant, that the procedure became more complicated and more time consuming and the prosecutor began to search for methods of faster disposition of cases. As the system of adversary procedure and the law of evidence was developing, the trials with the use of a jury became more and more complicated and made it unworkable as a routine dispositive procedure. For more see: Langbein (1978–1979), p. 261; McConville and Mirsky (2005), pp. 2–4; Combs (2002), p. 13.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, version of 1.12.2012, Rule 11(a)(3): http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp. Accessed 1 Aug 2014.
- 8.
- 9.
Turner and Weigend (2013), p. 1376.
- 10.
Turner and Weigend (2013), p. 1402.
- 11.
Such was the opinion expressed in: Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), Supreme Court, 2.6.1969.
- 12.
Damaška (1986), p. 110.
- 13.
As seen from the continental side.
- 14.
Goodpaster (1987), p. 138.
- 15.
- 16.
- 17.
Brady v. U.S. (379) U.S. (1970), Supreme Court, 4 May 1970.
- 18.
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, version of 1.12.2012: http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_11. Accessed 2 Sept 2014.
- 19.
Damaška (1986), p. 111.
- 20.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), Supreme Court, 18 January 1978. In more detail in: Ross PF (1978), p. 875.
- 21.
- 22.
Shelton v. U.S., 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957), U. S. Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit, 25.6.1957.
- 23.
- 24.
400 U.S. 25 (1970), Supreme Court, 23 November 1970.
- 25.
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), Supreme Court, 23 November 1970. See also: Łamejko (2009), p. 211.
- 26.
- 27.
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), Supreme Court, 20 December 1971.
- 28.
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984), Supreme Court, 11 June 1984.
- 29.
United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453 (1985), Supreme Court, 13 May 1985.
- 30.
Schone v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 785, 788 (1994), U.S. Court of Appeals, 7 February 1994.
- 31.
Schuon (2010), p. 79.
- 32.
See in general: Sprack (2012), pp. 271–279.
- 33.
Code for Crown Prosecutors, sections 9.1–9.6.
- 34.
Cit. after: Sprack (2012), p. 277.
- 35.
R v. Cain (Alan John) [2006] EWCA Crim 3233, [2007] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 25, England and Wales Court of Appeal (EWCA), Criminal Division, 5 December 2006 http://www.bailii.org. Accessed 13 Jan 2015.
- 36.
- 37.
R v Goodyear (Karl) [2005] EWCA Crim 888, England and Wales Court of Appeal (EWCA), Criminal Division, 19 April 2005 (§ 54), http://www.bailii.org. Accessed 13 Jan 2015.
- 38.
- 39.
Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/6/section/152. Accessed 13 Feb 2015. According to section 152, “In determining what sentence to pass on an offender who has pleaded guilty to an offence in proceedings before that or another court, a court shall take into account—(a) the stage in the proceedings for the offence at which the offender indicated his intention to plead guilty; and (b) the circumstances in which this indication was given”. For more see: Baker (2004), p. 383; Padfield (2008), p. 322; Spencer (2004), p. 179.
- 40.
Goldstein and Marcus (1977–1978), p. 241.
- 41.
Turner and Weigend (2013), p. 1400.
- 42.
Waltoś (1992), p. 37. Moreover, consensual disposition of a criminal proceedings on the basis of procedural agreements was recommended by the Council of Europe as a method of making the administration of justice more effective: Recommendation R(87)18, 17 September 1987.
- 43.
Waltoś (1997), p. 25.
- 44.
Langbein (1978–1979), pp. 267–268.
- 45.
Damaška (1986), p. 100.
- 46.
Damaška (1986), p. 226.
- 47.
- 48.
Damaška (1986), p. 20.
- 49.
- 50.
Langbein (1978–1979), p. 467.
- 51.
- 52.
Bundesgerichtshof judgment, 7 June 1983 (BGHSt 210, 214).
- 53.
- 54.
Langbein (1978–1979), p. 460.
- 55.
Or even Millionärsparagraph. For more criticism see: Volk (2006), p. 114; Tulkens (2004), pp. 656–657; Herrmannt (1973–1974), p. 494. Such a sentence is not registered in the criminal record, so it is considered to constitute a method of “decriminalization” or “contraventionalization” of certain behaviours. This provision has always played the most important role in economic cases.
- 56.
- 57.
- 58.
Grzegorczyk (2008), pp. 736–739.
- 59.
- 60.
- 61.
Lach (2015), p. 137.
- 62.
Ibidem, p. 138.
- 63.
Compare the views presented by Andrzej Zoll, a Member of the Codification Commission of Criminal Law, expressed during a Conference: III Kraków Penalist Forum, 6th of February 2015, Kraków, Jagiellonian University.
- 64.
- 65.
Langer (2006), pp. 226 and 252.
- 66.
As in: LaFave et al. (2009), p. 1005.
- 67.
- 68.
- 69.
- 70.
