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Abstract

The blanket license allows music users the immediate use of all musical compositions and provides greater flexibility in the unlimited choice of the works in a PRO’s repertory.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Patry (2011, p. 181).

  2. 2.

    See the analysis of Einhorn (2006); Einhorn and Kurlantzick (2003) for more here. This “all or nothing” blanket license—as the only viable option for local television stations to obtain the performance rights to the music of SESAC’s affiliates—is featured prominently in the Meredith Corp. v. SESAC LLC (2014) lawsuit.

  3. 3.

    See Nye (2000); Sobel (1983).

  4. 4.

    See Allen Consulting Group (2003); Besen et al. (1992); Jain (2008); Liebowitz and Margolis (2009); Nye (2000); Sobel (1983).

  5. 5.

    See Brabec and Brabec (2011, pp. 397–427).

  6. 6.

    See “The Lion King’ musical breaks box office record with $6.2 billion worldwide’: http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/theater-arts/lion-king-musical-breaks-box-office-record-6-2-billion-worldwide-article-1.1948400, September 22, 2014.

  7. 7.

    See London et al. (2009) for their analysis of the financial problems facing playwrights.

  8. 8.

    See Brabec and Brabec (2011, p. 311).

  9. 9.

    See Pitt (2010).

  10. 10.

    See Patissier (2012). The reporting of PRO licensing data is often primitive. Important licensing fees and royalty payments price deflators and other valuable statistical tools are often missing from these compiled industry reports, adding to the lack of transparency in music licensing.

  11. 11.

    See the extensive discussion in Boldrin and Levine (2009); Einhorn (2006); Katz (20052006).

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Pitt, I.L. (2015). Traditional Blanket License. In: Direct Licensing and the Music Industry. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17653-6_4

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