A related reason was that the defence’s freedom to mount its own case provides it with ample opportunity to spread ideas contrary to human rights values. See: Damaška (2008), p. 357.
- 71.
However, we can also take into consideration a “modified real offence sentencing principle”, which allows a court to determine a sentence also on the grounds of some elements of the offence that he was charged with in the beginning by a prosecutor, but finally these charged were dropped as a result of the bargain—and only on the grounds of the offence that the accused admitted to commit. See: Schuon (2010), pp. 82–83; Hessick and Saujani (2002), p. 189. Also in: Steinborn (2005), p. 68.
- 72.
When presenting to the defendant his suggestion as to the sentence in return for pleading guilty, the prosecutor de facto presents his theory on the trial that would have taken place, complete with his opinion on the possible sentence. This is the way to establish a sort of a “shadow-of-trial”—the trial that does not exist and, in the case of pleading guilty, will never take place. Litigants bargain toward settlement in the shadow of expected trial outcomes. In this model, rational parties forecast the expected trial outcome and strike bargains that leave both sides better off by splitting the saved costs of trial. The classic shadow-of-trial model predicts that the likelihood of conviction at trial and the likely post-trial sentence largely determine plea bargains. In consequence, the vision of the trial presented to the defendant differs depending on the prosecutor and the strength of the evidence collected by him. See: Bibas (2004), p. 2467.
- 73.
- 74.
- 75.
- 76.
Such data can be found in: Combs (2002), pp. 90 et seq.
- 77.
- 78.
See: Petrig (2008), p. 28.
- 79.
- 80.
As M. Damaška, puts it: The “desire to set the historical record straight, and to restore the integrity of human remembrance, is greatly strengthened by the belief that truth telling about the past is a necessary precondition for reconciliation and avoidance of future conflicts” (2008), p. 336. See for similar observations also in: Clark (2009), pp. 415–436; Harmon (2009), pp. 176–182; Combs (2002), pp. 150–151; Knoops (2005), pp. 264–266.
- 81.
Turner and Weigend (2013), p. 1406.
- 82.
- 83.
- 84.
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, IT-96-22, Trial Chamber, 5 March 1998, § 21.
- 85.
Tulkens (2004), pp. 641 and 669.
- 86.
1st Annual Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. Doc A/49/342, z 29.8.1994, § 74. A tendency described in detail in: Schuon (2010), pp. 196–197; D’Ascoli (2011), pp. 178–179; Tochilovsky (2008), p. 263.
- 87.
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, IT-96-22, Appeals Chamber, 7 October 1997, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, § 2.
- 88.
- 89.
As in the case of: Prosecutor v. Deronjić, IT-02-61, Appeals Chamber, 20 June 2005, § 47.
- 90.
E.g. in: Prosecutor v. Nikolić, IT-02-60/1, Trial Chamber, 2 December 2003, § 52.
- 91.
- 92.
Turner and Weigend (2013), p. 1382.
- 93.
In England and Wales, to address this problem a special procedure was developed of holding a “Newton hearing” (named after the first case in which the procedure was established) to resolve doubts. During this hearing, both sides present arguments with a view to the prosecution to prove its version of the facts “beyond reasonable doubt”: “if it cannot, sentence is passed in line with the version claimed by the defence”. Cit after: Baker (2004), p. 382.
- 94.
Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, IT-02-60/1, Trial Chamber, 2 December 2003, § 52 and 70.
- 95.
Turner and Weigend (2013), p. 1382.
- 96.
Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjić, IT-02-61, Appeals Chamber, 20 June 2005.
- 97.
Prosecutor v. Babić, IT-03-72, Trial Chamber, 29 June 2004. Described also in: Turner and Weigend (2013), p. 1383.
- 98.
Prosecutor v. Juvénal Rugambarara, ICTR-00-59, Trial Chamber, 16 November 2007, § 6. In this case, however, also other mitigating circumstances turned out to be decisive for the severity of the sentence: the accused’s behavior after the committing of crimes. He was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment and did not appeal.
- 99.
E.g. Prosecutor v. Plavšić, IT-00-39&40/1, Appeals Chamber, 27 February 2003, § 109.
- 100.
In the case: Prosecutor v. Todorović, IT-95-9/1, Trial Chamber, 31 July 2001, § 80.
- 101.
Prosecutor v. Babić, IT-03-72, Trial Chamber, 29 June 2004.
- 102.
Prosecutor v. Zelenović, IT-96-23/2, Appeal Chamber, 31 October 2007, § 46.
- 103.
The case of Prosecutor v. Sikirica, IT-95-8, Trial Chamber, 13 November 2001, § 150–151. More in: Combs (2002), p. 126.
- 104.
- 105.
Combs (2003), pp. 929–933.
- 106.
Prosecutor v. Bralo, IT-95-17, Trial Chamber, 7 December 2005, § 73.
- 107.
Prosecutor v. Jelisić, IT-95-10, Trial Chamber, 14 December 1999, § 127.
- 108.
As it will be later explained, the prosecution did withdraw 8 of the 39 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, but it did so as a result of evidentiary deficiencies, not to grant Jelisić a concession—the history of this defendant presented in: Combs (2007), p. 62; and Combs (2002), pp. 115–117 and 142.
- 109.
Prosecutor v. Banović, IT-02-65/1, Trial Chamber, 28 October 2003, § 68.
- 110.
Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, IT-98-32, Appeal Chamber, 25 February 2004, § 299.
- 111.
Prosecutor v. Bralo, IT-95-17, Trial Chamber, 7 December 2005, § 81.
- 112.
Prosecutor v. Zelenović, IT-96-23/2, Appeals Chamber, 31 October 2007, § 68.
- 113.
Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, ICTR 97-23-S, Trial Chamber, 4 September 1998.
- 114.
Prosecutor v. Serushago, ICTR-98-39, Trial Chamber, 5 February 1999. In detail in: Bohlander (2001), p. 152.
- 115.
Prosecutor v. Vincent Rutaganira, ICTR-95-1C-T, Trial Chamber, 14 March 2005. Also in this case the accused did not appeal, what could have confirmed the authenticity of the expressed remorse.
- 116.
Prosecutor v. Joseph Serugendo, ICTR-2005-84-I, Trial Chamber, 12 June 2006, § 38. In more detail: Combs (2002), pp. 135–136.
- 117.
Prosecutor v. Paul Bisengimana, ICTR-00-60, Trial Chamber, 13 April 2006, § 128–131.
- 118.
- 119.
- 120.
- 121.
Prosecutor v. Simić, IT-95-9/2, Trial Chamber, 17 October 2002. Noteworthy, on the 4th of November 2003 the convicted was conditionally released.
- 122.
Prosecutor v. Obrenović, IT-02-60/2, Trial Chamber, 10 December 2003.
- 123.
Prosecutor v. Plavšić, IT-00-39 & 40/1, Appeals Chamber, 27 February 2003, § 66–81.
- 124.
Prosecutor v. Deronjić, IT-02-61, Trial Chamber, 25 July 2005.
- 125.
See: Combs (2002), p. 140.
- 126.
Prosecutor v. Simić, IT-95-9/2, Trial Chamber, 17 October 2002, § 84.
- 127.
Prosecutor v. Bralo, IT-95-17, Trial Chamber, 7 December 2005, § 6.
- 128.
Cit. after: Combs (2002), p. 120.
- 129.
Prosecutor v. Todorović, IT-95-9/1, Trial Chamber, 31 July 2001, § 79.
- 130.
Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, IT-02-60/1, Trial Chamber, 2 December 2003, § 156.
- 131.
Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, IT-02-60/1, Appeals Chamber, 8 March 2006, § 98–115. See for more details: Combs (2007), pp. 79 et seq.
- 132.
Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, IT-94-2-A, Appeals Chamber, 4 February 2005, § 89.
- 133.
- 134.
Resolution of the Security Council No. S/RES/1503 (2003), § 5–6, http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_1503_2003_en.pdf. Accessed 12 Feb 2015; No. 1534 S/RES/1534 (2004), § 5, http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_1534_2004_en.pdf. Accessed 12 Feb 2015 and then Resolution No. 1966, S/RES/1966(2010), § 3, which called on the tribunals to take all possible measures to expeditiously complete all their remaining work as provided by this resolution no later than 31 December 2014.
- 135.
- 136.
Prosecutor v. Jelisić, IT-95-10, Trial Chamber, 5 July 2001.
- 137.
Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, IT-94-24, Trial Chamber, 4 February 2005.
- 138.
- 139.
Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, IT-02-60/1, Trial Chamber, § 67.
- 140.
Beresford (2001), p. 65.
- 141.
- 142.
- 143.
So: Guariglia and Hochmayr (2008), p. 1229.
- 144.
Lewis (2001), p. 547.
- 145.
See: Terrier (2002), p. 1287.
- 146.
Examples of such a solution can be found in the case law of the ICTY, e.g. in: Prosecutor v. Jelisić, IT-95-10-T, Trial Chamber, 14 December 1999, § 127.
- 147.
See: Guariglia and Hochmayr (2008), p. 1230.
- 148.
See: Schabas (2010), p. 779.
- 149.
- 150.
Turner and Weigend (2013), p. 1391.
- 151.
Guariglia and Hochmayr (2008), p. 1231.
- 152.
- 153.
See: Guariglia and Hochmayr (2008), p. 1232.
- 154.
Turner and Weigend (2013), pp. 1390–1391.
- 155.
- 156.
Till 1.2.2015.
- 157.
ICC-01/04-02/06.
- 158.
ICC-02/05-02/09.
- 159.
Terrier (2002), p. 1288.
- 160.
- 161.
Petrig (2008), pp. 1–31.
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Kuczyńska, H. (2015). Influence of the Prosecutor on the Consensual Termination of Criminal Proceedings. In: The Accusation Model Before the International Criminal Court. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17626-0_6
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